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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Douglas Wayland Foster 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Geography 
 
September 2015 
 
Title: Militarism in Tajikistan: Realities of Post-Soviet Nation 
Building 
 
 Shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the newly 
independent Central Asian republic of Tajikistan fell into a 
brutal civil war (1992-97) that exacerbated internal divisions 
based on ethno-regional groupings. In the following decade, the 
new government formed its own armed forces while maintaining the 
presence of the Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division in the 
country. This made Tajikistan the only former Soviet republic 
that did not inherit the Soviet units located within its 
territory; thus, Tajikistan formed its own national military. 
 This dissertation examines the effect of military service on 
the development of national sentiments in the Tajikistan,  
focusing on three main points: 1)the practice of military 
recruitment, 2) the conditions within the national military, and 
3) the available option for Tajikistan nationals to serve in 
active military units of the Russian Federation.  
 The autocratic Tajikistan government’s state symbolism is 
associated with the importance and glory of the military. However, 
the population has shown a strong distaste for service in this 
military, and the state’s approach to recruitment is both a 
 v 
 
response to this aversion and a contributor to it. I show that 
military recruiters’ use of an illegal but tacitly accepted 
practice of impressment called “oblava” (Russian: roundup) during 
bi-annual conscription drives has negative consequences for the 
development of national sentiments and state legitimacy. This 
conscription method is coupled with a lack of pay, training, 
adequate food, and health care during a member’s service. The 
conditions within the Tajikistan military stand in contrast to 
those within the Russian military, which has units based in 
Tajikistan and into which Tajikistan nationals may enlist as 
contract soldiers. I conclude by conceptualizing the majority of 
military service in Tajikistan as the state use of biopower to 
control young males in a territory with a rapid population growth 
rate but few economic opportunities while relying on the Russian 
Federation for its existential defense. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 In Dushanbe, Tajikistan, two young men board a marshrutka 
(minibus taxi) as they commute around this Central Asian 
republic’s capital city. Shortly after climbing in, they discover 
they are caught in a trap. Military recruitment officers have 
commissioned the taxi for oblava (Russian: roundup): the targeted 
impressment of Tajikistani males into the republic’s armed forces 
-- a situation nearly every male citizen seeks to avoid. Quickly 
understanding their peril, one of the men calls his “tagha” 
(uncle on mother’s side; in southern Tajikistan, vernacular for 
‘sponsor’), who is a man with connections who will tell the 
recruiters to let the caller go free. While the first male is 
able to calmly escape conscription, he could not directly help 
his friend, who is on his own to find a way out (Respondent 1 
2013). The other verbally resists, citing the technical 
illegality of oblava and stating his rights as a student to be 
deferred from conscription. Immediately the military recruiter 
asks if he is an ethnic Pamiri from the Gorno-Badakhshan 
Autonomous Oblast (GBAO).  
“I said yes. After that, they let us go. One of the reasons 
they let me go is my ethnic background. They know that 
normally Pamiris tend to be more educated people than the 
average citizens” (Respondent 15 2014). 
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The above episode is suggestive of two important components 
of this study. First, in Tajikistan, ethno-regional identity 
matters. The immediate inquiry into a specific group identity by 
the recruitment officer highlights this condition, though its 
importance is linked to many aspects of daily life (Nourzhanov & 
Bleuer 2013; Tunçer-Kılavuz 2009). Second, the government of the 
Republic of Tajikistan (RT)1 believes it must rely on direct and 
illegal coercive methods to fulfill its manpower needs for its 
national military – while simultaneously positioning the military 
as a symbol of the Tajik nation. However, the RT has been 
selective regarding which units receive adequate training and 
material support, and most units appear deficient in some of the 
most basic requirements for military personnel (food, clothing, 
ammunition). Similarly, there seems to be little in the way of 
military training for most of these units. For these reasons 
(among others addressed in this dissertation) military service is 
widely disdained in Tajikistan, raising important questions about 
the stability of the state and the role of the military therein. 
Why has the RT opted to invest so little capital (both human and 
financial) in its military when it consistently draws public 
attention to the contemporary geopolitical threats emanating from 
Afghanistan? How does the presence of the Russian 201st Motorized 
Rifle Division (MRD) in Tajikistan embody the RT’s reliance on 
the Russian Federation for its political stability? Lastly, what 
                                                          
1 I use RT to specifically denote the state of Tajikistan, and I 
use ‘Tajikistan’ to represent the country more generally. 
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role do ethno-regional identities play in the decision of male 
citizens to serve in the RT security forces? 
Investigating how these realities intersect and shape one 
another is valuable for understanding the development of national 
sentiments in Tajikistan. Tajikistan’s ethno-regional identities 
represent a significant obstacle to the development of a strong 
national identity. Members of these different groups (which I 
describe in Chapter II) serve together in the RT armed forces, 
which are positioned by the government as the embodiment of the 
Tajik nation. In many countries, the armed forces play an 
important role in promoting and sustaining national identity 
(Shils 1962). Yet if Tajikistani males largely disdain service in 
the military and the state uses physical coercion to secure 
conscripts, the development of national sentiments through the 
military in the RT faces serious challenges. This thesis is 
fundamentally concerned with understanding the nature and 
significance of those challenges. To set the stage, it is useful 
to consider the broad outlines of the RT’s post-independence 
history.  
 Shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the newly 
independent republic fell into a brutal civil war (1992-97) that 
claimed the lives of over 23,000 people and created more than 
100,000 refugees (Mukomel 2001). The war started when 
demonstrations in Dushanbe opposing a recent election escalated 
and groups seeking to alter the status quo (Pamiris, democrats, 
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nationalists and Islamists – see Chapter II) deposed the 
government. Simultaneous counterdemonstrations assembled that 
supported the previous regime, made up mostly of Tajiks from the 
south of the country. Violence erupted when groups on both sides 
mobilized supporters and armed them to form irregular militias. 
The ensuing war quickly transformed into a bloodbath targeting 
civilian victims for revenge and petty theft. Two aspects of the 
violence are notable: 1) the allegiance of combatants could be 
loosely defined by ethnicity and/or region of origin and 2) both 
sides’ pursued ethno-regional identity-based mass murder as a 
tactic/strategy. While the causes of the war were not primarily 
based on ethnic and regional cleavages, as the violence 
progressed each side increasingly defined their enemies by 
specific ethno-regional identity (Uzbeks and Kulobis as the anti-
opposition; Garmis and Pamiris as the opposition). This form of 
targeting was imprecise; there were people from all ethno-
regional groups on both sides of the war and many preferred to 
remain neutral, if possible.  
 The contemporary influence of ethno-regional identity upon 
national sentiments is undoubtedly affected by the civil war. 
Further, how these identities interact with each other within the 
RT military serves as an important gauge of the institution’s 
symbolic role in the development of national sentiment. Equally 
intriguing is the direct support given by foreign militaries 
(Russia & Uzbekistan) to the pro-government militias’ cause. The 
support of Russia has been on-going since the collapse of the 
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USSR; it has taken the form of a semi-permanent basing of the 
201st Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) in Tajikistan since the end 
of the war—an arrangement that will likely continue for the 
foreseeable future.  
This brief but bloody history poses questions about 
subnational identity within the contemporary RT armed forces and 
the prospects for the development of a more cohesive national 
sentiment in a state with strong ethno-regional cleavages. Given 
that national militaries are often seen as powerful symbols of 
‘imagined communities’ (B. Anderson 1991) constructed by the 
state, their ability to serve as a legitimate representative of 
the national population is relevant. Similarly, the presence of 
foreign militaries on national soil may pose challenges to the 
legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its people.  
Tajikistan (population: 8.27 million (PRB 2014)), like 
other post-Soviet Central Asian republics, represents a state 
where the titular nationality and border regime are the result of 
extensive social engineering efforts on the part of Soviet 
authorities (see Map 1.1). The results of those efforts are 
perhaps incomplete; in addition to its civil war, the RT has 
poorly delineated borders with China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, 
and people largely from one ethno-regional group head the top 
levels of government and the security services. Despite these 
issues, or perhaps because of them, foreign states with regional 
hegemonic intentions have based military units in Tajikistan 
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through agreements with the government. Foreign states’ desires 
for military presence in Tajikistan is driven by concerns about 
radical Islam, narcotics trafficking and general political 
instability.  
 In the other four former Soviet Republics in Central Asia, 
in-country Soviet military units were converted into the national 
militaries after independence; Tajikistan was the only such 
Republic that did not inherit the units based there. The 201st 
MRD, based in the Tajik SSR and subsequently independent 
Tajikistan, was instead retained by the Russian Federation. As 
the civil war progressed, the RT commissioned its own formal 
military to fight alongside the militias supporting the 
government, Uzbekistani forces and the Russian 201st MRD. The 
final peace agreement, signed in 1997 in Moscow, led to the 
subsequent integration of some of the militias that had fought 
for the opposition into the RT’s military units. Today, the 
Russian 201st MRD remains in Tajikistan, as the Russian 
Federation and the RT have recently signed an agreement for 
basing rights that extends until 2042 (RFE/RL’s Tajik Service 
2013).  
How has Tajik national identity been transformed with 
independence? How can this transformation be measured? In many 
states, national identity is strongly associated with military  
service and symbolism. Since the RT had no national military at 
independence, it is reasonable to postulate that the state might 
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Map 1.1. Tajikistan  
 
seek to grow national sentiments among its citizenry through 
everyday ties to, and popular representation of, its new armed 
services. This dissertation examines militarism’s role in the 
production of national sentiments among the population through 
questions related to conscription, military experience, and 
foreign presence in the republic.  
The research findings presented in this dissertation are 
based on a systematic examination of local and international 
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media coverage, ethnographic interviews, and participant 
observation. The news media has consistently covered oblava, 
often with the assistance of non-governmental legal organizations 
that seek to expose this process and defend illegally conscripted 
males. The media has also addressed issues related to the basing 
of foreign militaries in Tajikistan. The most prominent media 
outlets following these issues include (but are not limited to) 
Asia +, Ozodagon, and Radio Ozodi (Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty); also insightful are the blog websites of foreign 
observers, such as Eurasianet.org. International news media, 
especially those based in Russia (RIA Novosti/The Voice of 
Russia) have also been valuable.  
My semi-structured interviews were focused on males who 
have experienced the conscription process, including oblava, 
whether or not they actually enlisted in the military. Of those 
who have served, I limited my interviews to veterans as opposed 
to active duty soldiers in order to avoid putting the latter in a 
compromised position. I employed two research assistants both as 
translators and participant recruiters, who were able to identify 
many participants and arrange meetings with them. One was based 
in Dushanbe and covered most of the country, while the other 
lived in Khorog and worked solely in the GBAO. Participants were 
asked to complete a short questionnaire form that ascertained 
their military unit, ethno-regional identity and years of 
service. During the interviews I asked questions focused on the 
recruitment process and oblava (if applicable) experienced by 
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themselves and their friends and/or family, dedovshchina, and 
general life in the RT military. Specifically, I asked how ethno-
regional identity shaped their experiences positively and/or 
negatively; that is, did soldiers from the same region of origin 
seek each other out for social bonding, protection from 
dedovshchina, or potential advancement. 
The participant observation portion of my research took 
place during the course of visits to military bases throughout 
the RT. I also toured a few border outposts along the frontier 
with Afghanistan and a training facility in Dushanbe. During 
these visits I was able to experience first-hand the conditions 
under which RT military personnel operate. I toured the interior 
of different border zastavy (Russian: outposts) along the border 
with Afghanistan; one constructed with U.S. assistance funds and 
two more representative of typical RT installations. Most of my 
observations were visual, but I did have the opportunity to ask a 
few questions of a conscript in one location and a base officer 
in another.  
 The specific empirical focus of the study is centered on 
three basic questions. The construction of nationalism is often 
produced dialectically, with domestic social bonding occurring in 
conjunction with the identification and positioning of an outside 
Other. (J. Anderson 1986). The prominent role played by 
militaries in this dialectical relationship makes them central to 
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efforts to link the population to the state. Against this 
backdrop, I explore the following questions:  
 How do the cadre and enlisted personnel of the security 
forces shape and reflect ethno-regional identity in 
Tajikistan? 
 In what ways do recruitment and conscription practices 
hinder or improve the development of national sentiments 
among Tajikistani citizens? 
 How has the presence of foreign military units stationed in 
Tajikistan affected the government’s investment in its own 
security services? How are these units viewed differently 
from Tajikistani forces?  
 Focusing on the intersection of militarism and nationalism, 
these questions provide insights into the everyday lives of 
citizens in Tajikistan, as well as the geopolitics surrounding 
the region. In examining the everyday interactions with the 
military, the study seeks to unpack the manner in which it 
embodies other aspects of life in Tajikistan where average 
citizens come into contact with agents of the state. Tajikistan’s 
social cleavages and recent political conflict provide the RT 
with powerful incentives to forge a cohesive national identity 
that surpasses – or at least limits – the influence of 
subnational sentiments. Given the role of military symbolism and 
ideals in nationalistic discourse, building a military inclusive 
of all ethno-regional identities in Tajikistan would seem 
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paramount to the state’s own legitimacy. Further, the presence of 
outside military forces highlight the interest of foreign powers 
in the site and situation of Tajikistan’s territory, not to 
mention its stability.  
 How the RT military recruits its soldiers and integrates 
its various ethno-regional groups into its ranks is important to 
understanding how power is exercised in this poor country. Public 
reactions to these practices also show how citizens perceive the 
state and the importance of public service; a critical point in a 
post-Soviet state where public service carried significant social 
meaning. Understanding the relationship between the RT and Russia 
through the basing of the latter’s forces in Tajikistan provides 
an instructive case to examine how hegemons wield the combination 
of hard and soft power to establish and maintain dependencies 
among their spheres of influence. The largely positive perception 
of Russia and its military by RT citizens relative to their own 
armed forces is particularly significant, in many ways 
challenging the conception of Tajikistan as a sovereign state. If 
we are to understand how these dependent geopolitical 
relationships develop and are maintained, Tajikistan provides a 
valuable case study. 
 
Background Considerations 
The power of violence to construct geopolitical hegemony 
and shape the world map has been well documented by geographers. 
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However, geography’s inquiry into societal militarization is more 
recent and has focused primarily on the Anglophone world, as 
noted by Woodward. But many of its premises are equally relevant 
to post-colonial societies. Cultural-spatial patterns may differ, 
but military institutions share similar goals and organizational 
structures. For Woodward, it is the state’s infrastructure and 
capacity for military violence that must be investigated and 
conceptualized.  
Military geographies, therefore, need to be understood not 
only as the study of the causes and consequences of armed 
conflict, but also as the study of those military 
activities which make armed conflict possible (Woodward 
2005, 730). 
 
The visible impact of military power networks upon the landscape 
and their influence on the social, political and economic spheres 
is notable in states such as the U.S. and U.K., where they are 
seen as embodying and advancing national sentiment. For example 
Bernazzoli & Flint, quoting Bacevich, note that “Ronald Reagan 
reconstructed a heroic, virtuous image of American troops, in 
which ‘soldierly ideals and exploits’ were glorified and their 
images used to inspire American citizens to live up to their 
potential to ‘perform great deeds’ (Bernazzoli & Flint 2009, 401; 
Bacevich 2005, 106–7).  Woodward links the idea of rural England 
and its associated imagery to national identity, a landscape that 
is then transferred to far flung territories to legitimize 
military action. In places such as the Falkland Islands, for 
example, the media transformed the islands’ landscape “into 
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something like Britain through idealized geographical 
representations” (2004, 122).  
The premise that national militaries provide a cohesive 
institution, wherein differing subnational groups (e.g. races, 
ethnicities and/or regions of origin) may work together for a 
common civic purpose (national defense), is an attractive one to 
many statesmen. The general assumption that loyalty to the state, 
and thus stronger national sentiments, can be developed through 
military service carries significant weight in the post-colonial 
world. The influence of the constituting colonial power on these 
militaries is typically wide-ranging. It is particularly strong 
in post-Soviet Central Asia; all of the militaries of these 
republics follow the Soviet model of conscription, training and 
doctrine (Marten 2005).  
Simonsen’s analysis of the reconstruction of the Afghan 
military in the post 9/11 period has many parallels with that of 
Tajikistan. Geographically contiguous, constituted by outside 
powers, and comprised of a patchwork of group identities 
spatially patterned but also intermixed, both states see the 
value of militaries as integrative institutions. For Simonsen, 
such notions are mired in complexity.  
In settings where little or no sense of ‘nationhood’ 
transcending ethnic or sectarian boundaries remains, 
establishing legitimacy by ensuring that the composition of 
new military forces mirrors the population as a whole will 
only work to the extent that such representation is seen as 
desirable by the population and its political and military 
leaders (2009, 1486). 
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Tajikistan and Afghanistan share much in the way of ethno-
regional identities, including Tajik, Uzbek, and Pamiri groups. 
However, the Soviet experience, with its social engineering and 
modernization, represents a significant departure from many of 
the everyday similarities that bound these cross-border groups in 
the past. Still, the strength of ethno-regionalism in Tajikistan 
makes Simonsen’s analysis relevant here, in immediately related 
but also different ways. The connection between regional groups 
of Tajiks or among Pamiris, Uzbeks, etc, remains, as do tribal 
and/or clan structures. However, the legacy of the Soviet system 
adds the existence of patron-client networks of loyalty that 
often cross ethno-regional lines. Additionally, the recognition 
and appreciation of a more centralized state, established through 
the Soviet system of republics (not to mention autonomous 
oblasts, i.e. GBAO), produces a political landscape in which 
controlling the state and its apparatus is perhaps seen as being 
more valuable in Tajikistan than in the much more provincially 
divided Afghanistan.  
Shils’ work on the development of militaries in post-
colonial states draws attention to the juxtaposition between 
‘traditional’ societies and the ‘modern’ nature of military 
organizations. To be successful, state militarization must 
account for traditional forms of social organization that may 
conflict with its institutional structure, including the region 
of origin of military members and the separation of the military 
from political party affiliations.   
15 
(The military) is ubiquitous, it recruits from all parts of 
the country, and, most important of all, it is national in 
its symbolism. The fact that it is organized and technical 
checks or moderates the passions which otherwise overflow 
onto national symbols. These features, which make the 
military into a nation-building institution, also affect 
the intensity of national sentiment of the officer class 
(Shils 1962, 32). 
 
Shil’s point that the organized and technical aspects of the 
military keep fervent nationalism in check within its members is 
based upon its functionality (its focus on acting as a military 
force and not merely a tool of political symbolism) and how 
representative it is of the populous. When that representation is 
disproportional (particularly in the officer corps), its value as 
a symbol of national sentiments is likely to be diminished. 
Presumably, this diminished value is due to an unbalanced degree 
of hard power in the hands of one or two groups, who then favor 
their own goals over those of the whole state. 
Sociologists have long explored the social constructions 
surrounding group identity, nationalization and armed conflict. 
Malešević (2010) views the exhibition of intense nationalism 
during warfare as the result, but not a cause, of national 
sentiments actively constructed by the state and civil society. 
Emphasizing a hegemonic relationship that is reinforced from the 
ground-up, he notes that “this is not a one-way (top-down) 
process but works in both directions: the state apparatus 
utilizes its key institutions for ideological dissemination” 
(from the educational system, mass media, military conscription 
to welfare and citizenship obligations) (p.192–3). Such 
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constructions are imperative for the state to establish and 
maintain its sovereignty and create legitimacy. In cases where 
national sentiments and legitimacy are weakly developed, the 
state is likely to establish and promote institutions and 
practices that produce and reproduce its hegemony. To this end, 
military symbolism can be a powerful tool and a potential 
integrator, but only if it is seen positively by the various 
identity groups that comprise the population.  
While Tajikistan is arguably still a post-conflict state, 
most average citizens’ contact with the military is through the 
conscription process. Though scholars and policy makers alike 
have debated the issue of military conscription and volunteerism, 
these terms have different connotations outside of the West, and 
in the post-Soviet states specifically. As previously noted, 
geographers conceptualizing the intersection of citizenship and 
militarism (Cowen 2005; 2006; 2007; Flint 2008; Bernazzoli and 
Flint 2009; Woodward 2004; 2005) concentrate on experiences in 
North America and the U.K. The notion of military service in the 
Soviet Union was a powerful one that permeated many aspects of 
daily life. For example, reverence for veterans of the Great 
Patriotic War is exhibited on each May 9 through parades and the 
drinking of vodka to fallen soldiers. In Tajikistan, it was 
common during Soviet times for fathers to ask their daughters’ 
potential suitors whether or not they had performed their 
military service yet; those who had not were typically prohibited 
from consideration (Respondent 2 2013). This practice was a test 
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of the suitor’s integrity. As this dissertation addresses, this 
positive connotation has not been realized by the RT armed 
services. Indeed, in the eyes of many citizens, the military 
serves as a prison of sorts, offering little in the way of pay, 
training, health care or even sustenance. Nonetheless, the regime 
of President Emomali Rakhmon has continued to position it as an 
important contributor to state sovereignty and as a symbol of the 
Tajik nation--insisting that service within the military is 
obligatory and necessary to the nation’s survival. 
In Tajikistan, men aged 18-27 are notified of conscription 
via mail to their place of residence to report to their local 
voenkomat (Russian: recruitment office) for processing into the 
service. While this legal conscription process is in place, many 
more men are impressed into service illegally through the common 
practice called oblava mentioned in the opening of this chapter. 
Oblava consists of plain-clothes recruiters targeting and 
physically securing military-aged males and transporting them to 
the voenkomat against their will in a manner similar to a police 
arrest. It should be unsurprising that such practices do little 
to generate positive sentiments for the state among the 
population and stands in direct contrast to any imagery of the 
military as an attractive national symbol. The negative 
perception of the RT military is further exacerbated by the 
presence of the Russian military forces based in Tajikistan.  
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 Tajikistan’s territory has received growing attention from 
hegemons seeking influence and power projection, creating a space 
militarized in ways never before seen in its modern history. The 
Russian 201st MRD stands in sharp contrast to the RT units in 
terms of professionalism, capabilities and benefits. Enlistment 
in the 201st MRD is open to citizens of Tajikistan provided they 
meet the basic requirements of strong Russian language skills and 
being in good physical constitution, requirements that are 
difficult to meet for average Tajikistani males. By sanctioning 
the basing the 201st in Tajikistan, the Rakhmon administration is 
arguably making a statement about its trust in its own military 
as a functional institution of defense, not to mention integrator 
of its fractured ethno-regional identities. Coupled with the 
smaller-scale presence of NATO forces, including U.S. Special 
Operation Command (SOC) units, Tajikistan has become an 
increasingly militarized space. In contrast to the Soviet period, 
during which the 201st MRD and Soviet border guard troops were 
based in the Tajik SSR, now there are units from multiple foreign 
states in addition to the 201st and the RT armed forces developed 
after independence. 
 By examining the case of Tajikistan, I seek to open new 
avenues of research into the geographies of militarism beyond 
Anglophone regions, whilst empirically exposing and 
conceptualizing the structures of power of the Republic’s 
government. Geographers have studied U.S. and U.K. military bases 
abroad (Yamazaki 2011; Higate and Henry 2011), but by looking at 
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the simultaneous development of a post-Soviet national army in a 
post-conflict state hosting the forces of competing hegemonic 
powers, I provide a new and instructive case study where 
militarism, critical geopolitics and ethnic geographies collide. 
Such a case poses many important questions related to how spatial 
patterns shape and are shaped by social structures and how they 
reflect the human agency of geopolitical decision makers. This 
case study is significant to understand how military power is 
produced and reproduced through coercion and consent outside of 
the West and in the post-Soviet world specifically.  
 Critical military geographies in the developing world are 
different from those found in the contexts of hegemonic powers. 
While military institutions and structures maintain many 
commonalities, the shaping of the landscape and population by 
military power in the developing world is influenced by the 
existence of different territorial arrangements and colonial 
legacies. Further, the presence of foreign military bases 
(usually hegemonic powers) or intermittent cooperative 
interventions complicates the expression of military power and 
societal militarization in these spaces. This dissertation pushes 
the relatively recent exploration into critical military 
geographies into the rest of the world, asking many of the same 
questions, but within a context that is more representative of 
global political-territorial norms: multinational states governed 
by weakly legitimate political regimes that are caught up in 
larger-scale geopolitical dynamics.  
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Chapter Summaries 
 Chapter II outlines the context imperative for placing the 
case study chapters. The first section situates Tajikistan within 
the framework of the world system and the geopolitical challenges 
confronting it. This section is comprised of three subsections 
that lay out both empirical facts and conceptual frameworks for 
the study—situating it within the context of the critical 
geopolitics and militarism literatures The first subsection 
summarizes the Soviet construction (delineation) of the Central 
Asian republics generally, and Tajikistan specifically. The 
second analyzes the contextual literature on the immediate post-
Soviet period and the Tajik Civil War (1992-97). The third 
subsection summarizes critical work on militarism. The importance 
of these contexts cannot be understated. The decades-long 
administration of Tajikistan by the Soviet Union defined not only 
its social and political structure; Moscow oversaw the initial 
(and only historical) delineation of its territorial outline and, 
in the modern sense, constructed the modern Tajik nation through 
its nationality policies. The brutal civil war that followed 
independence was not a continuation of old territorial rivalries 
or ethnic hatred, but rather was directly related to the legacy 
of Soviet administration, nationality policies, and the collapse 
of economic subsidies from the center. One legacy of this war is 
the raised significance of ethno-regional identity, which sadly 
became the basis for targeted killings perpetrated by both sides. 
To understand how identity matters within the contemporary RT 
21 
military, we must understand how it was utilized for these 
nefarious purposes during the war, and how the current regime and 
its senior military commanders largely hail from a specific 
region of Tajikistan to the exclusion of most others. Regarding 
the second subsection, geographers studying critical militarism 
have developed the framework of this new subfield of political 
geography. In order to critically examine the role of militarism 
in Tajikistan, we must first understand what forms of analysis 
have been performed in previous research. This study can then be 
placed appropriately within the context of these previous works 
and its value in opening new doors can be revealed. This 
subsection also analyzes the intersection of ethnic identity and 
military service, with special attention paid to the Soviet and 
Russian military experiences. 
 Chapter III develops the theoretical framework I use to 
interpret data gathered through mixed methods in Chapters V and 
VI. It lays out the design and goals of ethnographic interviews. 
I discuss the use of news media and regional Central Asian 
analytical blogs. While it is necessary to describe the methods 
employed in the data collection process, it is particularly 
important to explain the difficulties in performing ethnographic 
research on what can be perceived as a sensitive topic among 
citizens in an autocratic political environment that employs an 
intricate internal security apparatus that can be suspicious of 
academic researchers. Understanding these difficulties 
contextualizes the scarcity of data on certain topics that I 
22 
investigate. While this scarcity may not preclude me from 
providing information, it necessarily limits my efforts to 
understand some phenomena.  
 In order to contextualize the academic and foreign policy 
discourse that shapes and reflects Western views of, and policies 
addressing, Tajikistan, Chapter IV analyzes texts relating to 
geopolitics in Central Asia and the so-called “Great Game.” Much 
of this discourse describes the region as one fraught with danger 
and in need of attention by foreign militaries. Examining the 
geopolitical landscape through both ‘realist’ and ‘critical’ 
frameworks situates not only the presence of foreign militaries 
such as Russia, U.S. and France, but also sheds light on the 
rationale for RT’s internal policies regarding its armed forces. 
The chapter shows the challenges of contemporary Tajikistan’s 
geopolitical situation and the Soviet border regime that 
delineated its boundaries to include numerous ethno-regional 
cleavages. These texts are then conceptualized through the 
discursive lens of the Global War on Terror, ‘critical 
geopolitics of danger’ (Megoran and Heathershaw 2011; Karagulova 
and Megoran 2011; Megoran 2004) and regional hegemony. The West’s 
rhetoric on Tajikistan is often manifested in notions of nation-
building and/or civil society development, but the investment in 
regional security is paramount. This study examines the 
intersection of all three of these foci, so the context of 
regional and global geopolitics of foreign influence in 
Tajikistan is relevant. 
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 Chapter V analyzes the conscription practices (both legal 
and illegal) of the RT military. Data for this chapter was 
collected through local and international news media coverage and 
security services; ethnographic interviews with veterans 
discussing their experiences; ethnographic interviews with 
recruitment-aged males discussing conscription practices; the 
publications and interviews with local and international NGOs; 
and participant observation on military bases. The practices that 
feed the RT’s military machine produce and reproduce biopolitical 
control of the male population without the benefit of a 
functioning defense force, thus posing serious questions about 
the state’s strategy to incubate national sentiments among its 
population. This chapter provides fundamental understandings of 
the RT’s military conscription process and provides evidence that 
its implementation is unpopular with its citizens, such as the 
performance of oblava. These negative qualities of the RT 
military present significant challenges to conceptions of it as 
an integrator of sub-national identities. 
 Chapter VI analyzes the material and living conditions 
within RT military bases, including soldier compensation. It also 
examines common practices and experiences of soldiers, 
particularly enlisted personnel; most importantly, I discuss the 
practice of ritualized hazing called dedovshchina (Russian: 
grandfathering) and how it directly contributes to military aged 
males choice to avoid enlistment or ignore conscription orders; 
this practice directly endangers soldiers mental wellbeing and 
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physical lives. This chapter also shows the importance of ethno-
regional identity both through everyday practices involving 
enlisted recruits and personnel, as well as within the structure 
of the senior officer ranks, which have glass ceilings for many 
officers dependent upon their group affiliation. I then 
problematize influence of foreign military forces based in 
Tajikistan, in particular the Russian 201st base. Data collection 
was performed through structured interviews, examination of local 
and international news media, and participant observation. 
Attention is paid to the state’s goals and negotiations for 
basing, the deployment of these forces, foreign cooperation with 
RT military units, and local populations’ experiences with 
outside forces. If Tajjikistan is a rentier state in which 
foreign militaries (e.g. Russia) base their forces in order to 
gain regional influence and/or hegemony, it is important to 
examine the ways in which this may affect local populations’ 
views of their own national military. Moreover, coupling this 
foreign influence with the inadequate nature of the RT military 
and popular disdain of its practices poses questions about the 
Rakhmon regime’s reliance on other states (particularly Russia) 
for its external security. This allows the regime to focus on 
perceived internal threats to the center in Dushanbe from those 
it fears. Any study of contemporary nationalism in Tajikistan 
must address this juxtaposition. 
 Chapter VII concludes the dissertation by addressing the 
contradictions inherent in conscripting a military that receives 
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little budgetary investment, has been shown to be operationally 
incapable, relies on an unpopular conscription system (including 
illegal impressment methods), and is viewed negatively by its 
citizens. The RT military stands in contrast to the Russian 
military, which not only acts as the security guarantor of the 
state’s territorial integrity, but accepts RT citizens as 
soldiers into its ranks. These contradictions, in turn, challenge 
any notion of the RT military as a legitimate integrator of the 
country’s various ethno-regional identities.  
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CHAPTER II 
BROADER HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT 
The context of military formation and nationalism in 
Tajikistan must be understood through its construction and legacy 
as a former Soviet Republic. In the 1920s, the Soviets drew the 
state’s boundary system (along with the rest of Soviet Central 
Asia), social systems changed, and ethno-national identities were 
destroyed, created and recreated. The emergence of the five 
Soviet Republics in Central Asia as independent states was sudden 
and unexpected, leaving them with a legacy of issues related to 
the Soviet system but lacking its resources to tackle them. In 
part, this contributed to the outbreak of the civil war that 
raged in 1992-93 and then simmered for four more years. The end 
result was a country in shambles and a regime staffed 
increasingly by one dominant ethno-regional group, presenting 
challenges to the growth of national sentiments. Under these 
circumstances, the RT created and developed its military forces, 
in many ways an embodiment of the Soviet legacy more than Tajik 
nationalism. The first two subsections of this chapter outline 
the historical and spatial framework that shapes these military 
forces and the RT’s ongoing production of them through 1) the 
Soviet legacy and 2) the Tajik Civil War. 
The third subsection diverts from the specific narrative of 
Tajikistan and explores the theories and concepts stimulated by 
critical military studies. Societal militarization and its 
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customary links to notions of a more uniform national identity 
can be conceptualized through these theories, which have been 
examined largely in Anglophone states such as the U.K., Canada, 
the U.S., and their installations abroad. Applying them to the 
case of Tajikistan provides both parallels and important 
variations, while pushing critical military studies into the non-
Western world.  
 
The Legacy of Soviet Delineation and Nation Building 
Nationalism and Delineation 
The modern political arrangement of states and boundaries 
in Central Asia reflects the titular ethnic nationalities 
encompassed in the names of the republics. This arrangement 
represents the culmination of a nation-building process by the 
Soviet authorities that lasted decades and, in many ways, remains 
active under the regimes of the current independent states. 
Deliberate state policies and actions were undertaken to unite 
subnational and tribal groups with the intent of forming 
homogenous, ethnic-based political territories within the 
U.S.S.R. This chapter subsection discusses the transformation of 
group identity in Soviet Central Asia from a locally-based 
phenomenon into five more unified and state-supported nations. As 
will become clear, this transformation shares some commonalities 
with the experience of other Central Asian republics, but there 
are also distinctive elements unique to Tajikistan. 
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James Anderson (1986) described the three formative roles 
that nationalism has played in the shaping of the modern state. 
First, it strengthens state/society institutional relationships; 
second, it helps to unify diverse regions into a more homogenous 
territory; and last it divides nations from each other. Each of 
these roles was important in the Soviet Union’s decision to 
subdivide Central Asia. Moscow believed that delineation of new 
internal republics would simplify administration, eliminate 
resistance from local elites, limit the strength of sub-Soviet 
identity, and divide the Muslim population in order to hinder any 
pan-Islamic resistance to the center (Haugen 2003; Khalid 2007). 
The delineation process has been researched primarily by 
historians (Haugen 2003; Laruelle 2012; Khalid 2007). Recent 
access to Soviet archives has debunked the long-held belief that 
authorities from Moscow solely managed the delineation process. 
In fact, the selection of final boundary lines was determined 
with intensive, active input from local national elites (Laruelle 
2012). Noting the difficulty of categorizing the ethnic identity 
groups in Central Asia, particularly in urban zones, Haugen 
(Haugen 2003) outlines the Russian and subsequent Soviet 
understandings of identity to be based on a series of binaries: 
primarily Turkic/Persian, nomadic/settled and tribal/non-tribal. 
Based on these binaries, local groups were assigned to a 
particular nationality associated with the territory of a newly 
established republic. This process resulted primarily in the 
separation of Turkic-speaking groups (Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kazakhs & 
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Kyrgyz) from each other and from Persian-speaking Tajiks. In 
about ten years, Soviet delineation created a series of national 
republics that replaced the weak local emirates (Khiva and 
Bukhara) previously in place. However, the new boundaries were 
imperfectly drawn, leaving some of the new national populations 
outside their titular republics and within the territory of 
another. These new nations would be the basis for the 
contemporary nation-states in Central Asia. 
Conceptually, the processes involved in Soviet delineation 
are often referred to as “nation-building.” Benedict Anderson 
(1991) sees nations as artificial constructions: “imagined 
communities.” However, the practice of forming new nations from 
loosely connected identity groups was, in fact, a destructive 
act. To establish communist rule in Central Asia, the Soviets 
needed to break local indigenous power structures such as those 
revolving around tribal rulers and key Islamic figures (Haugen 
2003; Khalid 2007; Edgar 2004).  
As Walker Connor noted, unthinking use of the term “nation-
state” has prevented academics from asking “how many examples 
come to mind of a strong state-nationalism being manifested among 
a people who perceive their state and their nation as distinct 
entities?” (1994, 42). Geographer Mikesell (1983) similarly noted 
that few states have ethno-nationally homogenous populations. By 
forcibly moving populations’ primary allegiance away from 
indigenous ethnic power structures to a newly created national 
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republic (subordinate to Moscow), the delineation process was 
actually one of smaller-scale “nation-destroying” (as per Connor:  
p. 42) to enable larger-scale “nation building.” 
 
Ethnogenesis 
At the heart of Soviet nationality policy’s rationale for 
delineation was the concept of ethnogenesis, which associated a 
population with a territory legitimized through ‘academic’ 
history. The reality was more akin to propaganda; this process 
was highly problematic and full of dubious claims and theories 
supported by the state.  
Ethnogenesis was based in primordialism, which holds that 
“nations are organically grown entities” (Nietschmann 1994). 
Connor (1994) views primordialism as consisting of psychological 
and emotional ties stemming from common language, religion, 
ethnicity or tribe; inevitably, it is also associated with 
territory. To legitimize so-called “primordial” ethnonational 
claims to territory, the Soviets employed historians to make 
essentialist connections between the modern nations of Central 
Asia and their republics. Laruelle describes state-sponsored 
academics of each titular nationality performing “archaeological 
patriotism” to establish a conceptual “ethnogenesis,” consisting 
of the “authentic connection among a people, its territory, and 
the state” that predates any other ethnic groups’ claim to that 
territory (2008, 170). This practice included positive 
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discrimination and ethnogenetic research to establish racial 
connections to territory. These historiographies considered 
theories of migration that might place the ethnogenesis of a 
particular ethnonational group outside of its primordial 
territory to be reactionary. They also rejected concepts placing 
Tajik origins solely in Iran or predating the arrival of Uzbeks 
(who, like other Turkic peoples, had actually migrated from NE 
Asia). Groups often made competing primordial claims to territory 
during the establishment of formal republic boundaries. Further, 
Soviet linguists developed standard literary versions of Central 
Asian languages, using the Cyrillic alphabet, that were to be the 
national languages of instruction in addition to Russian 
(Laruelle 2008). William Rowe (2011) documented the construction 
of the new language of Tajiki (a Persian dialect). Rowe argues 
that the use of Cyrillic was a method of cutting ties between 
Tajiki speakers and the literature and culture of their Farsi and 
Dari Persian cousins. New words that were added to the vocabulary 
were mostly derived from Russian rather than Farsi. By cutting 
these ties and making Russian the primary language of 
administration, science and education, the Soviets consigned 
Tajiki to simple uses at home and/or in more rural settings.  
Thus, what the Soviet histories presented as primordial 
(unconstructed and natural) was in reality largely imagined 
(constructed and unnatural). This is not to say that the 
individual titular groups did not exist prior to Soviet 
delineation. Persian speakers had long resided in Central Asia 
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and nomadic Turkic speaking groups had migrated to the region 
centuries ago. The names Tajik, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Kazakh and 
Turkomen were in use, though their meanings were somewhat 
different from those that the Soviets applied to them. It would 
be more accurate to recognize a number of connotations associated 
with these group names, including tribal (Turkic), and linguistic 
(Persian Tajik) associations, but “national” was not one of them. 
The contemporary titular nations of the republics were the result 
of substantial social engineering.  
According to Diener (2002), the goal of the Central Asian 
regimes upon independence was to establish the external 
legitimacy of their sovereignty and internal legitimacy among 
their populations. Largely embracing their Soviet pasts, they 
defaulted to the historiography that had been constructed during 
the ethnogenesis movement. Academics have noted remarkably 
similar contemporary state practices of nation-building in 
Turkmenistan (Kuru 2002) and Kyrgyzstan (Murzakulova and 
Schoeberlein 2009) and geographers in particular have researched 
the development of this phenomenon in Kazakhstan (Diener 2002; N. 
Koch 2010). 
 The Rakhmon regime constructs its ethnogenesis by tying the 
new state to the Persian Samanid Empire (875-999 CE). Although 
Tajikistan’s territory (and not even the whole of it) represented 
only a small part of the Samanid Empire, and its capital 
(Bukhara) is located in modern Uzbekistan, the official view in 
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Tajikistan frames the Samanids as the origin of a politically and 
culturally organized Tajik nation (Atkin 1993; Blakkisrud and 
Nozimova 2010; Horak and Shenfield 2010). Today, statues of 
Ismail Somoni, the founder and king of the Samanids, are common 
in Tajikistan’s main cities such as Dushanbe, Khujand and Kurgan-
Teppe. Behind the Somoni monument in Dushanbe (Figure 2.1) is a 
map of contemporary Tajikistan juxtaposed against the territory 
of the ancient Samanid Empire (tan shaded area) (see Figure 2.2). 
The map contains several inaccuracies, including its depiction of 
Badakhshan (GBAO), which is largely missing from the dark brown 
area symbolizing the contemporary republic’s territory (labeled 
“Тоҷикистон”). The map designates the location of Badakhshan, but 
fails to include it within the RT boundaries. This absence 
provides an obviously different (and completely inaccurate) 
territorial outline. Why this territory is missing on what is, 
for all intents and purposes, an official representation of the 
Republic is unknown. It is quite possible that this omission is 
merely incompetence on the part of the design and construction 
teams. However the government’s disputes with Pamiris are well 
documented and will be addressed later in this dissertation; 
suffice to say GBAO largely supported the opposition during the 
civil war and Dushanbe continues to have difficulty exercising 
full control over the region. 
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Figure 2.1. Ismail Somoni Monument, Dushanbe 
 
While growth of popular national identity remains a state 
goal in all five republics, local identities remain strong. These 
identities can take the form of tribal affiliations within a 
greater Turkic ethnic group (Edgar 2004), smaller unique ethnic 
groups within the republic (e.g. Pamiris in GBAO), or national 
groups located within states other than their titular republic 
(e.g. Kyrgyz in eastern GBAO or parts of Sughd Oblast).  
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Figure 2.2. Stone map of the Samanid Empire, constructed and 
placed behind the Ismail Somoni monument in downtown Dushanbe. 
 
Subnational identities among ethnic Tajiks are related to 
an individual’s region of origin (Tunçer-Kılavuz 2009; Nourzhanov 
and Bleuer 2013). Walker noted that assimilation is not a “one-
directional process” (Connor 1994, 69); subnational groups can 
and do fracture from the nation or rebel, particularly when the 
state is weakened. During the Tajik Civil War (1992-97), for 
example, combatants largely divided along the regional Tajik and 
ethnic lines and murderous cleansing targeted people based on 
region of origin or ethnicity (Tunçer-Kılavuz 2009). Central 
Asian regimes are aware of this possibility and both Tajikistan 
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and Uzbekistan have implemented efforts to homogenize the ‘other’ 
(Tajiks in Uzbekistan and vice-versa) into the titular nation of 
the republic, often simply by pressuring them to change their 
formal listing of ethnicity on government documents but also by 
restricting the use of the other’s language (Ferrando 2008). The 
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency lists the ethnic (but not ethno-
regional) distribution in Tajikistan as follows: “Tajik 84.3%, 
Uzbek 13.8% (includes Lakai, Kongrat, Katagan, Barlos, Yuz), 
other 2% (includes Kyrgyz, Russian, Turkmen, Tatar, Arab)”(CIA 
2010). Bleuer and Nourzhanov accept figures of Uzbeks as high as 
23.5% and Tajiks as 62.2% (Nourzhanov and Bleuer 2013). Both 
estimates include ‘Pamiris’ as ‘Tajiks’. Why nomenclature and 
percentages vary is worth examination. 
In Tajikistan, policies designed to promote the 
homogenization of the population include not only banning any 
official use of Uzbek (or any language other than Tajik – though 
Russian is often tacitly accepted), but reintroducing old tribal 
identities (Lakai, Congrats, Catagans, etc.) that had been 
collectively grouped under the ‘Uzbek’ nationality by the 
Soviets. This action served to divide the sizable Uzbek 
population (over 15%: Minority Rights Group International, 2008) 
and sap some of its potential power. However, the same procedure 
was not implemented for Pamiri groups (Shugni, Wakhi, Rushani, 
Yazgulyami, Darwazi and Ishkashimi), which the government 
currently lists as Tajiks in all official documentation. Ferrando 
notes that the motivation for this discrepancy is obvious.  
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As all requested officials from the Tajik Academy of 
Sciences refused to comment on the changes they have 
introduced in the Dictionary of Nationalities, its seems 
clear that the decision to promote Turkic tribes out of the 
Uzbek nationality, while keeping all eastern Iranian groups 
under Tajiki nationality, was motivated by political 
interests rather than a response to sociological realties. 
The titular Tajik group remained the sole legitimate heir 
to the nation (2008, 496). 
 
Pamiris are often referred to as “Mountain Tajiks” or simply 
“Tajiks,” but the reality is more complex. “Pamiri” is a 
collective term for groups speaking a variety of Eastern Iranian 
tongues and predominantly adhering to Ismaili Shi’ism. These 
groups identify as Pamiri first, and Tajik second. Most 
importantly, since the civil war there has been resistance to the 
government in Dushanbe’s efforts to maintain control in GBAO. The 
Rakhmon regime’s choice not to list these groups separately is 
motivated by the drive to solidify a Tajik national state, with 
other groups only as small minorities. Dividing groups (Uzbeks) 
into smaller ones and placing others (Pamiris) under the Tajik 
label helps to build a statistical legitimation for this goal.  
Appraising views of ethnic identity and nationalism in 
Central Asia, one constant is territory. Prior to the Russian 
conquest, group identity was locally based, whether familial, 
tribal or local in nature (Haugen 2003); Islam formed perhaps the 
most important individual component of identity (Khalid 2007). 
Subnational groups were connected to local territories and were 
largely unconcerned with the ruling sovereign if the daily lives 
of group members were not affected. Larger-scale ethnonationalism 
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was not well developed and the related identities (Uzbek, Tajik, 
Turkmen, etc.) held little importance in the practices of daily 
life. Over time, the effect of delineation did shape national 
identity; indeed Wixman (1980) argued that the creation of 
national republics and other administrative territories (e.g. 
oblasts) contributed to the development of a strong sense of 
ethnic identity, even if it did not supplant competing 
subnational connections. 
The strong association between ethnic identity and 
territory suggests the importance of taking geographic 
considerations seriously in the effort to understand the 
cultural-political evolution of the region. The influence of 
Soviet policies and practices poses questions about nation-
building, primordial v. imagined communities, and the role of 
common language and its inevitable link to territory. The 
emergence of the Soviet republics as independent states within 
the sovereign state system poses questions about how ethnicity is 
perceived and reinforced at multiple scales. Murphy has written 
extensively (1989; 2010) on the territorial relationship with 
ethnic identity, noting that “(f)ormal ethnic territories can 
have powerful effects on group identity,” and that “ethnicity is 
inherently territorial” (1989, 411). However, the process of 
politically formalizing ethno-national relationships with 
territory does not guarantee successful cohesion, nor are such 
efforts predictably instantaneous (Agnew 1994; Mikesell 1984). 
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By analyzing the conditions and processes under which 
Tajikistan was formed, both territorially and socially, we can 
better understand two key components of this research. First, 
such an undertaking shows that the titular national identity 
promoted by the state is weakly developed and hampered by 
persistent subnational identities. Secondly, it helps explain why 
Tajikistan and other Central Asian regimes actively attempt to 
manipulate these categories of identity to ensure the dominance 
of the titular population and build national sentiments that 
serve to secure the position and legitimacy of the state.  
 
The Tajik Civil War 
 The civil war influenced the structure of the RT’s 
contemporary armed forces. The Soviets’ attempt to create a Tajik 
national republic placed ethno-regional identity groups into 
competition for political authority and economic power within the 
Soviet system (Roy, 1997). The system distributed administrative 
posts to elites from particular regions to strike a balance 
between them. Thus, regional rivalries developed based on the 
linguistic/dialectic regions that pre-dated the institution of 
Tajik language policies by the Soviets (Rowe, 2011). These 
rivalries did not appear to exist in any significantly violent 
way prior to the formation of the Soviet republics; it was the 
divisive nature of the communist system of forced migration and 
kolkhoz (collective farm) formation that increased the level of 
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political and economic competition between groups. This 
competition spilled over into violence when the Soviet Union 
collapsed and Moscow’s subsidies evaporated. 
 Groups competed for control of the state and militias that 
were allied to the government fought units of what came to be 
known as the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), including the Islamic 
Renaissance Party (IRP). During the early months of the war the 
Russian 201st Motor Rifle Brigade was the only formal military 
unit in the country (Poujol 1997; Orr 1997; Burnashev 2002). The 
pro-government militias collectively referred to as the Popular 
Front (PF) consisted mostly of Tajiks from the Kulob and Hissor 
regions, as well as ethnic Uzbeks. After the PF had removed the 
opposition forces from Dushanbe and a new government was 
installed in late 1992, the first formal RT military forces were 
formed. The war would continue until 1997. The military was 
initially required to combat insurgents characterized by hard 
line remnants of the IRP still present in the mountainous east 
and across the border in Afghanistan. When the government of 
Tajikistan began to solidify its territorial sovereignty after 
1997, it was challenged by independent warlords of the PF that 
had neither demobilized nor formally joined the administration, 
as well as resistance from some former UTO commanders (Nourzhanov 
2005). Moreover, the provision of border security and defense 
from existential threats outside of Tajikistan (Afghanistan) was 
also necessary. 
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 However, the government’s solidification of power was a 
complex process that involved a number of factors. First, the 
Popular Front was made up primarily of Kulobi and Hissori Tajik 
militias as well as ethnic Uzbek units. As the hostilities came 
to an official end, it was clear that the unified action of these 
militias, which was difficult during the war, would be impossible 
as part of a centrally negotiated peace (Nourzhanov 2005; Akiner 
2001). Each regional group had its political priorities and the 
largest group, the Kulobis, began to fracture, as individual 
warlords were reluctant to give up the newfound power of their 
loyal militias. Second, the government of Uzbekista, which had 
supported the defeat of the UTO through direct military action 
(and installed Rakhmon in power) grew concerned with the regime 
in Dushanbe and increasingly took a hostile stance against its 
southern neighbor (Horsman 1999; Jonson 2006). This hostility was 
largely diplomatic but often contained threatening overtones and 
complicated Tajikistan’s political development by providing a 
potential external threat during a time of internal instability. 
In the economically powerful northern province of Sughd, 
connected to the capital by a sole mountain pass, the 
apparatchiks who had held substantial power during the Soviet 
period attempted to remain neutral during the war and now 
considered secession and/or possible unification with Uzbekistan. 
However without a military force, they would remain vulnerable to 
other interests if and when attention eventually turned to them. 
Lastly, the conflict continued; though a peace agreement had been 
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signed and opposition figures began to accept government posts, 
more radical elements continued to fight in the mountains. Many 
of the remaining insurgents had received material and training 
assistance from the mujahedeen in Afghanistan (Brown 1997).  
 These factors created a situation in Tajikistan in which 
the government would need to establish its legitimacy and 
territorial integrity through both coercion and consent. This 
integration would be achieved by the negotiated absorption or 
forced elimination of some the same militants whose military 
action had enabled the new government to take power while 
continuing to combat more radical remnants of the UTO on the 
frontier, with an increasingly hostile Uzbekistan to the north 
and an Afghanistan embroiled in civil war of its own to the 
south. Additionally, the existence of Russian military units in 
Tajikistan, while helping to combat the remaining opposition 
units in the mountains and guard the border with Afghanistan, 
served as a reminder that the influence of the former master of 
this territory had, for better or worse, not quite disappeared 
(Baer 2002; Lynch 2000; Horsman 1999; Orr 1997; Poujol 1997). 
Murderers, criminals…they took these people out of jail and 
made them soldiers. In Qurghanteppa, both sides did this. 
Narcotic users and alcoholics became soldiers.  
 
There were some families. They could not say they did not 
support the militias. But they did not send their kids, did 
not give money. They killed them. People could not say ‘we 
do not support’ because of fear. They obeyed them and did 
whatever they said (Tunçer-Kılavuz 2009, 704). 
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 In the summer and fall of 1992, the villages of SW 
Tajikistan erupted in ruthless violence that appeared senseless 
when viewed from afar. In a simple sense, armed militias fought 
each other over political control of the state: one side in 
support of the status quo and its Soviet-era power apparatus, one 
in opposition to it. The opposition militias were typically 
referred to as Islamists, though this is too general a 
description. Their “pro-government” enemies were often referred 
to as “pro-communists”, among other terms; Brown perhaps more 
accurately describes the pro-government forces as “anti-
opposition” (1995). Additionally, militias on both sides were 
associated with ethno-regional identities: Gharmi, Hissori, and 
Kulobi Tajiks; Pamiris; and Uzbeks. This association meant that 
the violent competition for power quickly turned into a murderous 
spree of identity-targeted killing performed by informal units 
led by radicalized leaders, who advocated and implemented 
increasingly violent actions towards their adversaries.  
 How and why did this murderous cleansing happen in 
Tajikistan? I use ‘murderous’ because ‘ethnic’ is too specific 
(Mann 2005); groups involved in this kind of violence may be 
divided based on other forms of identity, including patron-client 
networks. In Tajikistan, ethno-regional identity is a better 
term; groups may not only be based on ethnicity (Tajik, Uzbek, 
Pamiri, or Kyrgyz, e.g.), but also region of origin, as is the 
case among Tajik sub-national groupings (by region of origin) and 
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Pamiris (by regional origin and language). Bleuer correctly notes 
that 
(t)he Soviet authorities attempted to shape ethnic 
identities throughout the USSR, and in Central Asia there 
were particular difficulties as most people here did not 
see their primary identities at the ethnic or national 
level. As part of the Soviet process, languages were 
standardized, traditions codified, pre-existing sub-ethnic 
identities (e.g., tribe or city) were suppressed (e.g., by 
being removed as an option in the official census), 
privileges were granted or denied based on ethnic identity, 
and many people found that they were outside the borders of 
their titular republic (e.g., ethnic Uzbeks inside 
Tajikistan) (Bleuer n.d.). 
 
 
Though regionalism is strong and the relevance of ethno-
national identity rose during the civil war, the organization of 
perpetrators and targets into such distinct groups does not 
adequately explain the motives for the violence; other factors 
had important roles in mobilizing combatants and identifying 
their targets. Bleuer further explains the importance of 
clientelism within the Soviet system in Tajikistan, leading to 
“the ‘politicization’ of regional identities” (Bleuer n.d.). As 
individual patrons rose through the hierarchy of highly coveted 
political/economic posts, they brought increasing numbers of 
clients to fill positions underneath them, with a majority of 
such individuals recruited from the patron’s home region. This 
resulted in extensive patron-client networks that were somewhat 
homogenous in their ethno-regional background (though there were 
always exceptions). Tunçer-Kılavuz (2009) notes that these 
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patron-client networks were the main form of initial combatant 
mobilization during the early stages of the war, making 
regionalism as a macro-level cleavage appear illustrative while 
hiding much of the true complexity of the conflict.  
 Mann defines ‘ethnic cleansing’ as “the removal by members 
of one (ethnicity) by another (ethnicity) from a locale they 
define as their own” (Mann 2005, 11); he further posits that 
ethnic cleansing is primarily a modern phenomenon and linked to 
the concept of democracy. In this case, democracy does not 
necessarily refer to elections and methods of rule, but rather to 
the competition for power and rising expectations and fears faced 
by sections of the population potentially accessing political 
power for the first time in recent history. The breakup of the 
Soviet Union destabilized the geopolitical framework and 
initiated a period of somewhat chaotic political change (though 
not economic opportunity). In newly independent Tajikistan, the 
opportunity for a share of political power seemed possible for 
the first time in the region’s recent history; indeed the newly 
independent RT held its first elections in 1991. The subsequent 
competition for power represents an important step toward Mann’s 
cleansing thesis. However, it would be misleading to consider the 
identity-targeted killings in the Tajik Civil War as cleansing 
under his definition; among a variety of differences, the level 
of violence was significantly lower and mostly targeted military-
aged males associated with opposing sides of the civil war rather 
than a whole identity group; for example Gharmi Tajiks targeted 
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Uzbeks, but Kulobi Tajiks did not. Nonetheless, it is important 
to note that rape and starvation – both practices commonly 
revealed in analyses of civil war and murderous cleansing – were 
also perpetrated in the Tajik Civil War (Akiner 2001).  
 Kalyvas (2006) demonstrates that deconstructing civil war 
violence more generally involves an in-depth look at the forms of 
social cleavages that exist in civil wars, how they shape such 
conflicts at varying scales (often counter-intuitively), and how 
violence often has little to do with the common assumptions of 
what generates and perpetuates civil wars. He terms the main 
division of sides in a civil war that commonly characterize it as 
the ‘master cleavage,’ with more local and/or less obvious ones 
as ‘micro-cleavages.’ This terminology is useful if we are to 
unpack the complex nature of civil war violence, which was 
demonstrated in Tajikistan in 1992. Additionally, Kalyvas sees 
the role of personal agency (along with micro-cleavages) as 
having more relevance than previously considered, as some 
individuals commit acts that have little relevance, or obvious 
connection, to the macro-cleavages that supposedly represent the 
rationale for the war. While this form of agency does not explain 
the reasons for the master cleavage, it does help to make sense 
of much of the small-scale violence that was perpetrated as the 
war reached its peak. Kaylvas’ ideas are useful to better situate 
our understandings of the war in Tajikistan at the ground level 
and in turn provide context for the social relations that 
developed in the war’s aftermath. 
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 While it is illustrative to draw parallels to violent 
cleansing in Bosnia (which occurred almost simultaneously), there 
are important differences in performance and context that I will 
reference in the following pages. Western media attention focused 
on the Balkans during this period, but did not give the same 
attention to post-Soviet Central Asia and the Tajik civil war. 
This media coverage provided a wealth of information on the 
conflict in Bosnia. On the other hand, the relatively low level 
of journalist coverage of the civil war in Tajikistan makes 
researching this conflict challenging. Further, in some ways the 
current regime in Tajikistan seems reticent to contribute to 
comprehensive research on the war (Conversation with foreign 
academic 1 2013; Conversation with foreign academic 2 2013), 
making a comprehensive explanation difficult. That the violence 
in Tajikistan resembles ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in important 
ways allows us to deconstruct the patterns of this form of 
violence and better understand it within the Tajik context.  
 
Ethno-Regionalism in Tajikistan 
 Kalyvas describes the master cleavages in a civil war as 
the division “that drives the civil war at the national level,” 
while positing that local cleavages drive much if not most of the 
violence in such wars (Kalyvas 2006, 364). The master cleavage 
between the status quo of so-called neo-communists and the 
opposition led by the IRP was not the only grouping of 
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adversaries. Ethno-regional identity contributed considerably to 
the master cleavage; for some groups, such as Pamiris, it was the 
most important factor in the decision to join the opposition. The 
lingering basis of this phenomenon can be at least partially 
attributed to the physiography of Tajikistan, which is defined by 
high mountains that separate numerous remote valleys and plains 
where most of the population resides. This topography creates a 
significant challenge to national unity, dividing not only 
territories from the core, but also population clusters living in 
relatively close proximity to one another. Historically, this led 
to the development of separate regional identities that continue 
to permeate contemporary cultural and political life in 
Tajikistan.  
  Maps 2.1 and 2.2 portray the population of Tajikistan in 
terms of location and ethno-regional identity origins. Map 2.1 
shows the general ethnic/regional spatial distribution, whereas 
Map 2.2 shows the actual population distribution that highlights 
the physical isolation of the various regions within the state. 
Tajik society maintains strong identities associated with these 
regions, and allegiance to one’s home area is exhibited in many 
ways. Kulob, Karategin, and Khujand are the home regions to Tajik 
peoples who speak their own dialects of Tajiki (Persian) and 
share some similar culture traits. Additionally, these regions 
contain networks of economic and political power. Among Tajiks, 
the regional identity of intrastate migrants is commonly 
determined by the birthplace of one’s grandfather (Tunçer-Kılavuz 
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2009, 325). The home regions in Map 2.1 include migrants who have 
settled within their rough boundaries. The SW plains contain the 
most migrant group populations, many of whom were forcibly moved 
there to work in cotton kolkhozes during the Soviet period.  
 
 
 
 
  Map 2.1. Ethno-regional Identity Groups in Tajikistan 
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Map 2.2. Population Clusters in Tajikistan and Surrounding 
Regions 
 
The primacy of the Khujand (formerly Leninabad) region in 
Tajik economic and political affairs during the Soviet period was 
one of the issues that ignited the secular (non-IRP) groups of 
the opposition in the period just after independence. The Soviet 
government in Moscow made efforts to balance governmental posts 
between regions, but Khujand controlled the upper levels of the 
republic’s government while its rivals received more cabinet-
specific placements (Olcott 1994b; Tunçer-Kılavuz 2009). It is 
isolated physically from Tajikistan’s other three regions by the 
Zeravshan Range and Fan Mountains, as clearly illustrated in Map 
2.2. Its population is a mix of ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks as well 
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as some Russians. Located in the populous and fertile Ferghana 
Valley, it is also the most economically productive area in 
Tajikistan (Payne 1996, 371). 
 The Kulob region was second to Khujand in political 
influence, and many posts in the Soviet-era government’s internal 
affairs/security ministry went to its officials (Horsman 1999; 
Olcott 1994a) (though reforms in the 1980s placed Pamiris in the 
prominent roles). As a result, most of its combatants were allied 
with the pro-government forces. Despite its role as a junior 
partner to the more economically oriented northern regions 
surrounding Khujand, it is a region of (mostly cotton) farms.  
 Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast is perhaps the most 
ethnically distinct region of Tajikistan. Containing the heart of 
the Pamir Range, it is the largest province territorially and 
smallest demographically. Its relatively (see Map 2.2) small 
population consists of ethnic Pamiri peoples in the western 
valleys and Kyrgyz on the eastern plateau. In addition to being 
linguistically distinct, Pamiris follow Ismaili Shi’ite Islam and 
are considered the most secular Muslims in all of Tajikistan in 
terms of practice (Lynch 2000; O. Roy 2000). The variety of East 
Iranian languages spoken is geographically dependent upon the 
mountain valley and ethnic group in question, and are not 
mutually intelligible with Tajiki (nor necessarily to each 
other). Pamiris consider themselves to be distinct from Tajik 
groups to their west, as can be seen in their bid for autonomy 
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(Barabanov 1997; Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont 1997; McChesney 
1996). 
 Kurgan-Teppe in the southwestern area of the country is an 
ethnic mix of Uzbeks and Tajiks from Karategin and Kulob (among 
other regions), as well as Pamiris from Badakhshan, who were 
forced to migrate to work in Soviet kolkhozes. At the time of the 
war, the population in Kurgan-Teppe and the surrounding towns 
identified as Uzbek, Kulobi, Karategini, or Pamiri and was 
usually separated into kolkhozes, many of which were solely of 
one regional origin or ethnicity. 
 Uzbeks are considered ethnically distinct from Tajiks, 
speaking a Turkic language and having a somewhat different social 
organization (tribal). As noted above, they are most populous in 
the SW plains in Hissor and near Kurgan-Teppe, as well as the 
Ferghana Valley around Khujand. While their sense of identity can 
be strong, Tajiks and Uzbeks have frequently intermarried; 
distinguishing between the two requires simply inquiring into 
individual self-identification. Additionally, in many cases 
members of both groups speak Tajik and Uzbek as well as Russian 
(Atkin 1997, 280), though the use of the latter is fading in 
rural areas. 
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Unrest in Dushanbe 
 A detailed description of the personalities and 
intergovernmental instability immediately before the beginning of 
the violence is beyond the scope of this dissertation (see Brown 
1997; Bleuer n.d.; Atkin 1997; Akiner 2001). Understanding the 
breakdown of civil order in the capital provides context to the 
motivations of the various opposition groups and the predominant 
ethno-regional groups associated with them.  In short, a loosely 
connected opposition movement developed and began to protest in 
Dushanbe during the spring of 1992 after the first contested 
presidential elections that took place the previous November. The 
opposition encompassed a number of groups with different goals, 
including the implementation of reforms akin to those being 
instituted in the European republics of the former USSR and a 
return of Islam to daily life. These protests led to a loose 
coalition that included both these secular elements as well as 
the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) that ruled for a short period 
in late summer/early fall of 1992.  
 This ‘coalition,’ as it was commonly called, included 
nationalists, democrats, the Pamiri Lali Badakshan and the IRP. 
The largest militias were associated with the IRP. Though the 
Uzbek government (Horsman 1999), Russian, and anti-opposition 
(Bleuer n.d.) narratives characterized it as an extremist 
organization, such characterization is simplistic. It did have a 
goal of creating an Islamic republic in Tajikistan, but it was 
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aware that much of the population did not immediately share that 
goal (O. Roy 1997; Tuncer-Kilavuz 2011; Khalid 2007). Lali 
Badakhshan’s goals were simple: more autonomy for ethnic Pamiris 
in the Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) of SE Tajikistan 
that would help them maintain their unique (linguistic and 
religious) culture unimpeded by Dushanbe (Brown 1997; S. 
Dudoignon 1997). 
 The IRP was formed among Sunni Muslims from the eastern and 
southwestern part of the country, predominantly in Gharm 
(Karategin) and among migrants in the Kurgan-Teppe region. The 
IRP claimed to speak for all Sunni Muslims in Tajikistan, but not 
all clerics followed their lead. Many branded the IRP (mostly 
incorrectly) as Wahhabist and connected to similar groups in 
Afghanistan, and thus began to draw negative attention against 
them from abroad. The IRP began to develop a network of militias 
in Dushanbe, Gharm and Kurgan-Teppe that would perpetrate 
violence upon their opponents during the war; these units would 
constitute the backbone of the opposition’s military. These 
murderous campaigns were justified by their perpetrators and 
would also be the primary rationalization invoked by Russia and 
Uzbekistan for their direct involvement in the war, in efforts to 
bring stability to the state and bring an end to the violence 
(Bleuer n.d.; Brown 1997; Horsman 1999; Kuzmin 2001; Lynch 2000). 
As the war progressed, the IRP dominated the ranks of the 
opposition’s militias for the duration of the conflict. 
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 On the pro-government side, the People’s (Popular) Front 
(PF) started as a collection of irregular militias predominantly 
from the Kulob region that responded to the opposition’s coup and 
particularly to the massacres perpetrated by IRP militias. Many 
of its leaders were convicted criminals, and would perform 
organized violent retribution that rivaled the violence of the 
IRP. PF units were primarily loyal to their individual commanders 
as opposed to the new government in Dushanbe and at times clashed 
with each other (Akiner 2001; Matveeva 2009; Tunçer-Kılavuz 2009; 
Tunçer-Kılavuz 2009). 
 The factors that led up to the Tajik Civil War were 
multiple and interconnected. “Although the war was neither 
Islamic, nor ethnic, nor regional, all of these factors played a 
role in the war as mobilizing tools” (Tunçer-Kılavuz 2009, 674). 
In short, the Soviet system had favored officials from two of 
these regions (Khujand and Kulob) for most of the government 
posts and this was the case at the time of independence. In 
response, economically and politically marginalized Pamiris and 
Karategini Tajiks demonstrated in the street of Dushanbe. 
Counter-demonstrations of Hissori and Kulobi Tajiks and ethnic 
Uzbeks were organized by the government and the two sides clashed 
and began to arm themselves (Whitlock 2003). This division of 
combatants constitutes Kalyvas’ ‘macro-cleavage’ for the war. 
Shortly thereafter these forces gathered in the agricultural SW 
to further mobilize their networks. This agricultural zone of 
kolkhozes (collective farms) in the SW became the main 
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battleground of the war. Since the more technocratic Khujandi 
elites from the north who had dominated the republic’s politics 
during the Soviet period were distant from the fighting, they 
relied on their “junior Kulobi partners” to do their bidding in 
the maintenance of the status quo (Bleuer n.d.). As a result, 
when the PF won the war, the Khujandis assumed the junior 
position, inverting their previous roles in the partnership. 
 
Kolkhozes in Flames 
 According to Kalyvas, civil wars often experience a 
“disjunction between the macrolevel causes of the war and the 
microlevel patterns of violence” (2006, p. 4). This was certainly 
the case in the Tajik Civil War in this crucial stage. In areas 
around Kurgan-Teppe, militias mobilized by leaders on both sides 
attacked kolkhozes populated by the regional or ethnic identity 
associated with their enemies as outlined in the macro-cleavage. 
Tajikistani collective farms were typically much larger than 
those in the other regions of the FSU (Davies 1980; S. 
Fitzpatrick 1994), and were centers of power and money during the 
Soviet period. In some ways, these attacks could be seen as 
payback for perceived wrongs experienced by those marginalized by 
this power. Civilians became targets as IRP militias murdered 
Kulobis, while Uzbek and Kulobi militias retaliated and massacred 
civilians from Gharm or the Pamirs. Thus, this form of murderous 
cleansing targeted Tajiks based on their region of origin, and 
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Uzbeks and Pamiris based on their ethnicity (Human Rights Watch 
1994; Kuzmin 2001). The difference may seem semantic, but given 
the common use of the term ‘ethnic’ cleansing, it is important to 
note this distinction.  
 What makes this aspect of the war surprising is the general 
lack of any historical animosity or violent conflict between 
these groups within this part of Central Asia (there was 
localized competition for scarce resources, such as grazing areas 
of farmland, however). Roy (1997) explains that the Soviet system 
of forced collectivization and resulting forced migration broke 
up the regional stability of complementarity; “Tajiks in the 
bazaars and foothills, artisan Jews, Uzbeks in the irrigated 
plains, mountain-dwelling Ismailis (Pamiris) and Kyrgyz, and 
semi-nomadic groups who constituted a link in the marginal 
spaces, such as ‘Arabs’ etc.” (p.138). Groups were now associated 
with kolkhozes that were (mostly) populated by members from one 
regional-ethnic group. Groups that in earlier times had little 
interaction with each other were thrust into competition for 
state resources and markets. Patronage-client networks that were 
often strongly regional in nature became an additional sub-
national layer of identity within Tajikistan. These networks 
usually had a territorial association as well, typically with a 
kolkhoz or state industry. 
 Markowitz (2011, 2013) convincingly postulates that the 
main reason Tajikistan fell into civil war while Uzbekistan (with 
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similar regional and ethnic cleavages) did not was the lack of 
economic resources that could be distributed through elite 
patronage networks. With a more robust economy connected to 
regional markets, including agricultural commodities and 
petrochemicals, the Uzbek government apparatus could maintain the 
status quo by rewarding the loyalty of regional elites with 
access to markets for these resources. The nascent Tajik state, 
with support from Moscow now absent, could not. This prompted 
local elites to raise their own militias, often through the 
cooptation of state security forces in their respective regions, 
and thus led to direct, violent competition over what scarce 
resources and rents there were in the territory. Indeed, the 
various militias fought along the master cleavage (neo-communists 
v. Islamists) but also with each other over local territory and 
economic resources. Through this analogy, Markowitz explains the 
macro-cleavage at the ethno-regional level, with Khujandis, 
Hissoris, Kulobis and Uzbeks (western) opposing Gharmis and 
Pamiris (eastern)2. 
For many reformists, dismantling the republic’s political-
economic system was a means of ending the privileged access 
to state rents by elites from cotton-growing regions (S. A. 
Dudoignon 1994). When reform was abandoned in 1990, the 
return of many former elite and the continued exclusion of 
Tajikistan’s eastern areas brought these competitive 
pressures to the surface (Markowitz 2011, 163). 
                                                          
2 However, Darwazi Pamiris fought on the anti-opposition side, 
against the bulk of Pamiris associated with Lali Badakhshan. 
59 
For Markowitz, political power in Tajikistan is dependent 
on peripheral elites turning resources into cash (“loot”), 
through connection to the center. Without this connection, 
peripheral elites take matters – and local security apparati – 
into their own hands. This is precisely what took place during 
the civil war. Thus, Tajikistan’s “Unlootable Resources” noted by 
Markowitz are crucial to understanding the master cleavage of the 
war. If ties to the center through elite networks could not be 
maintained due to a lack of resources, the state was in danger 
from peripheral groups who would have little reason to be loyal 
to the central government. 
 When the war broke out in the spring 1992, neither side was 
prepared for military action, though the IRP had begun to 
stockpile light weapons and form irregular militia units. In 
September, the fighting moved to the countryside as the two sides 
clashed over kolkhozes throughout Kurgan-Teppe south of the 
capital. The Kulobi Popular Front had reorganized and obtained 
weapons from Russian troops and counterattacked. This initially 
light conflict quickly took a nasty turn that would rival the 
murderous actions that took place in the former Yugoslavia. 
This was a savage war: massacres, rape, torture, looting and 
summary executions. The lower Vaksh valley was the scene of 
Serb-style ethnic cleansing. The houses of Gharmis and Pamiris 
were systematically destroyed and the civilian populations 
fled towards the border with Afghanistan. After a pause of a 
month, the Amu Darya was crossed at the end of December in 
very difficult conditions by tens of thousands of Gharmi 
refugees, taking them into Afghanistan where they were rapidly 
taken into the care of the UNHCR (O. Roy 2000, 140). 
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 In a time of economic stress caused by the evaporation of 
the centralized Soviet economy, Tajiks elites mobilized their 
supporters (Tunçer-Kılavuz 2009) and turned on their rivals in 
competition for political power as well as scarce resources in 
the south of the country. While initial reports estimated 50-
100,000 killed and 500,000 refugees in the six months of 1992-3 
that encapsulated the vast majority of the conflict’s action 
(Matveeva 2009), estimates of 23,000 killed and 100,000 are 
perhaps more accurate (Mukomel 2001). As a new president (Imomali 
Rahmonov) from the Kulob region took office, he consolidated his 
power through the posting of others from his home region at the 
expense of their former allies and long-time political rivals of 
Khujand, as well as ethnic Uzbeks (Horsman 1999; Kuzmin 2001). 
Gharmis and Pamiris retreated to their respective mountain 
valleys; the latter actually achieving both “de facto and de 
jure” autonomy for Gorno-Badakhshan (O. Roy 2000, 141). By the 
end of 1992 the fronts of the war had stabilized. Afterward, 
remnant antigovernment insurgents intermittently attacked army 
posts in the central highland valleys of Tajikistan. The 
immediate effect of the civil war was to exacerbate the regional 
identity differences among the population, turning peaceful 
economic and political rivalries into violence-based fear and 
hatred. 
 By the time peace and stability had become both formal 
(peace treaty signed) and functional (warlords coopted or 
eliminated, remaining insurgents defeated, etc.), the RT military 
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could focus on creating a national military that was universally 
inclusive of ethnic and regional identities. The civil war 
(especially the violence against civilians) served to 
fundamentally undermine national unity. The 1997 peace agreement 
horizontally integrated both opposition and anti-opposition units 
into the formal RT military. However, it did not consistently 
separate these units from their commanders, to whom most of their 
troops were fiercely loyal (Nourzhanov 2005; Akiner 2001).  
 The loyalty of PF units that became integrated into the 
nascent RT military varied, as did their size and military 
capabilities. The most organized and functional unit in a formal 
sense was that of Captain Khudoberdyev, an ethnic Uzbek and 
former officer in the Soviet/Russian 201st MRD, whose militia 
sought to protect their ethnic brethren in the Kurgan-Teppe area 
from attacks by the opposition (Akiner 2001; Bleuer n.d.; 
Nourzhanov 2005). The story of his militia, the 1st Special 
Operations Battalion (SOB) is particularly important because it 
demonstrates their effectiveness in combat against the 
opposition, but also how they were politically marginalized by 
the Rakhmon regime later in the conflict.  
 The SOB successfully fought campaigns not only near Kurgan-
Teppe, but also during later stages of the war in the Rasht 
Valley (Garm and Tavildara) directly on behalf of the Rakhmon 
regime. However, Captain Khudoberdyev became dissatisfied with 
the ‘Kulobization’ of the regime, as Rakhmon continued to post 
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close Tajik associates from his home region to important 
positions in the government. His militia took up residence south 
of Kurgan-Teppe and ceased to take on offensive operations for 
the regime; he had 2000 active troops with a further 5000 
reserves, including armored vehicles (Nourzhanov 2005). In 1997 
he led an insurrection of sorts, blocking the key pass between 
Dushanbe and Kurgan-Teppe and making demands regarding an 
alteration of the peace agreement, believing Uzbeks had been 
marginalized despite their contribution to the war effort. In the 
subsequent meeting with President Rakhmon, he agreed to disband 
his unit and take another position. Shortly thereafter, one of 
the RT’s loyal units closed on Kurgan-Teppe and took brutal 
revenge on his veterans and ethnic Uzbeks generally. A year 
later, Khudoberdyev led an invasion of Khujand from Uzbekistan 
that was defeated. He is believed to be dead (sources vary as to 
the cause), but there are many within the RT political 
establishment who maintain that he remains across the frontier, 
ready to invade again with the support of Uzbekistan (Nourzhanov 
2005). 
 The various militias that operated in SW Tajikistan during 
the war were either coopted into the RT security services or 
brought into the fold through more direct, coercive methods. 
Sangak Safarov, the most popular such leader, met his end when he 
attempted to stop his former comrade, Faizali Saidov, from 
continuing his killing spree targeting Garmis and Pamiris. A 
shootout is said to have occurred, in which both warlords were 
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killed. Some believe the Rakhmon regime actually planned this 
outcome by encouraging this meeting and instigating the violence 
involved – or employed a sniper to shoot both men (Nourzhanov 
2005, 118; Bleuer n.d.). In some cases, commanders and their 
militias were absorbed into the RT security services, only to use 
the opportunity to develop their own fiefdoms to maintain power 
independent from the government. Obviously, this situation 
challenged the stability of the regime, and Rakhmon moved 
strategically to eliminate these threats over time, only bringing 
about a reasonable degree of stability after 2006 – nine years 
after the peace agreement. The warlords/militia commanders for 
the most part met similar ends: violent death, exile or prison. 
The full stories of these commanders is covered elsewhere (Akiner 
2001; Bleuer n.d.; Asia-Plus 2012; Asia-Plus 2006).  
 For the purposes of this dissertation, these commanders’ 
stories are relevant in a number of ways. Firstly, they 
demonstrate the informal, decentralized power structures of both 
the opposition and the anti-opposition forces during the civil 
war; they show how molding units integrated (during the war and 
after the peace agreement was signed in 1997) into a formal, 
national military presented significant challenges. Secondly, the 
control they exhibited over specific territories during the war 
and in the aftermath threatened the sovereignty of the newly 
independent state, not to mention the Rakhmon regime. Thirdly, 
and as a consequence of the foregoing points, the regime became 
fearful of the armed forces within Tajikistan – whether they 
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existed outside the government’s direct control, or within the 
supposedly loyal RT military structure. When examining the 
production of nationalism through the lens of military service 
and prowess, it seems clear that, rather than building on the 
personnel from wartime units, starting from scratch has distinct 
advantages if political stability is to be realized in a 
centralized “nation-state.” 
 The point is that the Rakhmon regime saw the military as a 
potential threat to the government. This threat is twofold. 
First, many of the military’s new commanding officers were 
warlords, who were unwilling to integrate their own loyal units 
into a military subject to Dushanbe’s control. Second, as new 
conscripts were drafted from throughout the territory, many came 
from ethno-regional backgrounds marginalized by the so-called 
“Kulobization” of the RT government. Knowing the national 
integration process within the military would take time, it is 
reasonable to assume that the regime would be fearful of the 
potential threat presented by these new military personnel in the 
short run. Slowly but surely, Rakhmon eliminated the internal 
threat posed by the presence of warlords (both from those 
absorbed into the formal military structure and those operating 
independently) and looked to new beginnings for the military. 
Thus, the institution of conscription of young men from all parts 
of Tajikistan and all ethno-regional identities became a strategy 
that served a dual purpose: 1) to provide loyal manpower to the 
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armed services and 2) to integrate the various social cleavages 
dividing the state. I examine this process in Chapter V. 
 
The Nationalism, Identity, and Militarism Nexus 
Critical Geographies of Militarism 
 To situate this study of militarism, it is important to 
examine the literature in critical militarism studies (geography 
in particular) that until recently has largely concentrated on 
the Anglophone world. Critical military geographies investigate 
our understandings of the ways in which military activities shape 
the cultural landscape and social relations. There are 
interesting parallels between these Western-based studies and the 
case of Tajikistan, but also important differences. The 
similarities are primarily related to the many commonalities 
found in modern military institutions, including but not limited 
to rank structures, orders of battle, and training practices. 
Within the commonalities of modern militaries, there are specific 
differences between Western experiences and those of the post-
Soviet states. In this section, I review literature on Western 
militaries, but also examine the Soviet and Russian experiences 
with militarism. In the latter section, I focus on two important 
legacies of the Soviet military that continue to shape militarism 
in Tajikistan: dedovshschina and conscription.  
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 The study of military activities, particularly conflict, 
has long been a part of geography. In the modern period, most 
geographic scholarship regarding military conflict fell under two 
subdisciplines: 1) geopolitics and 2) military geography, with 
the latter comprising the “application of geographic tools and 
techniques to the solution of military problems” (Woodward, 2005: 
720). The recent emergence of a new subfield engaging in the non-
violent processes and practices of military spatial ordering has 
opened the door to studies of militarism and its interface with 
civil society. A number of the geographers who publish within 
critical geopolitics circles are also regular contributors to 
scholarship in militarism, suggesting an already existing synergy 
between the two. This section conceptualizes my critical analysis 
of the RT military’s function in society. In doing so, I seek not 
to draw clear lines between what is (critical) militarism and 
what is critical geopolitics, but rather to outline the nascent 
framework of militarism geographies and to explore the 
inevitable, and to some degree already existing, crossovers 
between this subfield and critical geopolitics. 
 Gerard Toal (1996: 18) defined (critical) geo-politics as 
“the politics of writing global space.” He was a seminal figure 
making the case for the critical questioning of “how global space 
is produced and organized by governmentalizing intellectuals of 
statecraft.” Critical geopolitics seeks to question the manners 
in which space is dissected and defined through global power 
arrangements. From the imperial actions that drove the birth of 
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classical geopolitics through the Cold War era to the 
contemporary period during which the so-called “Global War on 
Terror” (GWOT) has dominated discourses in critical geopolitics, 
the role of the military in securing space has been ubiquitous 
and prominent, posing the question of how critical militarism 
differs from critical geopolitics. While I continue to discuss 
both here, I will concentrate on militarism in this section and 
critical geopolitics in Chapter IV. 
 Woodward (2004; 2005) stops short of defining the 
geographies of militarism and military activities as a 
subdiscipline. Rather, she has sought to expose geographers to 
the role the military plays in everyday practices and to the way 
it shapes societies at the local and national scales. In 
responding to Yves Lacoste’s (1976) view that geography is 
primarily about armed conflict, Woodward contends “the escalation 
of armed conflict should not distract us from paying attention to 
the little things that make armed conflict possible” (2005: 731). 
The active exercise of state power predominant in critical 
geopolitics’ discourses may now be complimented with geographies 
of militarism. However, cleanly separating these sub-disciplines 
is problematic; hence finding and developing synergies between 
them is easier than exposing the tensions. For my purposes, the 
synergies are more important; in Chapter V I address the 
geopolitics of Tajikistan and critically connect them with the 
geographies of militarism I introduce here. 
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At this relatively early stage in geography’s engagement 
with militarism, there are two primary differences distinguishing 
these two critical geographies: 1) scale and 2) nonviolent 
processes. Critical geopolitics’ focus on the state’s actions in 
the global sphere is complimented by militarism’s focus on the 
military land uses and consequences of military presence at the 
local and national scales. Power-centered relationships among 
states and non-state actors are located in the global sphere. 
Militarism’s emphasis on the local/national scale is reflected in 
some of the key works of geographers inquiring into the common 
practices associated with military activities. Woodward’s 
Military Geographies (2004) makes a compelling case for research 
into non-violent military spaces. Among other topics, she 
deconstructs the local-scale effects of active military training 
on land use and has increasingly engaged with personnel to 
investigate how soldiers perceive their participation in the 
military through spatial narratives (Woodward and Jenkings 2012; 
Woodward 2008). 
 Geographers are also investigating the development of 
environments (cultural, political and economic) that encourage 
and accept extensive militarism at a level that serves the needs 
of state and economic elites. Bernazzoli and Flint (2009; 2010) 
contend that through everyday practices, militarism ties the 
individual to the state and synthesizes the relationship in ways 
“not typically associated with the state, but which are vital to 
the success of state agendas” (2010; 159). Further, through the 
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lens of Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony, these authors 
posit that “– the ability (of elites) to set agendas and define 
values and norms – has advanced militaristic goals as well as 
economic or class goals” (2009: 397). By normalizing the role of 
the military and militarization in the everyday affairs of the 
domestic population, elites further their capability to conduct 
military violence: soldiers recruited, weapons manufactured, and 
unit deployments abroad are legitimized by elites and accepted by 
the population. 
 However, this normalization of militarism does not take 
place within a vacuum contained by the sovereign boundaries of 
the nation-state; rather it is affected by assumptions and 
perceptions of the outside world. The geopolitical fears that 
define the threat of the ‘other’ in turn shape government 
decisions and subsequently civil society’s relationship with its 
military. Geographers (Flint, 2008; Farish, 2007) have commented 
on the Cold War era construction of a psychologically and morally 
sound population that could serve the political needs of the 
state to defend against a conceptual threat (e.g. communism) 
instead of a specific territorialized enemy based in a nation-
state. In comparing everyday practices in Cold War North America 
and those in the post-911 period, Farish (2007: 265) noted that 
“(i)nside the indefinite boundaries of the homeland, moreover, we 
have recently witnessed another set of school drills, urban 
simulations, propaganda-heavy press conferences, and, most 
importantly, calls for the mobilization of minds in the service 
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of American militarism.” The militarized response to geopolitical 
frameworks drives domestic practices within civil society. Such 
practices can also mean the existence of militarized territory in 
the homeland; army bases, air force installations and naval docks 
all require visible imprints on the cultural landscape that shape 
and reflect both the local community in which they are placed and 
the nation as a whole. But some military spaces are designed to 
be invisible, both on the landscape and in the arena of public 
discourse. With origins in the Cold War and an expanded role 
after 9/11, the (global) network of “black” facilities operated 
by the U.S. security apparatus profoundly shape global 
geopolitics while remaining officially nonexistent on the U.S. 
landscape. Yet these “black” sites have a domestic geography too, 
its existence acknowledged through lived experience, conflict 
over indigenous territorial rights, and the fascination of the 
American population with its mysterious operational details 
(Paglen, 2009). 
 The existing framework of militarism’s geographies has 
focused on domestic and primarily everyday notions of military 
activities in the Anglophone world. But it would be difficult to 
accept this agenda as circumscribing this subdiscipline’s many 
avenues for research, either in terms of subject matter or scale. 
Synergies with critical geopolitics are evident and active among 
many scholars who publish along both lines of inquiry. A number 
of publications (see Flint, 2008; Woodward and Jenkings, 2012; 
Dijkink, 2005; Bacevich, 2005) straddle the line between 
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domestic/global scales and/or non-violent military 
activities/direct military action, providing evidence of the 
difficulty of attempting to epistemologically separate critical 
geopolitics from militarism.  
 To develop our understanding of the synergies between these 
two sub-disciplines, it is useful to unpack a similar 
relationship between international political economy and 
geopolitics. Publications rooted in the geopolitical/geo-economic 
nexus (see Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Agnew 2005; Smith, 2003; 
2005; Sparke, 2007; Roberts, Secor and Spark, 2007) combine the 
calculated raw power of geopolitics and its representations with 
the softer power structures of globalized capitalism. In doing 
so, they expose the fundamental relationship between the tools of 
power and their economic engine. The geographies of militarism 
can be added to this nexus, forming a triangular, rather than 
bilateral, relationship. Militarism serves the needs of 
geopolitical decision makers while increasingly relying upon a 
military industrial complex (to use the words of U. S. President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1960) that is hierarchically well 
situated within the political economies of the U.S. and U.K. (see 
also Anderton and Isard, 1985; Bacevich, 2005). The synergy 
between geopolitics, militarism and political economy (aka 
‘geoeconomics’) shape and reflect each other.  
In Tajikistan this synergy exists, though its political 
economy exhibits important differences. As a small, landlocked, 
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post-Soviet state with no historical links to the world system, 
the communist legacy is a powerful one. Tajikistan has little to 
offer the world economy in terms of natural resources, production 
capacity, or consumptive markets. However, it does have excess 
labor, which is employed through a migrant economy in the Russian 
Federation. This migrant economy shapes the decisions of both its 
supplier (Tajikistan) and consumer (Russia) with regard to their 
political and military relationships, whether it involves 
negotiations over the basing of the RF 201st MRD, the RT’s 
reliance on Russia for its existential defense, or young 
Tajikistani males’ personal choices between potential 
conscription and labor migration to Russia. Connecting the 
triangular links between geopolitics, political economy and 
militarism is imperative to understanding the relationship 
between national identity and militarism in Tajikistan, and I 
make these relationships clear in the coming chapters. 
 The domestic focus of current militarism geographies has 
expanded to the international sphere, where the politics and 
culture of the local intersect with the globalizing presence of 
foreign militaries in non-violent, everyday practices. The spaces 
surrounding Western military bases in foreign states have become 
the subject of scholarly research. These local-scale 
relationships often carry profound meaning both for the host 
population and for the foreign military personnel based in semi-
permanently in places such as Okinawa (Yamazaki 2011) and Cyprus 
(Higate and Henry 2011) they reflect and shape the geopolitical 
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relationship between the host and renting state. Similarly, 
investigation into military spaces of more peripheral states is 
an important next step for critical militarism/geopolitics 
research. This dissertation examines Russia’s long-term military 
basing structure in Tajikistan (Najibullah 2011; RFE/RL’s Tajik 
Service 2013). 
 
National Identity and Military Service 
Bernazzoli and Flint’s (2009) examination of the U.S.’s 
tacit and active acceptance of militarism as a component of civil 
society is, in essence, a framework for understanding how the 
military shapes and reflects national sentiments. Ronald Krebs’ 
work on citizenship and military service notes that during the 
late 1800s, Europe embraced the military as a ““school for the 
nation” that would transform multiethnic chaos into cohesive 
national order, and that during the post WWII decolonization 
period new militaries would act as “modernizing” and 
“nationalizing” forces that could bind subnational groups into 
new nations (Krebs, 2006: 1-2). This observation is important; 
much like militarism’s geographies, the study of militaries as 
nation-builders is anchored in Western, particularly Anglophone 
academia and policy circles. Studies of militaries in the 
developing world do exist; however, the modern national military 
that acts as a model for post-colonial states is essentially a 
Western invention. To understand how these institutions 
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(successfully or unsuccessfully) function as national 
integrators, it is helpful to understand the social composition 
of militaries of states such as the U.S., the U.K. and Israel. 
Naturally, the case of Tajikistan cannot be properly understood 
without analyzing the structure of the Soviet Union’s Red Army 
and the military of the Russian Federation. This section examines 
the experience in these states to understand the context of 
civil-military relations in Tajikistan. Each case relates to 
Tajikistan in a different way, whether it deals with successful 
integration and a contract military (U.S.), subnational cleavages 
and incomplete integration (Israel), or as the architect of 
established military structure (both formal and informal) of the 
RT military (USSR/Russia). 
 
The U.S. Experience 
The U.S. stands as a model for popular integration in the 
military; the egalitarian inclusion of blacks and Latinos (as 
well as other minorities) has generally been considered a 
successful, if incomplete process (Moskos, 1966; Levy, 1998; 
Kirby, et.al. 2000; Cowen, 2006; Lundquist, 2008; Bailey, 2009). 
The official beginning of desegregation in the U.S. military 
began in 1948. When forces still used conscription as a 
recruitment method (particularly the army), the institution of 
the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) produced a quantitative 
(Levy, 1998; Bailey, 2009) attempt at universalism. This exam 
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provided soldiers the opportunity to obtain training, be assigned 
to specific posts, and advance within the military ranks based on 
their performance rather than any subjective assessment of their 
abilities by their superiors. The AFQT is seen as an integrative 
step forward that would give blacks and other marginalized 
populations opportunity without the shadow of institutionalized 
racism.  
However, the deferment structure implemented in the 1950s 
that caused such a (justified) backlash during the Vietnam War 
placed a disproportional burden of combat on the lower classes, 
including blacks (Levy, 1998; Bailey, 2009). As a result of this 
backlash President Nixon implemented the All-Volunteer Force 
(AVF), which removed conscription and relied primarily on market 
forces to recruit personnel. As feared by military brass, the 
recruits to the AVF came mainly from lower income populations. As 
Yarmolinsky and Foster (1983: 75) explained: “it can be inferred 
from periodic surveys conducted by the Defense Department that, 
in the aggregate, today’s volunteers are more disadvantaged 
economically than their counterparts who elect not to join the 
military.” 
Geographer Debra Cowen (2006; 2007) argues that the AVF (in 
the U.S. and Canada) is a new form of neoliberal governance 
called ‘workfare,’ in which the social welfare benefits to lower 
income Americans are provided through the enticement of 
‘voluntary’ military service. In her view, “‘(m)ilitary workfare’ 
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raises particular questions given that large numbers of 
racialized people must risk their lives in exchange for basic 
wages and spaces of social reproduction. Old and new racisms 
together fuel U.S. militarisms at multiple scales” (Cowen, 2007: 
4). Cowen further notes the disproportionate number of poor rural 
whites who serve in the contemporary army, creating a stark 
rural/urban spatiality of small town and urban servicemen and 
women (ibid: 10). Hispanics make up a proportionally small 
percentage of enlistees, but their numbers are growing rapidly. 
To take Cowen’s view one step further, recruitment strategies 
still reproduce racial and ethnic divides in terms of who serves, 
but such divides are not necessarily reproduced within the 
military structure regarding personnel advancement and 
professional interaction.  
According to sociologist Jennifer Lundquist, military life 
seems to largely agree with minorities who serve relative to the 
civilian employment. Her quantitative research (2008) displays 
higher job satisfaction rates among blacks and Latinos of both 
genders as compared to whites. The explanation relies on the 
relative social status of each group in the civilian world v. the 
military. 
An identical term of military service experienced by a 
black man and a white man may be interpreted in divergent 
ways based on their different civilian baselines. ….More 
equitable circumstances in the military than the civilian 
world explain a great deal of why groups that ordinarily 
express lower satisfaction than whites in the civilian 
world express higher satisfaction in the military context 
(2008: 492). 
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I believe that the residual higher satisfaction with 
military employment among minorities is rooted in the 
military’s meritocratic organization (ibid: 494). 
 
 
The results of this research suggest that the U.S. project of an 
egalitarian military has been largely successful. This is not to 
say that racism doesn’t exist in the U.S. military or that social 
integration is complete, but rather that it has been essentially 
removed on an institutionalized basis. Coupled with other 
processes of militarization in American society, this degree of 
integration generates positive views of the military that 
position it as part of the glue that cements the American nation 
to the state. 
 
The Israeli Experience 
From its outset following the 1948 war, the new Israeli 
government designed the IDF (Israeli Defense Force) to be a 
universalizing nation-building project (Levy, 1997; Ben Eliezer, 
1998; Kachtan, 2012). The IDF also differed in an important way 
from the Western (i.e. British) militaries after which it was 
modeled. Ascension to the officer corps was to be directly from 
the enlisted ranks based on a uniform objective system of 
performance review. This system deviates from the Western model, 
which typically requires a college education and extensive 
officer training; a so-called “People’s Army” (Levy, 1997). 
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However, this system of rules was written by ethnically European 
Israelis, which meant that the “rational, objective criteria 
determining an individual soldier’s position were, in fact, 
geared more toward the education, values and primary skills of 
Western draftees (Levy, 1997: 41). Since military service was 
seen as a key to social acceptance, the experience could affect 
an individual soldier’s life long after his/her period in 
uniform. 
A division of labor became evident that challenged the 
ethos of the egalitarian IDF. Westerners (Ashkenazim) came to 
dominate the officer corps and coveted units, while ‘Orientals’ 
from the N. Africa and the Middle East (Mizrahim) took on more 
peripheral roles (Levy, 1997; Kachtan, 2012). Sociologist Levy 
(1997) notes that, at the time, this arrangement was considered 
to be appropriate by all parties, as the Ashkenazim had the 
relevant skills, experience and education; these traits were to 
be conveyed to the Mizrahim over time as the Israeli state 
developed. 
Kachtan (2012) demonstrates that this division of labor 
within the IDF has largely continued, at least in the perception 
of soldiers and citizens. Her focus lies solely on the ethnic 
divide between Ashkenazims and Mizrahims, thus avoiding other 
identities such as Russian, Ethiopian, Druze or Bedouin. By 
engaging with the production and reproduction of identity within 
two rival units, the (predominantly Ashkenazim) Paratroops and 
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the (predominantly Mizrahim) Golani, Kachtan contends (see also 
Levy, 1997) that the IDF “plays a key role in creating, 
maintaining, and perpetuating ethnic identities among its 
soldiers” (2012: 150). Further, she connects this ethnic divide 
to divisions in Israeli society as a whole: 
Instead of causing ethnic identity to dissolve into a 
melting pot, as it was meant to do according to the State 
of Israel’s goal, the army becomes an active participant in 
creating extreme ethnic identities. Focusing on the 
soldier’s part in this process in fact reinforces and 
highlights the part that ethnicity still has in the Israeli 
military and society (ibid: 169). 
 
An altogether different relationship exists between Jewish 
Israelis and Arab Palestinians who serve in the IDF. The prime 
consideration here is the issue of perceived loyalty to the 
ethnocratic state, which institutionalizes “low ceilings for 
promotions, extensive background checks and automatic rejection 
of applicants with relatives in the occupied territories” for 
Arab Palestinians resulting from distrust (Kanaaneh, 2003: 15-
16). Through interviews of Palestinian personnel serving in the 
IDF, police or border patrol, Kanaaneh argues that their social 
inclusion was often conditional, based on Jewish Israelis’ 
knowledge of that service. As one interviewee stated, “(y)ou feel 
one thing when you are in uniform. Then there is no such thing as 
Arab and Jew. But once you take the uniform off, it’s all 
forgotten. You’re a dirty Arab again (ibid: 15). Over the years, 
Palestinians have killed many Arabs suspected of collaboration as 
retribution, but apparently few of these have been actual members 
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of the security forces (ibid: 17). Despite its egalitarian 
design, the systematic reinforcement of ethnic identity within 
the IDF makes arguments framing it as a successful social 
integrator appear flawed. Nevertheless, comparing the U.S. and 
Israel, the relationship between identity groups within the IDF 
are probably more similar to those that exist within the 
Tajikistani armed services – although cohesion within the 
contemporary IDF is substantially stronger and has been 
throughout most of its history. 
The case of Israel demonstrates the difficulty of 
integrating different ethnicities even when they share a strong 
common bond (Judaism and Zionism). Ethnicities serving together 
in the military of a post-colonial state that has experienced 
civil war (ie. Tajikistan) - or at the very least, struggles for 
political and economic power among various groups – present 
significant challenges. Taking the example of a stable state such 
as Israel and its military’s reproduction of entrenched 
identities, Enloe sees military service as more of a nation 
destroyer rather than a nation builder due to its tendency to 
reinforce subnational cleavages (1980). This is crucial argument; 
while militaries have the potential to produce stronger national 
sentiments, they are quite capable, if not likely, to produce the 
opposite under all but the best conditions. 
Post-colonial militaries typically have significant 
challenges emerging from multiethnic societies and weak national 
81 
institutions. When comparing them to the processes and successes 
of ‘modern’ militaries from Europe and North America, it is 
important to remember the differences that have marked the 
history of these more cohesive states, in which the growth of 
national sentiments has developed over relatively longer periods. 
The militaries in postcolonial states may be positioned as 
potential integrators of subnational cleavages, but the reality 
is more complicated.  Examining the cases of Afghanistan and 
USSR/Russia provide important insights into the RT military, 
which contends with social cleavages similar to Afghanistan and 
institutional structure inherited from the Soviet Union. 
 
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation 
The case of Afghanistan contains both strong parallels and 
dramatic differences with Tajikistan. Both have experienced civil 
war, though the former’s war duration has been far longer, more 
devastating, and has yet to end. More importantly, both have 
integrated former insurgents into their current militaries. 
Remarkably, Tajiks represent a portion of those integrated troops 
in both cases. Simonsen describes the problems associated with 
this scenario. 
In deeply divided societies the most worrisome scenarios of 
disintegration would seem to be associated with the model 
in which entire existing irregular units are inducted into 
new military structures. Such units may already have strong 
primary-group cohesion: they may share a loyalty to their 
commander (who may or may not have joined the military with 
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them); they may have a history of (irregular) combat 
together; and they are likely to share values and goals, 
besides – most probably – being homogeneous in ethnic or 
sectarian terms. The primary-group cohesion in this case, 
then, would be within the pre-existing, irregular unit, as 
well as tied to the soldier’s kin outside of the force. On 
the other hand, vertical, secondary-group cohesion – 
between the soldiers and higher military units (and beyond) 
– may be very weak (2009: 1488). 
 
Further, he notes that when formerly under-represented groups 
(Tajiks and Uzbeks of the Northern Alliance, e.g.) gain power and 
influence, expectations that they might use their new position in 
society to advance the common good are naïve (ibid: 1486). Such 
has been the case in Tajikistan, where Tajiks from the Kulob 
region have solidified their power and employed it to enrich 
themselves. While the RT remains stable, it regularly contends 
with resistance to its sovereignty from the periphery, most 
notably in GBAO.  
 The degree to which the RT military is modeled after its 
Soviet predecessor is notable. A number of key practices of 
Soviet military culture remain in the armed forces of the 
contemporary Russian Federation (RF) and that of the RT, most 
importantly conscription and dedovshchina. Holloway notes that 
“in the 1970s most Western observers regarded the Soviet armed 
forces (along with the KGB) as one of the two Soviet institutions 
that worked well. This image was fostered not only by Western 
defense ministries, which needed to support their claims for more 
resources, but also by the Soviet press which, although it 
carried articles on problems in the armed forces, was devoted to 
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inculcating respect for the military” (Holloway 1989, 13). Gresh 
(2011, 192–93) adds that “the Russian State is derived from a 
long history of militarism,” which has served to maintain popular 
support for its policies and/or a lack of resistance to them, 
most specifically conscription. While militarism wields a 
powerful influence in both the U.S. and RF, there are important 
differences in the national cultures of these states that dictate 
how it is manifested. In Russia, “the principles of individual 
liberty and freedom that is often associated with an all-
volunteer force, as in the United States, do not factor into the 
equation – people generally accept the realities of service” 
(Gresh 2011, 192).  
 Among many others, Tajikistan shares two key practices with 
Russia that directly influence citizens’ connection to the 
military and thus, affect the development and maintenance of 
national sentiments: 1) conscription and 2) dedovshchina. 
Understanding the role of these practices in the Russian military 
contextualizes how Tajikistani citizens understand their own 
armed forces. In this section, I first analyze the similarities 
and differences between Russia and Tajikistan regarding 
conscription, and then examine the strong legacy embodied in the 
practice of dedovshchina. My research on the specific details of 
RT citizens’ experiences with these practices is found in Chapter 
V, so what follows focuses primarily on the Russia. 
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 Both Russia and the RT perform conscription of males 18-27 
years of age on a semi-annual basis for two months each in the 
Spring and Fall. Exemptions exist for cases of bad health, 
enrollment in college, and family provision (e.g. only sons, 
etc.) (Gresh 2011; Asia-Plus 2014a). Resistance to conscription 
policies does exist in Russia, though as Gresh (2011, 192–93) 
notes, it has not manifested itself into a strong civil 
opposition due to cultural acceptance of the practice and a 
historical appreciation of the military. Nonetheless, he further 
comments that top military officers still control much of the 
discourse on conscription in civil society (ibid, 195); and many 
of these officers hold on to conscription “since they believe 
that it provides a good method of instilling patriotic values and 
socializing young men” (Herspring 2005b, 143). Gresh further 
notes three common methods employed by those families who choose 
to avoid service: 1) leaving their homes during recruitment 
periods, 2) bribing medical examiners to produce a failed exam, 
or 3) bribing local conscription commissioners. As I will show 
later, all of these methods are common in Tajikistan, perhaps to 
an even greater degree than in Russia. 
   The ritualized hazing found in post-Soviet militaries is 
connected to the conscription process, though it is not 
necessarily the direct result of it. The Russian term 
dedovshchina translates to “grandfathering” and is performed on 
new conscripts by those already in service. Since recruitment 
drives occur twice a year in six months intervals, the victims 
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are primarily those who have just entered the service, while the 
perpetrators represent soldiers conscripted at least six months 
prior. Holloway (1989) observes that “(d)edovshchina is not a new 
phenomenon (it dates back at least to the 1960s, and perhaps 
earlier), but it is only in the last few years that it has been 
widely exposed in the press” (p. 14). That its exposure grew as 
the Soviet Union collapsed should not be seen as a surprise given 
the state’s attempt to hide the war in Afghanistan from its 
citizens (Whitlock 2003) and the resulting media backlash against 
the war and the policies that surrounded it. Daucé and Sieca-
Kozlowski’s (2006) examination of dedovshchina reveals that the 
number of hazing-related criminal cases rose by 25% between 2003-
05, and by August 2006, there were 17 deaths and over 100 
injuries stemming from about 3500 reported incidents (p. 23). 
 It also should not be much of a surprise that Soviet 
authorities would suppress any discussions of dedovshchina; the 
cult of personality in Russia is dependent upon a “family 
culture,” in which a fatherly figure sees himself as the caring 
decision maker with little input from subordinates and is 
accepted as such by them (Trompenaars 1998). Russian military 
authorities saw no reason to have their expertise examined and 
questioned, so they simply ignored its existence publically. 
Regarding family culture in the RF military (which the RT 
military imitates), Gresh remarks that 
(t)he corporate culture of the Russian Army very much takes 
on these characteristics. Russian authorities have 
86 
continually relied upon “the right person” or the power of 
personality to fix things. Power and decision-making is 
definitely not shared or decentralized, and all Russian 
authorities have repeatedly emphasized their expertise as 
one by definition; outside critique is certainly not looked 
favorably upon (2011, 199–200). 
 
 Authorities’ resistance to criticism, whether from 
subordinates within the military structure or as part of 
discourse in civil society, in turn produces and reproduces 
practices that have negative outcomes. These practices have 
become so accepted in the culture of the military that, even in 
the face of obvious detrimental effects, the command apparatus 
faces little serious internal pressures to change them. 
Dedovshchina in post-Soviet militaries clearly fits this 
description; in Tajikistan however, we can add the 
conscription/impressment practice of oblava to this category (see 
Chapter V). For now, it is important to understand the strong 
influence of the Soviet Union and the subsequent Russian 
Federation upon political and military culture in Tajikistan, and 
the contemporary views and practices this influence produces 
there.  
 The entrenched challenges posed by questions concerning 
conscription and the persistent problem of dedovshchina within 
the RF military manifested themselves into a military that had 
difficulty functioning effectively in time of need. Faced with 
these issues, plus the additional problems of corruption 
(including the scamming of conscripts for bribe payments by 
recruitment personnel), and the growing obsolescence and 
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maintenance of the military’s weapons technology, Putin began to 
institute reforms in 2008. The conflict in Georgia in 2008 
displayed a military success to the outside world, but internal 
studies have shown that all of these problems (and more) were 
seriously hampering the RF military’s operational effectiveness 
and that major changes were necessary (Braun 2012, 69). One part 
of these reforms has been the reduction of conscripted service 
from two years to one (Gresh 2011), which human rights groups 
have urged the RT to adopt as well (Ozodagon 2014a).  
 I bring the discussion of the Soviet and Russian legacy to 
Tajikistan’s military by highlighting some important insights 
from the experiences of Central Asian personnel in the Soviet Red 
Army, particularly from those who served in the Afghan war (1979-
89). Marat (2010) relates a number of these experiences; within 
them, I note three that have great relevance to understanding the 
contemporary RT military. First, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
ethnicity and degrees of Russian language fluency typically 
determined levels of respect and responsibility afforded to 
Central Asian conscripts by Slavic conscripts and officers, even 
driving those with better skills “to align themselves more with 
other Russian speakers than with their fellow countrymen” (p. 
38). Second, the economic and social disparities of the Central 
Asian republics “led to hazing based on ethnic background” and 
“continuously lower performance by non-Russian soldiers” (ibid: 
38). Further, she notes that “although the Soviet Union was still 
a superpower, its army was rived with ethnic resentments and 
88 
tensions. The Soviet Army with various ethnic groups serving 
alongside with each other exacerbated existing cleavages and 
indirectly encouraged confrontations among ethnic groups” (ibid: 
39).  
 However, the Afghan war acted as a social integrator of 
sorts, and Central Asian veterans of the conflict, due to their 
knowledge of local cultures and language (especially 
Tajik/Farsi/Dari speakers), did not have “to prove his nerve in 
the army’s informal hierarchy and therefore hazing was not as 
cruel at war as in peacetime” (ibid: 47). Third and finally, 
experience in the Afghan war, along with the universalism 
(‘internationalism’) of Soviet doctrine, built a Soviet identity 
among the veterans that remains in place today. The Afghan 
Veteran Union (AVU).  
Most Central Asia veterans, however, say that they drew a 
clear line between their Soviet identity, calling 
themselves internationalists, and the local Afghan 
population, despite often similar physical appearances and 
languages…Their dual identity – the Soviet and the national 
– explains the veterans’ support of both, the Soviet regime 
and the newly independent state (Ibid: 40) 
 
These experiences tell us two things: despite the existence 
of ‘internationalism’ as Soviet doctrine, ethnic cleavages not 
only persisted but were reproduced within the Red Army and 
dedovshchina was the preferred hierarchical method by which it 
was enforced. However, the bond and trust developed among troops 
through combat played a strong role in overcoming these cleavages 
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(contextualized in time and space) and left Central Asian 
veterans with a lasting positive impression of the Soviet Union 
generally and of their military experiences during the war 
specifically. The positive connotations of the Soviet effort in 
Afghanistan are based on a strong sense of purpose (most such 
veterans see the war as a victory, in contrast to Western 
narratives) and demonstrate the value of military conflict in 
building national sentiments. The contemporary RT military 
contends with similar issues regarding ethnic cleavages and 
dedovshchina, but its war legacy plays a far more divisive role 
in its history than the Afghan war does for Soviet Central Asian 
veterans.  
 
Conclusion 
This section highlights important considerations regarding 
the role of social divisions – particularly ethno-regional ones – 
within military institutions. The United States stands as an 
example of successful integration of race and ethnicity, but 
represents a very different historical and social context. 
Democratic governance, an immigrant population, and a history of 
foreign wars (in which social bonds are strengthened among 
soldiers) all contributed to its development in this regard. 
Similarly, Israel sought to use the military as an integrative 
institution from its beginning. Despite this goal, it has not 
been as successful as the U.S.; however, its history is 
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significantly shorter. On the other hand, democratic governance, 
Jewish religion and numerous wars that have threatened Israel’s 
existence have helped to produce and reproduce cohesion, even if 
integration has been elusive. 
 The Soviet legacy’s effect on the formation of the RT 
military is twofold: 1) it serves as the model for the 
institutional structure, complete not only with nearly identical 
formal conscription processes, rank structures, and equipment, 
but also the negative cultural practice of dedovshchina; 2) its 
collapse led to the civil war, which exposed social cleavages and 
also prevented the RT from inheriting the Soviet military units 
based in the territory – the only Central Asian republic that 
experienced this loss. Questions of national cohesion presented 
by ethno-regional identity in Tajikistan in the aftermath of the 
civil war are challenging. Studies have shown that such cleavages 
are usually reproduced in the militaries of states that contain 
them. Moreover, this is not the only issue with which the RT 
military must contend; the unfair and often brutal illegal 
conscription practice of oblava, the physically and 
psychologically abusive hazing of dedovschina, and lack of a 
clear foreign existential threat all contribute to Tajikistani 
males’ disinterest in, if not outright fear of, service in the 
military. The positive connotations of service associated with 
the Soviet Red Army have been sustained within the population of 
Tajikistan. However, the respect of Russian military – especially 
relative to that of the RT – persists. The project of the RT 
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military as a manufacturer of national sentiments faces serious 
challenges. 
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CHAPTER III 
CRITICAL MILITARY GEOGRAPHIES IN TAJIKISTAN: CONCEPTUAL AND 
METHODOLICAL APPROACHES 
 In this chapter I conceptualize my research within the 
framework of the nascent sub-discipline of critical military 
geographies introduced in the previous chapter. I then discuss 
the challenges present in conducting sensitive research in a 
closed autocratic environment, which, in turn, limits the 
methodological options available for data collection. Lastly, I 
outline my methods, discuss my choices of research participants, 
and explain adjustments I made to my original methodology after 
arriving in country for fieldwork. 
 
Critically Situating Tajikistan’s Military Geographies 
 In many ways, Woodward (2004; 2005) has identified an 
important gap in the geographic literature on political power and 
social relations in her discussions of militarism. For her, 
“(m)ilitarism’s geographies are about the control of space, about 
creating the necessary preconditions for military activities” 
(Woodward 2004, 3). Woodward’s focus on the preconditions for 
armed conflict is crucial here. She specifically seeks to avoid 
discussions engaging in war and its justifications – she sees 
critical geopolitics valuable in this regard – in order to 
conceptualize the everyday aspects of military presence in space, 
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how they become normalized into the dominant culture, and how 
they “produce their own ordering of space” (ibid, 4). By focusing 
on the power of military activities to shape landscapes and 
spatially influence social relations during times of peace 
(particularly domestically), she argues that we can develop a 
more complete understanding of military power.  
 For Woodward, this is not merely a descriptive process, but 
also a normative one. “It involves questioning the moral 
authority of militarism, the rights and wrongs of the use of 
violence in pursuit of political and economic ends, and the 
morality of the consequences of military preparedness” (Woodward 
2004, 9). In this way, critical geographies of militarism have 
much in common with the approach taken by critical geopolitics. 
But there is another important similarity that deals not in the 
conceptual method and morality but rather the practice of 
critical geographies of militarism: subject matter. Most (if not 
all) of the literature in this subfield focuses on Western 
militaries performing what are considered to be hegemonic 
geopolitical roles; Woodward’s own geographic focus is firmly 
located in the U.K. Others, such as Flint and Bernazzoli 
(Bernazzoli and Flint 2009a; Bernazzoli and Flint 2010; Flint 
2008) have engaged primarily with  the U.S. context, though Cowen 
(Cowen 2005; Cowen 2006; Cowen 2007) has conceptualized 
citizenship and militarism in both the U.S and Canada.  
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 Using this framework to examine and conceptualize how 
militarism shapes and reflects national sentiments in Tajikistan 
differs from these previous studies in important ways. First, 
Tajikistan relies on (so-called) universal national conscription 
to recruit personnel; all three of the above-mentioned Anglophone 
states rely primarily on contract (aka ‘volunteer’) soldiers in 
their armed forces.  
 Second, both the U.S. and U.K. have active foreign policies 
that involve military action in many areas of the world. Studying 
militarism in these states necessarily has to engage with their 
global reach and commitment. This global reach presents appealing 
avenues for critical review of how it shapes and reflects 
geographies of power both domestically and around the world. On 
the other hand, Tajikistan’s use of its military is focused on 
defense of the country from direct attack and internal threat 
suppression, a situation linked to its geopolitical situation, 
but also its governance, which also exhibits important 
differences.  
 Lastly, Tajikistan is a post-Soviet dictatorship (to pull 
the thin veil from its supposed representative democracy) with a 
highly centralized government evolving from the Soviet model 
(Matveeva 2009). The objects of most critical militarism research 
are liberal democratic governments. Much like my analysis of the 
differing goals of the U.S./U.K. militaries and that of 
Tajikistan, this governmental difference matters. The coercive 
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policies surrounding the RT armed forces (such as conscription) 
are made by a regime that appears to have little regard for the 
opinions of its citizens and the troublesome business of 
governing by consent. This is not to say that the Rakhmon regime 
does not pay homage to public opinion from time to time, but this 
is the exception rather than the norm. Civil society in 
Tajikistan is poorly developed (Lewis 2008; Heathershaw 2007).  
 Gramsci’s famous discussion on the “war of maneuver” in the 
overthrow of capitalist hegemony from European states is useful 
here. One of the most powerful aspects of militarism in Western 
states is the way civil society is shaped by the normalizing the 
presence and legitimation of military forces in daily life. 
Gramsci’s view that in “Russia the State was everything, civil 
society was primordial and gelatinous” (Gramsci 1972, 238) is 
applicable to Tajikistan. Dissecting the role of militarism in 
Tajikistan is, in general, simpler. The sole actor is the state, 
which decides who serves and who does not, how soldiers are to be 
compensated and cared for, and what role the military plays in 
Tajikistani society. Public debate on the subject may not be 
muted, but reactions by the government to such debates are 
primarily characterized by a defense of the status quo instead of 
the embrace of changing realities or popular viewpoints that 
challenge this status.  
 Much of the critical geographic literature on militarism is 
centered on the unpacking of Gramsci’s civil society, permeated 
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by militarism to its core, with the state serving only as an 
“outer ditch, behind which stood a powerful system of fortresses 
and earthworks” (Gramsci 1972, 238). In the West, geographies of 
militarism reach far beyond the state and are actively layered 
throughout civil society. The layers of militarism in civil 
society prompted Bernazzoli and Flint to ask, “what are some of 
the everyday activities that reinforce militaristic notions of 
citizenship, patriotism, and nationalism? How do civil society 
actors such as schools and churches perpetuate these views” 
(Bernazzoli and Flint 2009b, 399)? These two questions have 
relevance for both the U.S./U.K. and Tajikistan, but the answers 
are likely to be quite different. In Tajikistan, civil society 
hardly exists; its schools are directly controlled by the central 
government, its mosques must be approved by the state (which 
directly selects the controlling imams) (Pannier and Lemon 2015; 
RFE/RL 2014).  
 These differences are important not only to the subject 
matter of this dissertation; they also influence the type of 
field research that can be undertaken. The lack of a well-
developed civil society lays bare the state and its coercive 
nature, but also creates a difficult environment for 
investigating the state and its intensions. The components of 
civil society – schools, business, news media, places of worship, 
etc. – that help reinforce the state also work to balance its 
coercive power and negotiate consent. Part of this negotiation 
involves academic inquiry, which (among other things) helps 
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identify public issues, investigate them, and offer potential 
solutions. Indeed, Woodward, Cowen and other academics 
investigating issues related to the military experience ebbs and 
flows in the level of cooperation they receive from authorities, 
but they are unlikely to be in personal danger as long as they 
operate within the well-documented letter of the law.  
 When the components of civil society are under the control 
of the state, as they largely are in Tajikistan, academic inquiry 
becomes problematic, or, in the worst case, may be seen as a 
threat to the state. Research under these conditions creates 
unique challenges, not the least of which is the threat to the 
researcher; indeed, the research participants themselves may be 
in danger. This is the backdrop for the research approaches 
discussed in the remainder of this chapter, which outlines my 
choice of methods and explains the challenges associated with 
fieldwork in the autocratic environment of contemporary 
Tajikistan.  
 
Study Parameters 
 Fieldwork for this dissertation was conducted in Tajikistan 
from August 2013 to March 2014 and was funded through an 
Individual Advanced Research Opportunities Fellowship (IARO) from 
The International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX). During 
this period, I lived in Dushanbe and travelled to other parts of 
the country to conduct research. I stayed for extended periods in 
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Khorog and Khujand, and travelled to Kurgan-Teppe often. I made 
additional short trips to Kulob, Kholkhozabad and Moskovskii. I 
also took a multi-day trip into the Vaakhan Valley.  
 This dissertation is based on a combination of interviews, 
media analysis, participant observation and secondary sources. I 
used interviews and media analysis to answer all three of my 
research questions, which address 1) ethno-regional identity in 
the RT military, 2) conscription practices, and 3) the influence 
on foreign militaries based in Tajikistan on the state’s 
investment in its own armed forces (see Chapter I for the 
complete questions). I performed participant observation to see 
with my own eyes the living and material conditions in the RT 
military. These conditions shape RT citizens’ views of, and 
willingness to serve in, their national military forces. Given 
the limited amount of academic research performed in Tajikistan, 
I analyzed secondary sources to assist in addressing these 
questions and to align some of my findings with research on 
related issues from other post-Soviet states (e.g. military 
hazing/dedovshchina).   
 In the following sections, I will explain each of these 
methods, my reasoning for choosing them, and the challenges I 
experienced during data collection specifically and fieldwork 
generally. I start with the challenges associated with performing 
sensitive research in an autocratic political environment.  
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Qualitative Fieldwork in an Autocratic Environment 
 During my fieldwork, I had the opportunity to visit a few 
border guard zastavi (Russian: outposts) in the Vaakhan Valley in 
SE Tajikistan to perform participant observation and perhaps 
interview some border guard soldiers about the conditions in the 
service along this isolated frontier. My driver pulled our SUV up 
to the light blue driveway gate and my guide walked over to the 
smaller doorway entrance, where a young border guard met him. The 
border guard called another over, seemingly to get permission for 
our visit. A plain clothed man arrived shortly thereafter, and my 
guide spoke with him for a few minutes. He then returned to the 
SUV and said, “they will not let us in. The GKNB (State Committee 
for National Security) is there. They are afraid” (Respondent 10 
2013). I instantly became intensely worried, as I did not want to 
put any of my companions in danger, nor lose my visa and be 
forced to leave the country. However, my guide assured me that 
they were more afraid of us than we should be of them. They were 
only there because of the upcoming election (November 2013). 
 Tajikistan’s government for all intents and purposes is 
autocratic and inherits its structure from the Former Soviet 
Union. One respondent noted that most of its laws are either 
Soviet or Russian; in the latter case the RT government simply 
translates new Russian laws into Tajiki and puts them on the 
books without even reading them, assuming their worth solely by 
their origin (Respondent 23 2014). Included in this suite of 
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Soviet era bureaucratic structures is the secret police. Only the 
nomenclature has changed slightly, from the Soviet KGB (Committee 
for State Security) to the RT’s GKNB. 
 The danger of performing field research in an autocratic 
environment has been noted by some geographers (Natalie Koch 
2013; Gentile 2013). The incident above was typical of the fear I 
had for the local citizens whom I interviewed and who worked for 
me as guides and assistants. In most cases, my more educated 
associated were largely unconcerned as they were much more 
familiar with the dangers associated with their government and 
its secret service. I mostly only had to fear the premature end 
to my research in the country. My research participants, on the 
other hand, varied widely in their willingness to be interviewed, 
the types of questions they would entertain, and/or the type of 
answers they would provide.  
 
Encounters with the Security Apparatus 
 Gentile (2013) provides an important guide of sorts to the 
types of encounters one might experience from the security 
apparatus in autocratic states, which he refers to as the 
‘organs’. He performed most of his research in the post-Soviet 
world, so his insights are particularly relevant to Tajikistan. 
Indeed, I experienced a number of the same experiences he 
describes during my fieldwork; or at least, I think I did. One 
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can never be sure of everything when dealing with organizations 
such as the GKNB. 
 As per the story as the border guard zastava above, merely 
coming upon the GKNB is alarming and generates a moment of shock 
and fear, much of it to the unknown. For Gentile, “(t)heir 
occasional ‘emergence’ is enough to generate sufficient fear and 
diffidence to substantially alter the atmosphere of the research 
setting” (2013, 427). Indeed, encounters with the secret police 
can make you want to hide in your apartment, watch your back 
continuously, and even avoid contact with potential research 
participants in some belief that they will go away. The reality 
is that they may very well be following – shadowing – you 
frequently during your entire time in country.  
 The zastava encounter was not my only one with the GKNB 
while in GBAO; I was also stopped in Khorog while walking through 
the city. A few minutes after taking a photo of a government 
building (GKNB office perhaps), a young GKNB plain-clothed 
officer stepped in front of me, showed his badge, and demanded my 
passport in Russian. I provided it and he reviewed the page with 
my RT visa. Then he pointed to a specific date on the visa and 
told me that there was a problem and that I would have to come 
with him back to the office. I had to think quickly on my feet – 
in Russian as well – to extricate myself from this situation. The 
visa is written in Tajiki, not Russian; since I could not read 
it, I was not sure what he thought was wrong with the date. I 
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quickly flipped the page to my permit to travel to GBAO, which 
was much easier to read in that it only had two dates: the 
beginning and end of the permitted time I was allowed to visit 
the oblast. I pointed to these dates, citing that there was no 
problem. He reviewed the document, asked what I did for a living, 
and sent me on my way. He appeared slightly embarrassed about his 
error and seemed to want to end the encounter as quickly as 
possible after that.  
 This incident strongly parallels an example provided by 
Gentile’s description of the first encounter and its potential 
meaning.  
This confrontation may occur when you make an unexpected 
movement in a place where no one else is likely to be, but 
it might also be pre-arranged or even provoked by something 
you are (or from a distance seem to be) doing. Taking a 
casual picture of a street scene sufficed to provoke one of 
my shadowers into revealing himself as ‘representative of 
the law enforcement organs’ (i.e. the organ). Casual 
confrontations are best ignored; the shadower himself might 
even experience fear, embarrassment or shame. On the other 
hand, confrontations can be arranged on purpose, too, in 
order to convey a ‘we-are-watching-you’ message (Gentile 
2013, 431). 
 
In the aftermath, I could not discern the precise reasoning 
behind this encounter and largely considered it chance. My 
thoughts focused on the officer’s instinct to view a date on my 
visa as a problem. Either he knew everything was correct but 
thought I could not read Tajiki (he would be correct), or he 
could not read it himself. We were in GBAO, so if he was Pamiri 
his Tajiki may not be particularly good; Pamiris prefer their 
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local tongues (in Khorog: Shugni) or Russian over Tajiki, and 
many don’t know the national language. As it turns out, about a 
year later another researcher and I were talking and noted an 
encounter with someone fitting this description in Khorog. This 
researcher spoke Tajiki, not Russian, which the officer had 
difficulty understanding. We speculated that he was the same 
person, and that he actually could not read the visa correctly 
after all. Nevertheless, the experience haunted me for some time 
and altered the way I conducted myself during my fieldwork. I 
increasingly placed an emphasis on safety and caution in my 
processes; I discuss these changes later in this chapter. 
 
Electronic Communication Security 
 I had a lengthy conversation or two about electronic 
communication security in Tajikistan with a new American 
colleague, who had experience doing research in Tajikistan, a few 
weeks before I left. The overall message conveyed to me was to 
avoid using Skype (or similar programs), email or websites for 
any sensitive communication, a recommendation to which I adhered. 
Gentile notes that email messages he sent from an internet café 
“were saved and printed out by the organ, who even asked for my 
assistance in interpreting their contents” (Gentile 2013, 429). 
When speaking on Skype or over email, I developed a code that 
could be employed if sensitive material (such as my location, 
military installations I wanted to visit, or participants I 
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interviewed) needed to be discussed. I used these codes a few 
times, but I rarely had need for them as I generally avoided 
sensitive material in the online world; for the most part this 
did not directly affect my research.  
 
Effects of Closure on My Research Methods 
 Protecting my participants, my assistants and my research 
was constantly on my mind as I navigated through the securitized 
political landscape of daily life in Tajikistan. It was more than 
a month and a half before I conducted my first interview, 
spending most of that time acquainting myself with my 
surroundings and interviewing potential assistants. I considered 
it extremely important to avoid any attention from the state 
security services, but was more willing to take risks as the end 
of my research period approached. 
 The care and attention I took to staying off the GNKB’s 
radar led me to avoid virtually any attempt to contact and 
interview key members of the military or government until I was 
near the end of my research period. Any request for an interview 
would need to begin with an introduction from a mutual 
acquaintance of good standing. I would then need to be vetted 
through any channels my official thought fit to consult. I had no 
way of knowing whether a government or military official would 
include the GNKB as part of that vetting. So, as my fieldwork 
progressed, I made the decision to avoid speaking with any high 
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level official; it simply did not appear to be worth the risk, 
especially since they frequently made statements in the local 
media that addressed many of the questions I would ask. The 
arrest of University of Toronto researcher Alexander Sodiqov by 
GNKB agents while meeting a participant for an interview a few 
months after I left Tajikistan (Lemon 2014; BBC 2014) reaffirmed 
this decision as the right one. To be clear, Sodiqov is an RT 
national, so under greater personal danger than myself. In all 
likelihood, I would only have lost my visa and had my fieldwork 
brought to a premature end. 
 
Methods 
 As noted in the previous section, the sensitivity of the 
subject, the autocratic structure of the Rakhmon regime and the 
pervasive reach of the RT internal security apparatus heavily 
shaped my research. This context limited my choice of methods and 
tools in a number of ways. First, I could not openly advertise my 
research in attempts to recruit interview respondents; under 
these conditions, alerting the GNKB would not only threaten my 
research, but more importantly could endanger any RT citizens who 
might participate. Potential respondents were also aware of this 
concern; a few of them who had committed to meeting with me 
changed their mind before doing so and cancelled.  
 Second, my opportunities to directly observe military 
performances were shaped by my ability to be present incognito. 
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Keeping my identity a secret was not always possible, so in some 
cases I needed to create another identity for myself to gain 
access to the practice in question. For example, when I visited 
border zastavii in GBAO, my guide introduced me to border guard 
commanders in a variety of ways, including as a fiction author.  
 Third, my access to government and military leaders was 
severely limited. Since I did not want to draw attention to my 
research or myself, I opted to avoid any attempts to contact 
government leaders until I had gathered sufficient information 
from other sources. While this decision was successful in 
avoiding attention, it may have prevented me from successfully 
scheduling an interview; however, it is also possible that the 
officials in question or their superiors would have denied my 
request anyway after investigating me. In addition, the process 
of arranging an introduction and being vetted by the interviewee 
is lengthy: government officials do not want to be caught 
discussing their views on what may be considered sensitive 
information with someone with whom they are not familiar. The 
length of this process would make it difficult to complete other 
aspects of the research before turning my attention toward 
interviews with military and government officials. Given the 
potential repercussions, I did not see the benefits outweighing 
the risks of pursuing interviews with officials.  
 
 
107 
Research Assistant 
 My research assistant was a local Tajik living in Dushanbe. 
He was fluent in both Russian and Tajiki and spoke English 
reasonably well. He was useful in recruiting respondents for 
interviews, making travel arrangements in small towns and 
villages, and making small talk with respondents to help make 
them feel more comfortable. He was also helpful in assessing 
whether or not a respondent was holding information back during 
an interview (I was usually able to pick this up as well) and 
proposing questions to me that I should ask in specific 
situations. I will refer to him repeatedly in the sections that 
follow. 
 While in Khorog, I had a female Pamiri assistant. It was 
important to work with a local while in GBAO; it is likely that 
Pamiris would not readily trust a Tajik in this context and thus 
not respond as well during interviews. She was fluent in Russian, 
Tajiki and Shugni, and could speak English well. In addition, I 
needed a local assistant to recruit local respondents. However, 
using a female assistant came with a potential downside. The 
misogynistic culture of Tajikistan frowns upon men interacting 
with women in powerful positions that are usually associated with 
men. Talking about military conscription, bad conditions and 
dedovshchina with a female interpreter could make a respondent 
uncomfortable to answer certain questions. It is certainly 
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possible that a few of my interviewees were affected by this 
choice of an assistant.  
 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
 I chose interviews as a primary component of my data 
collection for a couple of reasons. First, without truly knowing 
what kind of data might be important, performing interviews 
allowed me to guide the conversation toward my interests while 
also allowing the interviewee to take me down new avenues that I 
may not have originally considered. For example, it quickly 
became clear upon the first conversations I had with locals that 
conscription and oblava were key sources of concern for citizens. 
However, the deep effects of dedovshchina, about which I had not 
placed much importance, were revealed to me by interviewees who 
brought the subject up themselves, without direct prompting from 
me.  
 My original target participant was the military veteran, 
who I believed would feel freer to discuss experiences and would 
be more accessible than actively serving soldiers. This strategy 
remained in place after I arrived in country. However, I added 
military-aged males to my targeted interview list after learning 
more about conscription and oblava and their potential effect on 
notions of national unity. I also added citizens who could 
comment on these practices from their important positions, 
including NGO staff, mahalla leaders, or simply village elders. 
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Identifying and Recruiting Participants 
 I wanted to get a representative sample of participants 
from each ethno-regional identity group in Tajikistan, which for 
my purposes includes Tajiks from Sughd Oblast in the North 
(primarily Khujandi), Khatlon Oblast in the south (primarily 
Kulobi), Garm/Rasht Valley in the Regions of Republican 
Subordination, Uzbeks, Pamiris and Kyrgyz. To this end, I spent 
extended periods in different locales to recruit interviewees 
from these different groups. In Fall 2013, I spent over 3 weeks 
in Khorog, GBAO, to recruit Pamiris and observe military 
installations in the region. This trip took place at this time 
and was limited in length due to the imminent arrival of winter 
weather, which severely reduces the area’s accessibility. My trip 
to Garm was cancelled due to bad weather, as this location is 
also subject to varying accessibility in the winter months. I 
spent a few weeks in Khujand in January 2014 to conduct 
interviews with locals and meet with Amparo staff. I travelled to 
Kurgan-Teppe on a number of occasions to interview Uzbeks and 
Kulobi Tajiks.  
 My research assistant was aware of my interest in 
participants who were representative of the whole country, and 
made it a point to inform me of the group identity of each 
participant he recruited. This point was especially important in 
Dushanbe, where the population contains representatives of all 
ethno-regional groups. Some of the Pamiris or Khujandis I 
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interviewed lived in Tajikistan’s capital city. I personally 
recruited some participants, while my research assistants 
recruited others. In some cases, interviewees introduced me to 
acquaintances and friends, creating a snowball effect. 
Snowballing was particularly true in Khorog and Dushanbe, with 
participants from the latter city even leading to participants in 
Kurgan-Teppe. I found this method was the most effective way to 
find military veterans. Since this group can be a bit more 
reserved (see next paragraph), receiving an introduction from 
another veteran helps to smooth the process and perhaps make a 
potential interviewee feel more comfortable sharing his 
experiences. 
 Finding interview participants who could talk about 
conscription and oblava was easier than finding actual military 
veterans who would comment on these matters. Most males had some 
experience with conscription as it is/was part of their daily 
lives for four months per year. Military veterans were more 
difficult to find and more reticent to meet. Many were from rural 
areas and were highly distrustful of outsiders, while others may 
have preferred not to talk about their experiences as they have 
the potential to be traumatic (as I demonstrate in Chapters V and 
VI). I sought veterans from all uniformed military services 
(Army, Air Force, National Guard Border Guards, Alpha, etc.), 
hoping to get representatives from each. 
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 I was successful in finding Tajik participants from the 
north, south and Dushanbe, an Uzbek, and multiple Pamiris. I was 
unable to interview either a Kyrgyz or a Garmi Tajik participant; 
Kyrgyz constitute a very small portion of the population and most 
live on the high plateau of eastern GBAO. Unfortunately, I did 
not come across any Garmi Tajiks in Dushanbe or Kurgan-Teppe in 
our recruiting process and I had to cancel my trip to Garm and 
the Rasht Valley, but I do believe their representation is 
important. I was especially interested in the experiences of 
Garmis, who largely sided with the opposition during the civil 
war and have experienced RT military operations in their home 
area in recent years.  
 With greater time and resources, I would have scheduled a 
summer trip to Garm and the Rasht valley to interview Tajiks 
there. I would also have schedule a trip to Murgab in eastern 
GBAO with its Kyrgyz majority, and another to the north, not only 
to Khujand, but also Penjakent and other smaller cities. Lastly, 
I would have spent more time in Kurgan-Teppe to gain access to 
the substantial Uzbek population there and in Kulob, where I made 
important new contacts just prior to my departure from 
Tajikistan. 
 Table 3.1 displays the list of interviewees. In order to 
keep their identities protected, I have only listed the location 
of the interview and ethno-regional group with which the 
interviewee self-identifies. 
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# Location Identity 
1 Dushanbe Tajikistani 
2 Dushanbe 
Northern 
Tajik 
3 Dushanbe Tajikistani 
4 Dushanbe Tajikistani 
5 Dushanbe 
Northern 
Tajik 
6 Dushanbe 
Northern 
Tajik 
7 Khorog Pamiri 
8 Khorog Pamiri 
9 Khorog Pamiri 
10 Khorog Pamiri 
11 Khorog Pamiri 
12 Khorog Pamiri 
13 Khorog Pamiri 
14 Khorog Pamiri 
15 Dushanbe Pamiri 
   
16 Dushanbe/Khujand 
Northern 
Tajik 
17 Isfara 
Northern 
Tajik 
18 Khujand Pamiri 
19 Kholkhozobad Kulobi 
20 Kholkhozobad Kulobi 
21 Dushanbe/Murgab Pamiri 
22 Kurgan-Teppe Uzbek 
23 Dushanbe 
Northern 
Tajik 
24 Kurgan-Teppe American 
25 Dushanbe/Khorog/US American 
26 Kurgan-Teppe ? 
27 Khorog Pamiri 
28 Ishkashim ? 
29 Ishkashim ? 
30 Vaakhan Kulobi 
Table 3.1. Interviewees/Respondents 
 
Interview Process 
 Each respondent was asked to fill out a simple 
questionnaire that asked the questions listed below. Each 
question had a list of potential responses, including the option 
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of “other,” where the respondent could fill in an answer that was 
unlisted in the selections provided. My assistant or I provided 
the questionnaire in Russian and Tajiki, with the respondent 
selecting the form to be completed.  
1. In which branch of the military did you serve? 
2. What was the highest rank to which you were promoted? 
3. Which of the following best describes a group with which 
you identify? 
This questionnaire acted as a simple assessment of the ethno-
regional and military background of the respondent. After 
answering the questions, I assigned a number to the respondent 
(the only way to identify him/her after this point) and wrote the 
number on the questionnaire. 
 The next step in the interview process was oral. I asked 
initial leading questions about how the respondent joined the 
military (if he actually served), the conscription 
process/oblava, and military service as a form of national pride. 
Related follow-up questions pertained to reactions to the 
conscription process or how the respondent’s feelings might 
change if this process were different. After sustaining as much 
discussion as possible regarding conscription, I asked questions 
and probes about basic conditions and ethno-regional identity in 
the military. I also asked specifically about the respondent’s 
experiences with dedovshchina. Some respondents went into detail 
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about this subject, whereas others preferred not to answer or to 
avoid the question.  
 It some cases it was difficult to get the respondent to 
expand on any particular experiences; while these interviews were 
not hostile, they left me with the feeling that the respondent 
did not fully trust me. As my assistant once told me after one 
such interview, “they will think you are either an academic or a 
spy. But they may not trust you either way.” It was usually 
obvious when a respondent trusted me and when he did not, but 
occasionally it was difficult to tell.  
 My assistant acted as a translator when we conducted 
interviews in Russian or Tajiki (which was most of them). I do 
not speak Tajiki and my Russian is not proficient enough to 
conduct a full interview. However, during Russian language 
interviews, I often understood responses and asked follow-up 
questions in Russian. This often helped interviews run more 
smoothly, even if I could not do it consistently.  
 
Secondary Sources 
 The use of secondary sources is important to my research. I 
did not possess extensive background knowledge of Tajikistan 
before starting this project, and there are not many academics 
who specialize in Tajikistan (only two other American 
geographers!) so it was apparent to me that I would need to 
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obtain and read nearly every book and journal article I could 
identify to learn about this place. As my research focus 
narrowed, it became apparent how little I still knew and how 
little anybody seemed to know for sure; research in Tajikistan 
largely suffers from two issues, 1) lack of interest by 
academics, an issue almost surely in part related to 2) a lack of 
official access to documents, officials or controversial subjects 
– “a space of closure” (Natalie Koch 2013, 390).  
 I had hoped to obtain basic information on the military in 
Tajikistan at the national library, but this huge building is 
practically empty of written materials and stands more as a 
monument to spending excess in a poverty stricken state than a 
functioning entity (Parshin 2012). I considered the few Soviet-
era academics who might be able to get me access to the archives, 
but this process also would have involved vetting me through 
layers of contacts, some of whom may be connected to the security 
services. Perhaps this fear was unfounded, but I did not want to 
take the risk – and I lacked a contact to introduce me.  
 The most important documents I obtained and have used while 
in Tajikistan were the publications by the Association of Young 
Lawyers, ‘Amparo.’ This group, which I discuss more thoroughly in 
Chapter V, works against state abuses of the conscription process 
through legal channels and public outreach. They have authored 
two annual reports on conscription and associated abuses for 
Sughd in 2010 (Samadova and Gulov 2011) and for the whole country 
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in 2011 (Samadova, Sobirov, and Rahimova 2012). These documents 
were full of important basic information on the conscription 
process and their responses to it, as well as documentation of 
the illegal detention of conscripts through oblava. Due to the 
organization’s official disbandment (though it continues to 
operated de facto), there have not been any further such reports 
produced.  
 
Media Analysis 
 Media coverage of military issues and conscription in 
particular in Tajikistan is relatively strong, which allowed me 
to focus on collecting data through local online news sources. 
Western media coverage of Tajikistan is largely done from a 
distance. There are occasional articles written about human-
interest stories or trends that are affecting the country and/or 
region, but little of the day-to-day events that define life in 
Tajikistan. There are, however, two main local sources and an 
American source with local reporters on the ground in Tajikistan. 
These three main sources are, Asia-Plus, Ozodagon and Radio Ozodi 
(“Radio Liberty:” a division of Radio Free Europe). Most other 
online news outlets doing daily stories pick up and repost 
articles already posted on one of these sites. Each has its own 
character but all use local reporters. 
 Asia-Plus carries stories written in Tajiki, Russian and 
English; stories in English have typically been translated from 
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Russian via an online translator website. Not all articles posted 
in Tajiki or Russian are translated into English and it is not 
entirely clear how articles are chosen for translation. Asia-Plus 
covers all topics, from the mundane to the highly controversial, 
and, according to a local military expert (Respondent 16 2014), 
relatively objective. For my purposes, this news outlet provides 
good coverage of conscription, oblava, dedovshchina and the 
military in general. It regularly interviews military and 
government officials and appears to have reasonable access to 
them.  
 Ozodagon writes stories predominately in Tajiki but also 
Russian. In addition, the outlet publishes blog posts from 
regular contributors. Ozodagon is less objective than Asia-Plus, 
often publishing articles or blog posts taking stands or 
expressing viewpoints more controversial than the other two 
outlets. For example, it regularly publishes blog posts by Rustam 
Gulov, a member of Amparo, who writes about his own and his 
clients’ experiences with oblava and the conscription system. 
 Articles on Radio Ozodi are posted in Tajiki, Russian and 
English; similar to Asia-Plus, not all articles are translated 
into English; Russian appears to be its primary language of 
publication. Radio Ozodi may be the best-funded news media site 
that reports on Tajikistan and Central Asia, but it is also owned 
and operated by the U.S. government’s Broadcasting Board of 
Governors (formerly a division of the U.S. Information Agency) 
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(BBG 2015). While it is difficult to detect subjectivity in its 
reporting, articles about U.S. activities in Tajikistan are 
noticeably lacking. 
 There are a number of blog websites on Central Asia. The 
most prominent and well funded is EurasiaNet.com. Most posts on 
this site are written by few regular bloggers who follow Central 
Asia and Russia their interactions with other states. Posts 
typically are referenced with links to news stories from RFE/RL, 
Asia-Plus or other reputable outlets. EurasiaNet postings are 
valuable for providing deeper context to news stories and 
connection to related past articles and events. They also publish 
posts by guest bloggers, many of whom are academics. 
Table 3.2 below shows the number of articles I reviewed, 
the subject category in which I placed the article, and the media 
source. I did not cite every article and not all contained 
valuable information, though most had a least one item worth 
noting. 
Subject Asia-Plus Ozodagon 
Radio 
Ozodi EurasiaNet Total 
Conscription/Oblava 53 33 9 2 97 
Conditions 6 0 9 1 16 
Russian 201st MRD 16 0 14 11 41 
RT Military (other) 30 1 13 2 46 
Foreign Assistance 29 0 8 14 51 
  
 Table 3.2. Media Outlet Stories and Subject Matter  
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While the above media outlets make up the bulk of my 
references, it is important to note one that does not: Central 
Asia Online. The U.S. Department of Defense’s Central Command 
(CENTCOM) sponsors this news media site “to highlight movement 
toward greater regional stability both through bilateral and 
multilateral cooperative arrangements.” The site focuses on 
hindering “terrorist activity and support for terrorism” 
inCentral Asia (“Central Asia Online” 2015). Its stories on these 
subjects are often alarmist and do not reflect actual events on 
the ground; this became apparent during my fieldwork and 
wasechoed by colleagues performing research in Tajikistan at that 
time. As such, it is an important benchmark for Western efforts 
to label Central Asia as “dangerous,” a topic I address in 
Chapter IV. Headlines and news stories posted on its pages should 
be viewed from this perspective. 
 News media stories are useful in two important ways. First, 
they provide up-to-date and reliable information written about 
local issues and for the local population. Their reporters are 
fellow Central Asians who are better positioned to ask locals 
about controversial subjects such as oblava and dedovshchina. 
They are able to travel quickly to the scenes of events for on-
site interviews. They can better understand the problems that 
people in Tajikistan experience in ways that an outsider, such as 
myself, cannot (at least without spending an extended period in a 
particular area getting to know the subjects involved in such 
events).  
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 Second, the stories they choose to cover and the amount of 
coverage given to them are indirect indicators of popular trends 
and concerns. That a significant amount of news coverage is 
devoted to oblava and, to a lesser degree, dedovshchina, speaks 
to the importance average Tajikistanis place on these matters. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that the lack of coverage 
of a subject – for example ethno-regional group identity among 
government leaders or within the context of military service – 
does not matter to the population at large. This issue is more 
controversial in the eyes of the Rakhmon regime, which view of 
freedom of the press with suspicion. If Asia-Plus published an 
article about the concentration of Kulobis in high positions 
within the national government, this action would likely elicit a 
response from the regime. 
 
Participant Observation 
 I performed participant observation on military bases on 
three occasions; each at a border guard facility. The first was 
along the Panj River in GBAO (of which the visit mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter is a part), during which I visited two 
zastavii (Russian: outposts) and one otriad (main base). This 
experience was particularly valuable because I was able to walk 
around and photograph a small zastava and see its living 
conditions first hand. I also interviewed an enlisted border 
guard and two officers.  
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 The second trip was to a border guard otriad and one if its 
zastavii along the Panj River in Khatlon Oblast near Moskovskii 
(south of Kulob). I went on this trip with an American military 
contractor friend of mine who was on a business trip to these 
facilities. The zastava we visited was built with U.S. assistance 
funds and the otriad (and its subordinate zastavii) were equipped 
with U.S. provided radio equipment and small all-terrain 
vehicles. Once again, I was able to see on-site living 
conditions, but in this case there were two important 
differences. First, the officers of the district gave me (in 
actuality, my friend) a full tour of a new U.S.-funded facility 
that stands in contrast to those I visited in GBAO, which 
appeared to be constructed in the Soviet era. It was incredibly 
interesting to watch and experience the interactions between this 
American (inactive) military officer and RT officers during 
discussions pertaining to the care and use of U.S. supplied 
equipment at the otriad. Similarly, he RT officers at the zastava 
we visited nearby appeared uncomfortable with our presence. 
However, I could not comment on precisely why they reacted this 
way, whether it was due to indifference, perception of American 
arrogance, unhappiness with the pomp and circumstance of an 
outside visitor, or fear that we would/could report them for poor 
behavior or facility upkeep.  
 My last on-base experience was shorter in length. Not long 
before I departed the country, I visited a border guard base in 
Dushanbe that serves as a headquarters of sorts. This base was 
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the central hub for training RT military and other government 
personnel on the communications equipment provided by the 
American contracting firm that took me on my previous trip to 
Moskovskii. In this case, I did not conduct any interviews, but I 
did get the opportunity to watch RT border guards going through 
basic marching training. While this simple daily practice may 
seem small, in reality the lack of discipline among RT soldiers 
and a comment by a contractor who is a veteran that the 
soldiering skills of the border guards was akin to “playacting” 
were revealing (see Chapter VI)  
 In many aspects of my research, my role as an American 
outsider acted as a barrier. Locals quickly recognized me as an 
outsider and as a result many may not have trusted me. Some might 
have been afraid to meet with me for fear of getting into trouble 
with the GKNB. My Tajik language skills are rudimentary at best. 
But in the case of access to these two military bases, being an 
American presented a relatively unique opportunity in this 
autocratic state. The performance of conscripts in action is not 
something I expected to experience.  
 
Conclusion 
 Conducting critical militarism research in Tajikistan is, 
to my knowledge, unlike any previous work done in the name of 
this sub-discipline. The differences between Western, Anglophone 
professional militaries and the post-Soviet mode are striking. So 
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too, is the purpose for these militaries’ existence; the U.S. and 
U.K. engage in actions worldwide, while Tajikistan is formulated 
for border defense and internal threat suppression. However, it 
is differences in governance and civil society that create the 
biggest divides. Tajikistan’s autocratic government stands in 
stark contrast to the liberal democracies that have been the 
object of attention by critical geographers thus far. And as 
noted above, fieldwork on militarism in Tajikistan is rife with 
barriers, challenges and even threats to personal safety that are 
not common in more liberal-democratic settings. 
 The ever present belief (if not reality) that the GKNB was 
watching, listening, and following Westerners with the power to 
inhibit research, endanger participants, confiscate data, or 
revoke visas at any time was a constant concern. Though I had 
little evidence that I was being watched or that my participants 
were in danger, I had to acknowledge that I would always need to 
act as if this was the case. This understanding actively shaped 
my methodological approach and treatment of both my assistant(s) 
and research participants.  
 My research methods consisted primarily of semi-structured 
interviews and news media reports; I also used participant 
observation as a secondary method, mostly to confirm material 
learned from the former two methods regarding conditions within 
the military. While these methods were effective, they also 
represented the limited choices I believed to be open to me in 
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Tajikistan’s autocratic political environment and the limited 
public and archival information available in the country.  
 My identity as an American primarily positioned me as an 
outsider and presented challenges to working with locals 
regarding the sensitive topic of military service in Tajikistan. 
However, it also presented the opportunity to connect with other 
Americans to gain access to RT military installations in ways 
even most local citizens could not. Similarly, access by foreign 
(or even domestic) researchers to military bases in many parts of 
the word – especially autocratic in states – is rare indeed.  
 In short, the difficulties of this research were 
considerable: an autocratic government largely closed to access, 
a sensitive political topic, the existence and threat of the GKNB 
to researchers and participants, and the lack of public data 
availability. Still, the methods employed allowed me to deepen my 
understanding of militarism and national sentiments in 
Tajikistan. This is especially true when these methods were 
complemented with published research on Russian/post-Soviet 
military issues, which have strong parallels and empirical 
frameworks. The data presented in the following chapters 
represent the success of these methods and offers useful 
insights. 
  
125 
CHAPTER IV 
GEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATIONS OF TAJIKISTAN 
 In order to understand the current geopolitics of 
Tajikistan both within Central Asia and more globally, it is 
imperative to appreciate its colonial legacy. Its suzerains 
include a number of past empires, most recently the Russian 
Tsarist Empire and the USSR that followed it. Chapter II examines 
the historical context of the Soviet legacy regarding its current 
boundary arrangement, its administration of the Tajik SSR, and 
the Soviet system’s shaping of its cultural, political and 
economic systems. Russification policies by the Soviet government 
resulted in the spread of the Russian language and culture to the 
Tajik Republic (Maps 2.1 and 2.2) and would contribute to the 
subsequent migration of Russians to Tajikistan and Tajiks to 
Russia. Tajikistan was situated on the periphery of the Soviet 
Union. However, the appearance of regional non-state actors 
associated with the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, the 
reemergence of Russian power in Central Asia, and the increase of 
Chinese interest to its west has placed Tajikistan in a more 
central role of recent global geopolitical narratives.  
Linking the RT’s conscription practices to bigger 
geopolitical issues within the region provides a context for 
understanding not only the state’s rationale for its policies, 
but also for the aid delivered to its security forces by the 
United States and Russia. In this chapter I focus on a pair of 
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contemporary geopolitical issues involving Tajikistan that help 
to define its relationships with these two states. First, I 
dissect the grand narrative views of Eurasian geopolitics and 
Tajikistan’s role within them, with particular attention to those 
of the post-9/11 period. These narratives place Tajikistan within 
a ‘dangerous’ space in need of attention from Western security 
institutions that all too often go unchallenged in popular and 
policy-oriented media, and, in turn, influence the RT’s policies 
on its national military service. Understanding the contemporary 
geopolitical framework contextualizes perceived threats to the RT 
regime, particularly those arising from Uzbekistan and 
Afghanistan.  
The second geopolitical issue I examine is the structure 
and role of the migrant economy in which workers from Tajikistan 
travel to (predominantly) Russia to work in formal and informal 
economies; the remittances they send home have accounted for 
substantial portions of Tajikistan’s GNP in the last decade. For 
its part, Russia not only consumes this labor but also uses the 
visa status of migrant workers as leverage over the RT government 
to ensure favorable interactions regarding its military presence 
there and political support on both the regional and world 
stages. This section provides a context for understanding the 
conscription process and RT citizens’ response to it. I argue the 
migrant economy is part of a positive feedback loop that 
increases RT citizens desire to travel to Russia for profitable 
work while simultaneously (for military aged males) avoiding 
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military conscription. Migration generates income for families 
living in Tajikistan’s stagnant economy, while the state 
continues to rely on Russia for its external (if not internal) 
security through the 201st base. The reliance on Russia for 
security allows the Rakhmon regime to invest lightly in its own 
defense and avoid improving the living conditions for its 
military personnel. This generates negative views of national 
military service and citizens’ attempts to avoid that service, 
including the option of labor migration to Russia, thereby 
completing the loop.  
 
Eurasian Grand Narratives 
 The “Great Game” of geopolitical competition between 
Tsarist Russia and the British Empire for hegemony over Central 
Asia (W. Rowe 2010; O’Hara, Heffernan, and Endfield 2005; Hooson 
2005; Akiner 2011) gave the territory encompassing Tajikistan a 
strategic regional significance. Similarly, Mackinder’s (1904) 
and Spykman’s (1944) metageographic visions of territorial world 
hegemony place Tajikistan along a frontier of contention. As 
such, early geopolitical discourse frames it within a ‘dangerous’ 
expanse of territory – at least in the path of conflict between 
great powers striving for global hegemony. Mackinder’s 
“Heartland” centered on Western Russia and Eastern Europe, and 
his adjacent “Inner Crescent,” contained contemporary Tajikistan. 
Similarly, Spkyman situated Tajikistan’s territory within a 
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strategic “Rimland” of territories that surrounded much of the 
USSR. In either case, Tajikistan, covered with high mountains and 
occupying a pivotal position between the Russian sphere of 
influence and maritime South Asia, stands more as a stepping-
stone to be controlled rather than a territory strategically 
valuable for its internal resources. Hence, Tajikistan has much 
in common historically with Afghanistan in a geopolitical sense; 
in many respects it resembles a buffer state.  
The Soviet structure, however, provided a layer of social 
cohesiveness that its southern neighbor lacked, centered as it 
was on Moscow’s political control and economic interdependence 
with other Soviet republics. In the early days of the Soviet 
Union, this political control was not initially established. The 
violence of the Russian Civil War, which ended in 1922, continued 
in Central Asia through the Basmachi movement. Turkic and Persian 
guerillas continued an insurgency that lasted into the early 
1930s before it was considered defeated in full. This was in no 
small part due to the skillful use of the mountainous terrain of 
what is today Tajikistan. While the mountains held marginal value 
in terms of natural resources in these early days of the Soviet 
Union, they were clearly of great value to any potential 
resistance to the Soviet center and were thus deemed to be worthy 
of direct administration. The lasting effect of this history was 
to contribute to the Western perception of this space as “wild” 
and prone to instability. 
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 As the Soviet experiment came to a close, Tajikistan opened 
to the outside world. It became subject to narratives 
problematizing a post-Cold War arrangement, even if these 
narratives were a repackaging of the classic views of global 
hegemony. Huntington’s (Huntington 1996) conceptualization of a 
world divided into “civilizations” of loose culture traits such 
as religion (Orthodox/Muslim/Hindu), language (Latin America) or 
race (Africa) located Tajikistan once again in a transition zone 
prone to contention between hegemonic powers. For Huntington, the 
edges of his Muslim civilization are rife with conflict (“Islam’s 
bloody borders”); he refers to the Tajik civil war (1992-97) as a 
“fault line war” that is representative of such conflicts (ibid, 
253–254). His identification of the civil war in this manner is 
flawed, however. As discussed in Chapter II, the origins of the 
civil war are complex, and while notions of ethnic nationalism 
and Islam played a role, the causes are better understood through 
the Soviet system, its favoritism of certain regional groups over 
others, and the collapse of the political economy when Moscow’s 
subsidies disappeared upon independence (Akiner 2001; Matveeva 
2009; Bleuer n.d.). The characterization of the civil war as a 
fight between the Muslim world and more secular (or, by his 
nomenclature, even Orthodox) civilizations is simplistic at best 
and outright false at worst.  
 Regional narratives focusing on Central Asia – especially 
from the policy perspective – also place Tajikistan in a locus of 
conflict and instability. Heathershaw and Megoran note “the idea 
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that Central Asia presented an enduring danger to Moscow was 
repeated in dominant western literatures on the region during the 
Cold War” (2011, 591). Civil wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan 
contributed to Western views of the surrounding region as 
fundamentally unstable and violent. For Heathershaw and Megoran, 
the so-called ‘war on terror’ has dictated international 
understandings of “the Asianess of Central Asia,” and “has not 
precluded orientalist representations of Central Asia in popular 
culture, policy formulation and practice, and even certain 
‘policy-relevant’ academic circles” (Megoran and Heathershaw 
2011, 598).  
If orientalism (Said 1978) continues to influence Western 
policies in Central Asia, it not only frames the region within a 
discourse of danger, but also enables it to be “disregarded with 
indifference” (Megoran and Heathershaw 2011, 601). Such 
imaginative geographies shape actions in ways that limit long-
term diplomatic investment and establish and reaffirm simplistic 
views of the region’s needs, particularly those involving the 
security sector. The diplomacy associated with the interests of 
foreign actors plays easily into the hands of Central Asian 
autocrats seeking assistance for their security services, 
especially those geared toward internal rather than external 
threats. But whatever danger may be present, it is neither 
inherent nor solely internally sourced; foreign powers have 
played an important role in Central Asia’s political and social 
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development, in many ways shaping much of the ‘danger’ that 
supposedly characterizes the region. 
 Gregory’s analysis of political violence in Afghanistan is 
relevant here. He convincingly contends that this violence is 
connected not only to the agency of those directly involved but 
also to the manipulations of foreign powers: Russia, the U.K. and 
the U.S. in particular (Gregory 2004). He chronicles 
Afghanistan’s entry into the nation-state system, emphasizing the 
role of Moscow and London in its border delimitation, and the 
subsidization of its government by these two powers. Further, the 
Soviet invasion in 1979 was countered by a proxy war perpetrated 
by the U.S and Pakistan, among others. The civil war that 
followed the Soviet withdrawal continued to involve outside 
stakeholders, with Russia and Iran supporting one side and 
Pakistan the other. 9/11 and “Operation Enduring Freedom” marked 
the return of U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, and 
Gregory notes the parallels of the first three years of U.S 
military involvement running with the previous colonial periods 
of Russian and British suzerainty. Outsider influence in 
Tajikistan has been almost solely Russian and, as noted 
previously, has been a contributing factor in past political 
violence, which in turn has heightened perceptions of insecurity. 
Discourses of “danger” encompassing Tajikistan (and Central Asia 
generally) should be evaluated within the context of extensive 
historical foreign involvement that serves as both a cause of, 
and solution to, this narrative of instability. 
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 The violence in Tajikistan led Russia to intervene in the 
civil war to contain it while simultaneously securing its former 
colonial frontier with a violent and fractured Afghanistan. This 
action was legitimized by Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s 
statement “that the Tajik border was “effectively Russia’s” 
(Erlanger 1993), a clear description of Russian intentions. 
Russian (and Uzbek) assistance to the pro-government forces in 
Tajikistan enabled the defeat of the opposition in the civil war 
and helped to foment an indefinite basing of Russian military 
units in the territory, particularly along the border with 
Afghanistan. In so doing, Russia did, in a military sense, 
reintegrate Tajikistan--this time, however, under different 
auspices: as a rentier of territory for foreign military forces 
(Ostrowski 2011). Russia’s 201st MRD and other units are based in 
Tajikistan, and the two states have recently signed long-term 
agreement to keep them there until 2042 (Najibullah 2011). 
 
New Grand Narratives  
 Under the narrative of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) that 
refocused military and diplomatic attention toward combating al 
Qaeda and related Islamic terrorist networks, another wave of 
grand geopolitical visions problematized territories believed to 
be prone to instability and violence. Journalist Robert Kaplan 
(Kaplan 2009; Kaplan 2012) embraces the work of Victorian 
geographer Halford Mackinder and a slew of other old-school 
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geopoliticians in his so-called “Revenge of Geography.” Kaplan 
considers the whole of Eurasia a “shatter zone” rife with danger 
and threats to the Western world. Referencing Bracken’s (1999) 
view of an “unbroken belt of countries,”  “from Israel to North 
Korea, which are developing ballistic missiles and destructive 
arsenals” (Kaplan 2009, 101), Kaplan suggests that an arms race 
engulfs the majority of Eurasia’s states, including Central Asia. 
This statement is unwarranted; when one considers that Kazakhstan 
actually gave up its nuclear weapons shortly after independence, 
and other Central Asian republics neither had WMDs nor sought to 
acquire them, where is the arms race?. He further proclaims that 
demographic growth will create a “new map of Eurasia – tighter, 
more integrated, and more crowded,” which “will even be less 
stable than Mackinder thought”, with a “series of inner and outer 
cores that are fused together through mass politics and shared 
paranoia” (ibid, 102). What exactly drives this paranoia is 
unclear, though Kaplan seems to think that increased population 
growth will inevitably lead to increased civilizational proximity 
and thus conflict as described by Huntington. Kaplan has advised 
members of the Department of Defense as a member of its Defense 
Policy Board and served as an analyst for the subscription-based 
geopolitical think-tank Stratfor, which is read widely in 
American and international foreign policy and defense circles. As 
such, his discursive construction of Central Asia has the 
potential to influence governmental decision makers’ views of the 
region.  As such, unpacking his language is important. 
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 Similarly Barnett (2004), who advises defense and foreign 
policy decision makers, suggests that the world is effectively 
divided between “Core” and “Gap” states—in the process directing 
attention away from power relations within the state system and 
instead “render(ing) the world in a cartography of safety and 
danger” (Dalby 2007b, 296). With the legacy of the civil war and 
substantial narcotics smuggling over the porous border with 
Afghanistan, Tajikistan is clearly located in the Gap of 
Barnett’s cartography—an area understood to be a danger zone.  
 While the problems of Central Asia are not entirely unique, 
Barnett, like Huntington (1996) and Kaplan (2012; 2009), sees 
these and other regional zones of instability as examples of a 
greater spatial pattern. Dalby described this pattern as a “re-
mapping of the geostrategic vision (that) involves both a 
reduction of regional concerns in favor of a global understanding 
of potential conflict and a re-mapping of the whole planet as a 
potential battlefield, taking the global war on terror to its 
logical geographical conclusion” (Dalby 2007a, 591). Thus, a 
delineation of the Core and Gap simultaneously represents a 
definition of zones of “safety and danger.” A more profound 
understanding of the cultural framing contributing to the 
acceptance of this thesis within foreign policy circles and the 
public at large is crucial if we are to unveil the issues that 
surround its foundation. Barnett’s further contribution to this 
narrative is the active pursuit of the integration of these Gap 
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zones into the Core, creating long-term peace through geo-
economic connections backed by geopolitical force, if necessary. 
 
Orientalism Revisited 
Barnett’s concept of forced integration represents a deeper 
narrative that poses questions about who integrates and who is to 
be integrated. Contending that threats emanating from the Gap 
need to be pacified by force ignores the histories of colonial 
empires and support of pro-Western autocrats, among other 
external influences, and eases the development of binary 
descriptions of the world’s spaces. Gregory presents this 
viewpoint of spaces in need of civilizing as a form of 
patriarchal, benevolent ethnocentrism conceptually connected to 
the recent geopolitical past through his title. 
These are constructions that fold distance into difference 
through a series of spatializations. They work, Said 
argued, by multiplying partitions and enclosures that serve 
to demarcate “the same” from “the other” at once 
constructing and calibrating a gap between the two by 
“designating in one’s mind a familiar space which is 
‘theirs.’ “Their” space is often seen as the inverse of 
“our” space: a sort of negative, in the photographic sense 
that “they” might “develop” into something like “us,” but 
also the site of absence, because “they” are seen somehow 
to lack the positive tonalities that supposedly distinguish 
“us”(Gregory 2004, 17; Said 1978, 54). 
 
 Gregory’s discussion of the “other,” viewed as a state that 
is alterable through the application of direct political and/or 
military action, poignantly places the matter broadly within 
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Western culture. In his analysis, this culture remains coupled to 
its colonial past, leaving it to process world events and foreign 
spaces through the binary lens of the Other by its proponents. 
Development of the world into globalized spaces connected to the 
Core is seen as widely desired and even inevitable among 
developers and the developed alike. To become liberally 
democratic (connected and integrated) is to progress. To progress 
is inherently, in Barnett’s view, to become peaceful. Therefore, 
further warfare prosecuted by Core states is to be supported in 
the cases where the integration of unstable Gap states is 
desirable by Western power brokers. Thus, any resistance 
emanating from within the Gap to the ‘inevitable’ expansion of 
Friedman’s globalized ‘flat world’ (Friedman 2005) must be 
addressed through coercion should consent fail; the implication 
is that integration may take the form of legitimized military 
violence. Integration challenges the very notion of sovereignty 
by making connection to the capitalist global economy a 
requirement for its recognition by Core states. 
The concept of ‘integration’ strongly parallels President 
Bush’s declaration that “either you are with us, or you are with 
the terrorists” (United States et al. 2001). Indeed, after this 
most basic binary statement, U.S. government rhetoric and policy 
regarding Tajikistan quickly adapted to resemble it. In doing so, 
the U.S. redefined its relationship with the former Soviet 
republic. Bialasiewicz, et.al. see this proactive geopolitical 
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framework as a sea change from previous imaginary geographies of 
U.S. foreign policy.  
(W)e detect in recent strategic performances a different 
articulation of America’s relationship to the world. 
Signified by the notion of integration we identify elements 
in the formation of a new imaginative geography, which 
enables the U.S. to draw countries into its spheres of 
influence and control (Bialasiewicz et al. 2007, 409).  
 
 A complementary conceptualization of these spheres of 
influence and inclusion within, or exclusion from, their 
imaginary geographies can be found in the urban geography 
literature. Yiftachel’s discussion of safe and dangerous urban 
spaces provides a useful framework for unpacking U.S. 
interventionist visions. Yiftachel “describes ‘gray spaces’ as 
‘those positioned between the “whiteness” of 
legality/approval/safety, and the “blackness” of 
eviction/destruction/death.“ (Yiftachel) notes that these spaces 
are tolerated and managed but only ‘while being encaged within 
discourses of “contamination”, “criminality”, and “public danger” 
to the desired “order of things” (A. Roy 2011, 235; Yiftachel 
2009, 88–89). There are, of course, differences with the spaces 
that define cities, but Yiftachel’s concept is applicable to 
geopolitical discourses of danger in Central Asia and Tajikistan 
in particular. Barnett’s “Core” and “Gap” could easily be 
described in this manner, with the ‘gray space’ of Tajikistan 
adjacent to the ‘blackness’ of Afghanistan, while both reside 
within the “Gap.” While Barnett sees integration as an objective 
for both states, the respective methods to accomplish this end 
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would seem to differ: diplomacy and military assistance for 
Tajikistan and direct military action for Afghanistan. Indeed, 
American policy toward Tajikistan in the post-9/11 era has 
strongly resembled Barnett’s vision and is reflected in the 
significant levels of security-sector assistance to the republic. 
I address this assistance in more detail in Chapter VI.  
 
Geo-economic Contradictions 
 I have noted above the conceptual structure of militarized 
integration of Tajikistan -- located in Barnett’s Gap -- into the 
core. But for Barnett, successful integration requires economic 
integration; indeed his main point is that connection to the core 
through the embrace of globalized capitalism will bring peace to 
the state in question and increasingly to the world as a whole. 
There are a number of problems with this viewpoint that can be 
exposed through an analysis of Tajikistan’s economic structure 
and geopolitical environment. The analysis of discourse 
surrounding globalized integration, perhaps best referred to as 
‘critical geo-economics,’ provides an appropriate conceptual 
framework to dissect the underlying spatial structures involved. 
Neoliberal journalist Thomas Friedman (1999; 1999; 2005) not only 
sees the spatial spread of globalization as inevitable, but also 
as something to be encouraged, even through the use of military 
force -- his “hidden fist of capitalism” (Friedman 1999b, 373). 
According to his framing, the “fist” responsible for keeping “the 
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world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies is called the United 
States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps” (Friedman 1999a, 
11). By legitimizing the wedding of globalized capital and raw 
military power, Friedman embraces the conduct of war for economic 
gain as beneficial for all; the world economy needs transactions, 
and U.S. military power is a suitable enabler. While perhaps not 
berthing Barnett’s vision of integration directly, Friedman 
undoubtedly provided some of the genetic material. 
 A number of geographers (Roberts, Secor, and Sparke 2003; 
Dalby 2007a; Sparke 2007) have commented critically on the 
integration concept in the development of world security. For 
these authors, the globalized order promised by integration is 
framed as a benefit to all those connected to it. Roberts et.al. 
note that these narratives place “globalization as the force that 
will lift the whole world out of poverty as more and more 
communities are integrated into the capitalist global economy” 
(Roberts, Secor, and Sparke 2003). Sparke draws attention to the 
neoliberal viewpoint that embraces the term ‘flat’ as a euphemism 
for the (supposed) equality that capital markets provide: 
 (T)his flat world vision is all about economic competition 
trumping military competition, a world where global free-
market integration is promoted as the solution to all 
distress and disgruntlement, and thus a world where economic 
developments such as outsourcing are offered as antidotes to 
both terrorism and new social movements at the very same 
time (Sparke 2007, 344; with quotes from Friedman 2005; 
Spivak 2004, 91). 
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 Barnett sees (coerced) market expansion as a vehicle for 
creating violence-free spaces, presumably as connection leads to 
rising incomes. Indeed, this future vision parallels capitalism’s 
search for expansion; merely containing the negative ‘exports’ of 
the Gap from entering the Core is insufficient. For Barnett, 
“(i)t is not enough for the Core to survive. It must grow” 
(Barnett 2004, 56). When growth stagnates in the center, new 
markets (i.e. populations and territories) must be found and 
secured to enable the economic organism to swell. 
 However, Barnett posits that democratic governance and 
globalized capitalism change the accepted structure of the status 
quo, which he refers to as a “rule set” (Barnett 2004, 9–10). For 
Barnett, these rules must be introduced to the states within the 
Gap. Currently, he sees different rule sets in play; falling, not 
surprisingly, on either side of the Core/Gap boundary. Roberts, 
Secor and Sparke point out that, for Barnett, “the Core and the 
Gap are two ‘distinct venues’ in which the U.S. is bound to act 
according to entirely different rules” (Roberts, Secor, and 
Sparke 2003, 893; Barnett 2002a; Barnett 2002b).  
Agamben’s explanation of the sovereign state of exception 
describes the juridical process by which national law is 
suspended by the state (typically) in order to handle a national 
emergency (Agamben and Heller-Roazen 1998; Agamben 2005). The 
rendering of the earth into a binary cartography representing 
“safety” and “danger” or “civilized zones” and “wild zones” 
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enables the identification of explicit areas (the Gap) where the 
state of exception is in play. In these spaces, Barnett allows 
for a different rule set to be employed: one that subverts the 
juridical order of the constituting power (i.e. U.S.) in order to 
establish the same legal framework in spaces framed as a threat 
to the civilized world. In short, states must break the rules in 
faraway lands in order to recreate them there for their benefit. 
By changing the rule set under which states and populations 
operate to one deemed acceptable in the Core, Barnett contends 
that the people of the Gap will benefit from the structure of 
neoliberalism and connection to global markets and thus the 
violence originating within its spaces will diminish. In fact, he 
suggests that “…if we do not all live under the same basic rule 
set, there will always be a global hierarchy by which some rule 
and others are ruled. Until there are equal rules, we are not all 
equal” (Barnett 2004, 54). This is a strange statement given the 
immense amount of research dissecting the various hierarchies of 
economic, political, and cultural power found in the states of 
the West. If such power is unevenly distributed over space within 
the Core, it is unclear how integration can suddenly create a 
level system based on equality within the Gap. Surely capitalism 
is not expected to fulfill this task. Its record of inequitable 
distribution of wealth and opportunity is well documented; yet 
connection to the market is a fundamental asset of Barnett’s plan 
for integration. Indeed, the link to (in)equality is also one 
that can be connected to violence. 
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 Flint and Radil link the expansion of capital markets into 
the Gap to violent conflict. They contend that connection to the 
global economy as a solution to political violence may also be 
flawed. 
To the long-term processes of colonialism and state 
building can be added the permanent (world-systems theory 
would say “necessary”) disparities of wealth of the 
capitalist world-economy, and the social tensions that 
result from the politics of trying to achieve economic 
success, or “development,” within the world-economy’s 
structural constraints (Flint 2009, 163). 
 
 
This quote not only draws attention to the unequal nature of 
capitalism’s spatial and hierarchical distribution of opportunity 
and wealth, but also suggests that the resulting disparities 
constitute the potential for violent conflict in the semi-
periphery, especially sections of Barnett’s Gap. Their research 
further proposes, “that increases in development might actually 
lead to an increase in terrorism” (Flint 2009, 162). Flint and 
Radil reference Bergesen and Lizardo, who see terrorism (and 
perhaps related forms of political violence) as a facet of the 
global capitalist economy; the semi-periphery of world systems 
theory offers the “most intense social struggles” that can be 
linked to this violence (Flint 2009, 157; Bergesen and Lizardo 
2004). The semi-periphery is often a zone where resistance from 
traditional elements of society is present. Flint and Radil seem 
to suggest that Barnett’s proposed solution to the violence in 
“untamed areas” may actually be part of the problem. Linkage to 
the global economy brings globalization and traditional cultures 
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into direct and often-opposing contact, leading to forms of 
resistance from the latter that culminate in political violence. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Central Asians fighting for the 
Islamic State in the Middle East were primarily recruited while 
living in Russia as labor migrants and not from their home 
regions (Bleuer 2014).  
 The above discussion of geo-economics is relevant to 
discussions of the RT military and the production of national 
sentiments. Tajikstan’s role in the global economy is quite 
limited. It produces aluminum at the TALCO plant in Tursonzoda, a 
facility that changed hands a number of times during and since 
the civil war, but now is firmly in the hands of the state (and 
likely, Rakhmon’s associates). The cotton production that was so 
important to the Soviet economy remains, though it offers little 
to the contemporary economy in real terms. Mineral resource 
potential is considerable, but requires foreign technical 
investment and appropriate transportation networks to be viable. 
For a landlocked state with little water transportation options 
and problematic border transits on nearly all its frontiers, the 
challenges are momentous and prevent much direct foreign 
investment. Its main export is migrant labor bound primarily for 
Russia—a labor flow that has significant geopolitical 
considerations, both domestically and in foreign affairs. By 
unpacking the role of the migrant economy in shaping Tajikistan’s 
geo-economic situation and the challenges it presents to the 
republic’s geopolitical framework, I show the integrated nature 
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of its relationship with the Russian Federation that serves to 
reproduce the lack of investment in, and popular disdain of, its 
national military. 
 
The Migrant Economy 
 The structure of Tajikistan’s migrant economy is imperative 
to understanding its geopolitical/geo-economic situation and its 
connection to militarization and nationalism. The migrant economy 
is profoundly important to both Tajikistan and Russia; the former 
needs the remittances that are sent home to family members from 
migrant workers, while the latter relies on foreign labor to 
perform work that the shrinking Russian population will not do 
(Nidoev 2015). In order to understand the depth of Tajikistan’s 
client-like geopolitical relationship with Russia, it is 
important to examine its parameters and link two of its crucial 
aspects: 1) the use of migrant labor visa policies to coerce the 
Rakhmon regime to submit to Russia’s foreign policy goals (in 
particular the basing rights of the 201st MRD in Tajikistan) and 
2) the choice of migrant work to escape living conditions at 
home, including the avoidance of national military service. 
Further, the experiences of migrant workers in Russia may 
contribute to their vulnerability to recruitment by extremists in 
ways that do not exist at home. Bleuer (2014) aptly notes that 
Central Asians in Russia are “(d)etached from the control and 
moderation of family, village, local mosque, society and 
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government – and experiencing discrimination.” Making them “more 
receptive to recruitment into radical extremist groups.” Thus, 
the geopolitics of this migrant economy reach beyond Central 
Asia, drawing further discursive attention to Tajikistan and 
other republics as spaces of danger, even if inaccurately.  
 As of March 2014, 1,033,914 RT citizens were living in 
Russia (FIDH, fms.gov.ru), most as migrant workers. The most 
recent statistics (2012) of migrant remittances as a percentage 
of Tajikistan’s GNP place the number between 43.3% (Kozhevnikov 
2013) and 53.6% (Mahapatra 2014), with most estimates citing 
about 50%. Whatever the precise figure, it is clear that this 
sector plays an important role in Tajikistan’s economy. The 
relationship is also unbalanced in Russia’s favor; it has used 
this advantage to secure favorable financial conditions (nearly 
cost-free) for the basing of the 201st MRD in Tajikistan. The new 
lease was signed October 1, 2013, replacing the old lease that 
was due to expire January 1, 2014 (RFE/RL’s Tajik Service 2013). 
The year-long negotiations involved two main concerns: duty-free 
imports of Russian oil products and better terms for migrant 
workers from Tajikistan in Russia (Kozhevnikov 2013).  
Some speculated that the Rakhmon regime may have attempted 
to secure a cash deal up to $300 million per year from Russia for 
the basing rights (Kucera 2013c), but this was unacceptable to 
Russia. In the period leading up to the ratification of the 
basing treaty the RT attempted to renegotiate the deal (which was 
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agreed to by both Putin and Rakhmon on the Russian president’s 
visit to Tajikistan in October of 2012) to include these cash 
payments, among other items. At this time, Russian politicians 
and institutions began to threaten the status of migrants from 
Tajikistan working in Russia, a not-so-subtle signal that the 
demand for cash payments and the associated delays to 
ratification were not acceptable. These actions help to form what 
Eurasia.net blogger David Trilling refers to as “a familiar 
pattern” in this relationship: “Moscow doesn’t get what it wants, 
so it starts threatening Tajik migrants” (Trilling 2013). 
Trilling further notes a 2011 case in which Russian pilots were 
arrested by the RT on dubious charges, to which Russia responded 
by deporting Tajik migrants--an action that resulted in the 
immediate release of the pilots. Russia’s use of the status of 
migrant visas places a powerful hold on the Rakhmon regime; the 
RT government simply cannot afford to alienate Moscow on most 
matters relating to foreign affairs. I will further examine the 
direct influence of Russian military presence on national 
sentiments in terms of the 201st MRD base in Chapter VI; here it 
is important to understand the geo-economic relationship between 
Tajikistan and Russia and how it shapes the geopolitics of the 
two states.  
The importance of the migrant economy to Tajikistan cannot 
be overstated. The concept of integration into the world economy 
is an important aspect of Barnett’s vision and recent Western and 
Russian foreign policy discourse on Central Asia has mirrored 
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this concept. Yet for Tajikistan, it is hard to imagine a 
different outcome. With few natural resources, a relatively 
impoverished and rapidly growing population, and mountainous 
terrain that inhibits transportation, Tajikistan has little to 
offer the global economy. Further, political corruption in 
Tajikistan is a serious barrier to foreign investment. These 
conditions present narrow options for Tajikistan; thus, like many 
peripheral states, labor migration is a crucial component of its 
economy. Considering the unequal distribution of wealth and the 
networks of capital flows in the world system, for Tajikistan 
integration into the global economy currently translates into the 
provision of labor migrants and little else. 
The migrant economy is also a factor in the conscription 
process, particularly when considering the practice of oblava. 
This practice, along with conditions within the RT military, 
creates an incentive for recruitment-aged males to choose to 
migrate to Russia for work. Chapter V addresses the individual 
motivations of males in Tajikistan regarding the choices 
surrounding military service; this section focuses on describing 
the realities of migrant work in order to contextualize those 
decisions. From an economic standpoint, the choice is an easy 
one; for most average men of military age, there is simply more 
money to be made in Russia than staying at home. Understanding 
this bigger picture allows us to compare it to other options 
found at home in Tajikistan.  
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Even with the economic benefits, the migrant experience is 
rarely pleasant. Central Asian migrants are subject to racism, 
extortion and physical attacks (Nidoev 2015; Ganjova 2013; C. A. 
Fitzpatrick 2009). Much of this persecution is actively 
perpetrated by ethnic Slavs on behalf of the state or is tacitly 
accepted by it. Statements by Moscow’s mayor Sergei Sobyanin and 
President Putin broadly exhibited disdain for these migrants in 
response to the circulation of video footage showing migrant 
workers beaten by plain-clothed men while police prevented 
bystanders from interfering (Sadykov 2013). My research shows 
that the lives of many military-aged males from Tajikistan are 
subject to physical and mental abuse, whether at home during 
military recruitment as part of oblava or during the performance 
of dedovshchina during military service, or by xenophobes while 
working in Russia. However, comparing the hardships experienced 
in both labor migration and military service, the potential 
financial benefit of the latter is significant. Additionally, 
once conscripted, dedovshchina is difficult to avoid as part of 
the military experience. Attacks on labor migrants may happen at 
any time or place, but not all migrants experience them. 
Similarly, young males may or may not be conscripted or 
experience oblava; neither of the latter two experiences place 
males under the direct control of their abusers, nor is the abuse 
ritualized as is the case with dedovshchina. 
Migrant work has a few advantages over military service, 
particularly financial and the absence of dedovshchina. However, 
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instead of the hazing of conscripts, Central Asian migrants face 
real fears in Russia: racist attacks, the threat of deportation, 
and other forms of persecution, the choice to migrate may be a 
difficult one, but at least 100,000 military-aged males from 
Tajikistan are currently in Russia. As I show in Chapter V, many 
do so to avoid military service--challenging notions of it as an 
institution for national integration. 
The migrant economy poses questions about the relationship 
between geo-economics and geopolitics in Tajikistan. 
Specifically, integration, as described through Western grand 
narratives (see Barnett), U.S. Department of State’s ‘New Silk 
Road’ initiative or through Russia’s attempt at trade bloc 
through the Eurasian Economic Union (Parshin 2015; The Economist 
2015), are likely to solidify the status quo, rather than offer 
new opportunities. Central Asian migrants may work in Russia or 
other locations, but other forms of integration into the world 
economy (and the peace supposedly associated with this 
connection) appear far-fetched, and there seems to be little 
obvious potential for future opportunities. Tajikistan’s geo-
economic realities in turn limit its geopolitical choices, 
leaving it largely vulnerable to, if not heavily dependent on, 
foreign powers for its economic and political survival. 
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Radical Islam 
 Much of the geopolitical discourse of ‘danger’ focuses on 
presence and growth of ‘radical Islam.’ Indeed, for U.S. funded 
outlets such as Central Asia Online it seems to be the primary 
subject of its media coverage. Authors on Central Asia include 
the term (or related ones) in their titles, even if the subject 
is not proportionally represented in the text (see Rashid 2002; 
Jonson 2006; Olimova 1999; Mcglinchey 2011; Zelkina 1999; Naumkin 
2005). Further, as Heathershaw and Montgomery (2014) show, 
reputable sources commonly and repeatedly focus attention on the 
dangers of Islamic extremism, even though evidence for such 
discourse is strongly lacking. Much of this discourse is related 
to the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan (Rashid 2001), the role 
of the IRP in the Tajik Civil War, and the subsequent emergence 
of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in the late 1990s. 
However, it is imperative to understand that the appeal of these 
forms of Islam is quite limited in Tajikistan, even as the 
population’s exposure to the rest of the Muslim world grows in 
the post-Soviet period.  
 The story of the Taliban is well documented and ongoing. 
Strongly linked to Pashtun ethnicity, southern Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan’s concerns there, it has shown little interest or 
capability in moving north into Tajikistan. Its form of Islam 
(Wahhabism) has its origins in Pakistani madrassas funded by 
Saudi Arabia during the Soviet-Afghan War. Wahhabism conflicts 
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with many aspects of Islam in Central Asia (Khalid 2007), making 
penetration into Tajikistan difficult. The IRP has origins in the 
former Soviet Union, though it experienced only a short period of 
militancy. In the simplest terms, the IRP has marginal influence 
in Tajikistan and has shown little interest in violence since the 
end of the Civil War. There is no denying that it is strongly 
repressed by the Rakhmon regime, and those seeking to investigate 
its societal role place themselves in danger from the RT security 
services (Asia-Plus 2014d). But it remains difficult to envision 
it as an existential threat to the RT.  
 The Islam Movement of Uzbekistan is an offshoot of IRP 
hardliners who did not sign the peace agreement in 1997 and 
targeted the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan, often using the 
mountains of Tajikistan as a base for their attacks. After 
conducting a few bombings in Uzbekistan, the organization 
migrated to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban against 
the Northern Alliance and its new Western allies (Rashid 2002; 
Lewis 2008). By most accounts it was largely destroyed as a 
fighting force in the early part of the U.S.’ Operation Enduring 
Freedom, though the Karimov regime maintains its survival in its 
rhetoric; its (perceived) existence conveniently serves to 
legitimate Uzbekistan’s repression of its population, 
particularly in the Ferghana Valley. Lewis aptly notes that its 
importance to Karimov is such that “(i)f the IMU had never 
existed, the Uzbek government would have had to invent it” (2008, 
191). Recent evidence shows that it still exists, though it 
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operates outside of Central Asia (in Afghanistan and Pakistan) 
and is unpopular among Central Asians (Heathershaw and Montgomery 
2014; Bleuer 2014). Thus, it is unconvincing to consider the 
contemporary IRP or IMU as representative of real and existential 
threats to Central Asian regimes generally, or Tajikistan 
specifically. Nevertheless, the Rakhmon regime, like Karimov in 
Uzbekistan, uses the threat of ‘radical Islam’ as a vehicle to 
justify popular repression, to eliminate political rivals, and to 
obtain material aid for the RT security apparatus, both internal 
and military. 
 The policies of these regimes were initially supported by 
the U.S. in the post-9/11 period. ‘Insurgents’ began to be 
considered ‘terrorists’ by the State Department, and the Tajik 
government took advantage of its connection-based approval to 
eliminate its political rivals under the auspices of fighting the 
Global War on Terror. Even so, U.S. policy analysts were aware of 
the regional autocrats’ strategy. CRS’ Nichol noted that the RT 
charges of terrorism against some individuals or groups “may mask 
repressive actions against religious or political opponents of 
the regime” (Nichol 1999, 7), and during a Congressional Hearing, 
Rep. Ackerman pointed out that Central Asian states were using 
the War on Terror to “crack down on political opponents and 
Islamic groups” (Ackerman 2006, 4). Indeed, such actions would 
continue as the selective use of the state’s forces from the 
Ministry of the Interior (as opposed to those of the Defense 
Ministry) sought to eliminate so-called “terrorists” who often 
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represented opponents of the regime. While some were indeed 
active militant groups (IRP remnants/IMU), there has been much 
speculation regarding the government’s motives and targets in 
these operations. The Rakhmon regime’s use of ‘radical Islam’ as 
legitimation of popular repression and justification for military 
assistance requests does not mean that there are not groups that 
offer potential threats in the region. However, many of those 
groups the regime considers to be ‘extremist’ scarcely fit 
definitions of that term, and those that do may or may not be 
violent actors, and lastly those that are violent receive little 
support from the population.  
 It is important that foreign benefactors maintain 
perspective regarding such threats when considering how their 
assistance might be used. It is also important to consider how 
this affected relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Even 
though assistance from Uzbekistan helped to put Rakhmon in power 
during the Civil War, relations between the two governments 
soured over the 1997 peace agreement and have been tense ever 
since. Karimov blamed Tajikistan for failing to oust the IMU from 
its territory, even going so far as to plant land mines along the 
border to prevent militants from crossing in 2000 and conducting 
airstrikes on suspected IMU targets (without notifying Dushanbe) 
in 1999 (Stein 2012).  
 Radical Islam and political instability in Afghanistan are 
consistently featured prominently in the foreign policy discourse 
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not only of Tajikistan, but of all major actors in the region, 
including the U.S. and the Russian Federation. Given the basing 
of the RF 201st MRD in Tajikistan, such thinking is not 
surprising. Russian discourse is prone to overstatement, such as 
the Russian Ambassador to Tajikistan’s recent (4/2015) comment 
that “Taliban fighters are massing in northern Afghanistan on the 
border with Tajikistan, in Gorno-Badakhshan and other provinces” 
(Kucera 2015b), but it is clear that threats from the south are 
taken seriously by Moscow. As RT soldiers are ordered to perform 
their patriotic duty to defend the motherland, the threat of 
Afghanistan is featured prominently in the calls to arms. I 
address these calls in more detail in Chapters V and VI 
particularly as they relate to justifications for conscription 
and service in the RT military. 
 
Regional Threats 
 The diplomatic differences between Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan do not end with concerns relating to radical Islam. 
Matters relating to water resources are also contentious. 
Tajikistan’s interest in completing the Rogun hydroelectric dam, 
which was begun during the Soviet era, is considered to be an 
existential threat to the Karimov regime. Uzbekistan has been 
quite open with its view that its construction constitutes a 
casus belli with Tajikistan (Camm 2013b; Lillis 2012; Kucera 
2013b), as the waters of the Vakhsh River where the dam is 
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planned feed into the Amu Darya, from which Uzbekistan diverts 
substantial volumes of water for irrigation. Efforts to mediate 
the issue through diplomacy have generally resulted in mundane 
statements and little actual interaction between the two states 
(Camm 2013b; Kucera 2013b). In reality, the point is moot unless 
foreign investors agree to finance the construction; planned for 
335 meters, the world’s tallest dam’s price tag is estimated 
between $2 and $6 billion, far beyond the RT’s means.  
 The tensions between Tashkent and Dushanbe put pressure on 
the defense apparatus of Tajikistan. Uzbekistan’s military is 
substantially larger, better equipped and better trained than its 
southern neighbor. Estimates place over 60,000 personnel in Uzbek 
uniforms, likely over 3 times as large as Tajikistan’s forces. 
Its air force has over 50 combat aircraft, while the RT service 
has but a small number of helicopters (Pike 2015). Comparing the 
capabilities and the threatening rhetoric over regional 
geopolitics between these two states helps to contextualize the 
close security relationship Tajikistan has with the Russian 
Federation. Should a military conflict erupt, Tajikistan would 
have an extremely difficult challenge in defending its 
territorial integrity, not to mention its transportation 
nodes/routes and population centers from swift conquest by 
Uzbekistan’s armed forces. For the Rakhmon regime, maintaining 
strong ties with Moscow and its 201st MRD is a far safer bet in 
deterring Tashkent from military action. Male RT citizens mention 
the Uzbek threat from time-to-time, mostly with a laughing sense 
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of helplessness for their armed forces. My review and analysis of 
interviews in Chapter V highlights a few examples.  
 
Conclusion 
 Tajikistan’s geopolitical position has been influenced by 
historical world powers such as the U.K., Russia/USSR, and the 
U.S., regional states such at Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, and 
discursive framings of ‘danger’ from Western and Russian sources, 
mostly as it relates to so-called ‘radical Islam.’ Neoliberal 
narratives of ‘integration’ (either coercive or consent-based) 
ignore local realities of political power and economic potential 
by associating connection to the world economy with decreased 
violence and extremism even though evidence to the contrary is 
particularly relevant to Central Asia. These discourses have 
shaped and reflected the policies of states both large and small 
involved in Tajikistan’s affairs. In turn, my research shows that 
this influence has altered the RT’s policies regarding its 
military and, in turn, challenged the notion of the armed forces 
as an institution of national integration.  
 The role of the migrant economy links Tajikistan to Russia 
in multilayered ways. The reciprocal relationship that consumes 
Central Asian labor in Russian markets connects Dushanbe’s regime 
to Moscow, simultaneously increasing its financial vulnerability 
in order to bolster its external security with foreign troops. 
The state of the RT military and its reliance on conscription and 
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even impressment are a byproduct of this relationship. Russia’s 
use of migrants’ visa status to bend the Rakhmon regime to its 
wishes in the foreign policy arena cements a co-dependent 
relationship that appears difficult to unglue. If anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that migrants in Russia are vulnerable to 
extremist (Islamic State) recruitment is confirmed through 
further study, another layer will be added to the geopolitics of 
Tajikistan. How these issues are embodied in the justifications 
and legitimations of the practices surrounding the RT military 
and the experiences of its personnel are the subject of the next 
chapters. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONSCRIPTION AND OBLAVA IN THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN 
Introduction: Conscription, Conditions and National Sentiments 
 The first lines of this dissertation describe common 
experiences shared by many (if not most) young adult male 
citizens in Tajikistan: the semi-annual military conscription 
drives, the illegal methods often used by representatives of the 
military commissariat (oblava), and the strong opposition to 
military service exhibited by male citizens’ unwillingness to 
serve. This chapter addresses these issues. The Rakhmon regime’s 
efforts to develop national sentiments include the construction 
of architecturally extravagant national buildings in Dushanbe, 
associating the ethnogenesis of Tajik national identity with the 
Samanid Empire (819-999) and King Ismail Somoni, embracing Tajiki 
as the official language, and universal military service. To 
better understand the realization of this effort through the 
military, it is important to unpack how citizens from Tajikistan 
regard service in the national armed forces. The performance of 
everyday practices of military recruitment and service present a 
challenge to the development of national sentiments; they are 
mostly associated negatively with the state by the population. 
This chapter describes these practices, based on semi-structured 
interviews, media reports, and personal observation. 
 The negative connotations associated with service in the RT 
armed forces do not necessarily represent negative attitudes 
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toward military service in general, nor is the need for national 
defense questioned. Rather, it is the RT military’s methods and 
practices that many citizens reject. The social importance of 
military service that was so strong during the Soviet era may 
have been significantly reduced, but it has not totally 
evaporated. The existence of the Russian 201st MRD is generally 
viewed positively and regarded as both professional and 
necessary. How and why do citizens view the RT military, which is 
modeled after the Soviet/Russian structure, so negatively? The 
answer lies in the experiences of those in direct contact with 
it. These experiences may be related to either the recruiting 
process or actual service, but are not limited to males of 
military service age. Families and friends often play an active 
part in the conscription experience. For example, they may be 
present when their friend/family member is picked up by 
conscription authorities, attempt to prevent his conscription 
through bribing or legal action, and/or tell their stories to 
news media outlets that publish stories on oblava. This chapter 
unpacks the RT’s recruitment processes, both legal and illegal 
(i.e. oblava), while the following chapter (VI) addresses 
material and living conditions in the military as well as how 
ethno-regional identity shapes and reflects social structures 
within the military. In the sections that follow, I demonstrate 
that popular resistance to the recruitment process (and the 
state’s need for conscription) and life in the military are 
closely related, but detailed discussion of the latter follows in 
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the subsequent chapter. Before examining the conscription process 
and issues related to personnel, it is important to outline some 
basic information about the RT military structure and its 
technical capabilities. I analyze this structure in the next 
section. 
 
The Structure of the Armed Forces of Tajikistan 
 The RT national army was formed during the Civil War on 
February 23, 1993, predominantly of Popular Front (PF) militias. 
This date is symbolic, as it is also celebrated as the day the 
Soviet Union’s Red Army was formed (Salimpour 2015).  Unlike the 
militaries of the other four former Soviet Central Asian 
Republics, Tajikistan did not inherit the Soviet units within its 
territory. This was in part due to the timing of the Civil War 
shortly after independence. The main Soviet units based there 
were the Ministry of Interior’s border guard service and the Red 
Army’s 201st MRD. The last border guards left in 2005, and the 
201st remains in the republic as a unit of the Russian Federation 
(cite). Within this context, it should not be surprising that the 
RT military is the weakest of the five republics and has 
experienced the most growing pains from its initial formation to 
its current status. 
 The contemporary armed services of the RT include over 
16,000 personnel and are composed of units organized under three 
main ministries, with one unit tied to the president’s office. 
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The Ministry of Defense (MoD) oversees the Army (7,300 troops) 
and the combined Air Force/Air Defense units (1,500). The 
Ministry of the Interior (MoI) houses the Border Guards and the 
“Alpha” elite unit, accounting for a combined 3,800 personnel. 
The National Guard (NG) (1,200) answers directly to the 
president. In addition, the Committee on Emergency Situations 
includes a special forces unit referred to as the “White Wolves,” 
which numbers about 2,500 personnel (IISS 2015, 198–199).  
 The London International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS) performs an annual assessment of all of the state 
militaries of the world. The Institute’s brief description of the 
RT structure and technical equipment outlines the meager 
capabilities of this small force. The army’s vehicle pool is 
minimal: about 80 armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), including 37 
main battle tanks (MBTs), and with 23 artillery pieces. The Air 
Force has 15 helicopters (4 attack), less than 10 fixed-wing 
aircraft (mostly trainers with one transport) and 20 mostly 
obsolete surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) for defense. In 
comparison, Russia’s 201st MRD has more firepower in Tajikistan 
than the entire military and paramilitary apparatus of the RT, 
and nearly as many troops as its national army (IISS 2015, 198–
199). Further, Uzbekistan’s forces (68,000 + personnel) are over 
four times as large, with substantially superior equipment in 
terms of both quality and quantity (IISS 2015, 203–204).  
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 Marat’s (2010) analysis of the RT military and security 
apparatus provides a rudimentary, description of its development 
as an institution. She pays particular attention to the lack of 
planning and development of a military doctrine, citing a failure 
“to identify what type and size of army” the state needs for its 
national defense. Interestingly, she also notes that the 
government’s official statements on the military place the MoD’s 
troop numbers around 20-22,000, but does not cite a year. Her 
2008 statistics place the MoI troop levels as significantly 
higher than those of the MoD: 40,000 v. 18,000 (Marat 2010, 74). 
This is a significant difference relative to the IISS figures, 
which seem to match those reported in media outlets during the 
period 2008-2015 in my research. Whatever the number, what is 
relevant here is the difficulty in acquiring accurate information 
on personnel levels of the RT military and paramilitary forces. 
Further, my own questions to a Western military diplomat in 
Dushanbe on the subject confirmed that the RT did not offer such 
information, and that his office developed its own estimates; 
despite my efforts, I was never able to obtain these figures from 
him. 
 The size of the RT military apparatus is presented here 
primarily for reference and comparative purposes, but it also 
demonstrates the practical considerations that lead the Rakhmon 
regime to rely on foreign assistance from Russia and the CSTO. 
Given the capabilities of the national army and air force, it is 
hard to imagine the successful defense of the country’s sovereign 
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territory from any conceivable form of foreign invasion on its 
own. With such limited technical capability and manpower, the 
nature of Tajikistan’s geopolitical relationship with Russia 
becomes profoundly evident. In terms of national defense, the RT 
must rely on Russia to maintain its security. Thus, RT 
authorities cannot afford to alienate the government in Moscow. 
 
Universal Conscription and the Culture of Oblava 
 
In accordance with Article 43 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Tajikistan: “The protection of the homeland; 
safeguarding the interests of the state; and strengthening 
independence, security and defense capabilities of the 
homeland are the sacred duties of citizens. The procedure 
for military service is specified by law” (Samadova, 
Sobirov, and Rahimova 2012, 7). 
 
 The most common way citizens of Tajikistan have contact 
with their national military is through the conscription process. 
Military recruitment in Tajikistan is universal for men aged 18-
27. Whether a military-aged male or not, the process is familiar 
to nearly everyone, and experiences with it are common both 
directly (as a participant or relative of an eligible male), and 
indirectly (as a friend, colleague or employer of an eligible 
male). In any case, the practice carries negative connotations 
among citizens of Tajikistan, and media coverage on the subject 
during the semi-annual recruitment periods focuses on the 
experiences of regular citizens who are caught in its somewhat 
indiscriminate web. 
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 Legal conscription is the term I use to refer to the 
official way the state performs this task. It involves the 
written notification of military-aged males of their selection 
for military service; this letter is referred to as a povestka 
(Russian: ‘subpoena’) (Respondent 5 2013). All males must notify 
the state of any address changes in order to ensure its ability 
to properly notify them; failure to do so is a criminal act. Upon 
receipt of a povestka, a conscript has five days to report to the 
local voenkomat for either processing or to present their proof 
of exemption or deferment (Samadova and Gulov 2011; Samadova, 
Sobirov, and Rahimova 2012).  
 There is significant resistance to conscription, however. 
Few males embrace the idea of service in the RT military for 
reasons related to poor conditions, pay, and lack of training. I 
will address the negative conditions in Chapter VI; for now it is 
important to understand that Tajikistani males’ reluctance to 
enlist is based on a multitude of factors that encompass the most 
basic aspects of enlisted military life. Resistance to military 
service has led the state either to support, or at least tacitly 
accept, the use of an even more coercive method of securing 
military conscripts: oblava. In order to understand this widely 
despised and illegal method, it is important first to examine the 
parameters of legal conscription. 
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The Conscription Process 
 Conscription is performed twice per year in the spring 
(April-May) and fall (October-November). Local media sources 
report that each year some 15-16,000 men are brought into service 
in the various military and paramilitary forces, with a similar 
number released from service as their conscription comes to an 
end. Official figures tout the military-aged male population at 
600,000, with about 150,000 eligible for deferment, exemption or 
are unsuitable for service. A further 100,000 are considered to 
be working abroad, mostly in Russia (Yuldashev 2013c). The total 
servicemen listed matches the total number of personnel in the RT 
security forces provided by IISS, which lists a figure of about 
16,000 (IISS 2015, 198–199). Conscripts are required to serve for 
two years, unless they have a college degree, in which case the 
service requirement is one year.  
 In order to understand some of the realities of the 
conscription process – particularly regarding deferments and 
exemptions – it is crucial to situate higher education into daily 
life in Tajikistan. The quality, rigor and value that once 
existed in universities during the Soviet period have diminished 
to a very low level. Most participants interviewed stated that 
their university experience was neither challenging nor 
particularly useful, even while recognizing that their parents 
experiences during the Soviet period were different (Respondent 1 
2013; Respondent 5 2013). The concept of having a degree is 
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valued, but the knowledge and practices gained through university 
are not. This, however, is a two-way street. Underpaid professors 
require little rigor from their students and accepting bribes for 
higher grades is common. In Tajikistan’s colleges and 
universities, paying bribes for higher grades is quite common--so 
common that most people consider a college degree from these 
schools to be worthless outside of the country, if not within. 
Universities do vary in their quality; the Russian-Tajik Slavonic 
University (RTSU) is considered to be markedly better when 
compared to RT state universities, such as Tajik State National, 
Tajik Agrarian or Tajik Philological. Nonetheless, interviewees 
who attended RTSU, especially those who had also studied in the 
West, stated that it was not particularly challenging (Respondent 
5 2013). 
 
Service Exemption 
 Military-aged males who legally do not have to serve are 
considered exempt. Unlike deferment, which is conditional and 
temporary, exemption is typically a permanent status once 
assigned. There are conditional exemptions for service, including 
being married with two children or physically unfit for duty 
(Kiromova 2013). Exemption from service is officially secured 
through the possession of a voenniy bilet (Russian: military 
ticket): a card issued by the voenkomat (military recruitment 
office) that registers their status/condition and prevents future 
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conscription of the citizen in possession. They are issued to 
those males who have performed their service, for medical 
conditions that prevent service, or to only sons. Tajikistani 
males covet such cards; once in possession of a voenniy bilet, 
they are free from any form of conscription or recruitment 
effort. Unsurprisingly, the demand for voenniy bilets leads many 
recruitment officers to accept bribes in exchange for them. Only 
sons are exempt from service to ensure that they are available to 
work as the breadwinner for their families. There are also 
medical exemptions for various ailments and conditions that are 
deemed incompatible with military service. In such cases males 
may apply for a medical voenniy bilet. 
 The reality is that legally/officially obtaining an 
exemption is not straightforward. The bureaucracy of the RT 
government presents a formidable obstacle, not only in the 
various layers inherited from the Soviet system, but also within 
the context of the government’s disincentive to distribute them. 
While the Soviet Union was dutiful in documenting its citizens, 
requiring paperwork for many aspects of daily life, such 
bureaucratic detailing in many ways has crumbled in the 20+ years 
following independence for Tajikistan. Verifying whether a male 
is indeed an only son may not be as easy as it once was; official 
records can be quite spotty, particularly in rural areas. Even in 
cases where documentation is current and available, government 
officials may doubt its authenticity (and its existence may deny 
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an opportunity for a bribe), causing processing delays that last 
months to over a year.  
 In order to secure a medical voenniy bilet, examination by 
a doctor is required. Once revered in society and decently paid 
during the Soviet period, doctors in Tajikistan are now underpaid 
and poorly trained (one might argue untrained!). During my field 
research, anyone with whom I came in contact flatly refused to 
visit a doctor trained in Tajikistan after independence, 
preferring Soviet-trained or Iranian doctors. In fact, under 
emergency conditions, many considered a visit to locally trained 
medical staff to be synonymous with death or grave injury. The 
ineptitude of medical staff can be traced to the collapse of the 
education system. Just as in undergraduate studies, the practice 
of paying for grades is common in the country’s medical schools 
(Respondent 5 2013). Under these conditions, it is prudent to 
question the competence of any doctors trained in Tajikistan. 
Even so, doctors do graduate from medical school and are in need 
of employment, even if they are incompetent. One potential 
employer is the military. 
 Doctors in the service of the voenkomat typically push 
conscripts through their exams, denying all but the most obvious 
medical claims and stamping approval for eligibility or, if 
conscripted, direct entrance into the military (Respondent 1 
2013). However, as with many government officials, doctors in 
such positions are typically open to the offer of bribes in 
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return for signed paperwork for a voenniy bilet, or at least 
temporary rejection from service. Meanwhile, during the time it 
takes to receive a voenniy bilet, the applicant remains eligible 
for conscription. It stands to reason that, since neither the 
conscription process nor military service is popular in 
Tajikistan, the government (and thus any examining physician) has 
an incentive to maintain the service eligibility of as many males 
as possible. 
 Simply because a potential conscript possesses a voenniy 
bilet does not necessarily mean he is safe. One respondent waited 
more than two years for a voenniy bilet, and still received a 
povestka six months after obtaining it. Upon reporting to the 
voenkomat, the recruitment officers refused to look at it, 
denying its existence or validity; only after calling his mother, 
who went through the same conversations by phone, did they 
release him. “From this point I realized that the paper I have in 
hand does not put me on the safe side” (Respondent 5 2013). 
 
Service Deferment 
 The official status that delays eligibility for 
conscription is called deferment. When a young male is assigned 
this status, he is not subject to conscription as long this 
status remains in effect. It is, however, a temporary situation; 
when the deferment period/status comes to an end, the male is 
once again eligible for service provided he meets all other 
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criteria (age, marital status, etc.). Much like exemptions, 
deferments can be treated as fleeting; recruitment personnel 
often ignore their validity or deny their existence in order to 
conscript eligible males. 
 The most common form of deferment is for educational 
purposes. While enrolled in a state or state-approved institution 
of higher education, a male student’s identification card serves 
as his proof of deferment. He must be enrolled in good standing 
and regularly attend classes, where professors must document the 
individual’s presence. Student ID cards are coveted, even though 
they are relatively easier to obtain than a voenniy bilet. 
Additionally, the law that states that university graduates who 
are conscripted are only required to serve one year; this 
provision acts as an additional incentive for eligible males to 
pursue higher education. For many male students, avoiding the 
draft is a primary reason to enroll in a university. One 
respondent noted that he travelled from the south of Tajikistan 
to Dushanbe to attend class in place of his brother (pretending 
to be him), in order to keep him in good standing with the 
university while he worked (Respondent 19 2014). 
 
Bribes 
 If they have the means, avoiding military service by 
bribing officials at the voenkomat is a common practice of 
families in Tajikistan (EurasiaNet 2012a; Respondent 4 2013; 
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Respondent 8 2013; Respondent 15 2014; Respondent 18 2014; 
Respondent 22 2014). The aggregate amount of bribes paid to 
military officials are estimated to “add up to millions of 
dollars per year” (EurasiaNet 2012a). Indeed, for those who do 
not have connection to key positions in the state but do have 
financial means, bribing is a typical choice to avoid service. 
One respondent, a respected Uzbek mahalla (village) leader in 
Khatlon, when asked about Uzbeks in the military, remarked, 
“(t)here is not reason for this service. We pay their way out of 
service. We can make more money during the two year service 
period than a bribe costs” (about $1000 in his region) 
(Respondent 22 2014). An expatriate friend of mine in Tajikistan 
noted the local Uzbeks’ work ethic and focus on commerce in the 
marketplace, so this view is perhaps unsurprising (Respondent 24 
2014).  
 The cost of a typical bribe varies in time and space, but 
bribe amounts do appear to be growing. The demanded price is 
dependent upon a number of factors, including whether the bribe 
is for one-time or for a longer-term (or even exemption-based) 
voenniy bilet; where the conscription takes place; whether or not 
the conscript has been shipped to a military base; and who the 
officer(s) in charge is. The fluid nature of these transactions 
makes it difficult to ascertain a going rate with any 
consistency, but it seems clear that the rates in questions 
represent substantial amounts for average families in Tajikistan.  
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 When appropriate and relevant, I asked interviewees about 
the going rate for a bribe to avoid service and received a 
variety of responses. A respondent in Khorog paid $300 to avoid 
service some years ago, but noted that the price had risen to 
around $800 at the time of the interview (Respondent 8 2013). 
Another Pamiri living in Khujand told me the current rate for a 
3-year voenniy bilet is $1200 (Respondent 18 2014).  
 The speed at which a conscript is processed and sent to a 
military base influences the asking price of a bribe. Much like 
oblava, the military commissariat indiscriminately and coercively 
moves newly arrived conscripts through the voenkomat and off 
their first base posting. The time period varies, but it can be 
as fast as 24 hours or a couple of days (Respondent 5 2013). This 
is the most important time for the conscript and/or his family to 
act to escape military service. In terms of bribes, the cost can 
rise to more than double that once the conscript has left for his 
duty assignment (Respondent 4 2013), which is more than likely 
very far from his family and home region.  
 
A Peasant Army 
 Those citizens who do not have the financial means to pay 
the substantial cost of a bribe at the voenkomat to avoid 
military service, or who cannot afford to lose their sons to 
attend college, are left with little alternative. That poorer, 
less connected citizens have a difficult time avoiding 
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conscription and military service contributes to popular views 
that the RT military is composed of personnel from lower socio-
economic backgrounds. Media articles have explored this 
phenomenon, based on interviews on the streets of Tajikistan’s 
cities. A respondent in one article noted that: “I have served in 
the military for two years and 24 days in Tajikistan and did not 
see even one son of an authority figure. The ones who served with 
us were the sons of peasants and teachers.” Another respondent 
noted that “(f)or 4,000 recruits for the quota, they visit all 
the villages across the country, when this many could be 
collected from only one town” (Ozodagon 2012). In other words, 
for the actual number of overall conscripts drafted for each two-
month drive, the number could easily be filled by a city, yet the 
government practices conscription in every small village because 
it is easier to find recruits among poor villagers than among its 
wealthier and better connected urban citizens.  
 During my research in the field, I had the opportunity on a 
number of occasions to see regular RT soldiers and border guards 
in uniform during marches in Dushanbe, serving on a military 
base, or at a border guard zastava (Russian: outpost). It seemed 
clear that most were of smaller stature – some appeared underage 
– and their uniforms were often too large for their small bodies. 
All things considered, they fit the descriptions relayed to me by 
my interview respondents and media--descriptions that portrayed 
the military as comprised mostly of physically weak soldiers from 
marginalized backgrounds. My interviews with young males in 
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Dushanbe were largely with those from the other side of the 
socio-economic scale: middle class and college educated men, with 
some even connected to an authority figure or two. All of these 
respondents had at least one way out of service, though the 
conscription process could pose a burden on them or their family 
financially (or did in the past). One Pamiri interviewee living 
in Dushanbe noted that “(i)n our country and in the entire world 
rich people make laws for middle and low class people. It is when 
10% controls 90% of the population. Therefore, these are low 
class people serving in the military” (Respondent 15 2014). For 
poor citizens, the options to avoid service are few and far 
between.  
 The RT military appears to be disproportionately comprised 
of poor conscripts, but without a detailed study of the socio-
economic backgrounds of its personnel, an accurate assessment of 
this phenomenon is speculative. Given the state’s distaste for 
academic research on matters relating to subnational identity, 
security, and the privileges of its political figures, such as 
study is unlikely to be conducted anytime soon. Yet for the 
purposes of understanding the military’s influence on national 
sentiments, public perception carries significant, if not 
dominant, weight. If the population believes the military to be 
devoid of privileged citizens – and full of lowly conscripts 
serving in poor conditions – then it is difficult to envision it 
as a strong symbol of the nation. This situation is exacerbated 
by a lingering Soviet legacy that honors military service and 
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views it as a valuable social contribution. Many sources (both 
through interviews and in media articles) refer to this legacy 
and concept of universal military service when discussing the 
negative aspects of their national military, noting the specific 
problems they see with the conscription system and living 
conditions within the military. Specifically, citizens negatively 
view the use of impressment to secure conscripts (oblava), hazing 
within the ranks (dedovshchina), and generally poor quality and 
quality of food, medical care and basic equipment. I discuss 
these negative aspects in the following sections.  
 
Illegal Methods: Oblava 
 To combat popular resistance to service, the military has 
resorted to the outright impressment of males, a tactic that is 
technically illegal but tacitly accepted, if not directly 
conceived, by the civilian government of the Rakhmon regime. The 
Tajik news source Asia-Plus goes so far as to state that “despite 
the cloudless statistics of the defense ministry, to recruit the 
necessary number of young people by legal means is not possible, 
and so they use the method of military conscription raids” 
(Mannon 2013). The use of the term ‘raid’ here is important. To 
locals, the term oblava has come to mean the illegal impressment 
practices by military recruitment agents biannually performed 
upon male citizens of Tajikistan. Oblava can be either overt or 
clandestine, performed by uniformed official military recruiters 
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or plain clothed hired thugs. It can be executed painlessly or 
brutally through the aggressive capture of unsuspecting males in 
public places or even dragging away them forcefully from their 
homes. The populace strongly opposes oblava regardless of the 
performers or the methods, even if they agree with the concept of 
universal service.  
 The Association of Young Lawyers, Amparo, published a 
monitoring report that outlined statistics from a survey of 2525 
people (soldiers, conscripts, eligible males, parents, and 
citizens) affected by the conscription process in Sughd Oblast in 
2010. I will discuss Amparo’s work in more detail later in this 
chapter; for the moment it is important to acknowledge the work 
to document the Sughd population’s experiences with oblava.  
 Figure 5.1 displays five categories representing the period 
during which a conscript received his povestka requiring him to 
report to the voenkomat for military service, if one was received 
at all. Those received outside or during the conscription period 
might be considered formally conscripted, even if the former is 
technically illegal. Some of those surveyed did not receive a 
notice. The remaining two categories indicate an illegal act on 
the part of the state, with the conscript either having received 
a povestka at the commissariat or after an oblava by commissariat 
officers; this means that about 20% of conscripts surveyed in 
Sughd in 2010 were the victims of oblava (Samadova and Gulov 
2011; Amparo 2011). 
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Figure 5.1. Where did you receive your conscription notice? 
(Samadova and Gulov 2011) 
 
 In order to understand this illegal recruitment method, it 
is useful to examine the recent experiences of Tajikistanis with 
oblava.These experiences demonstrate the relatively ad hoc nature 
of the practice, its illegality and lack of popular legitimacy, 
and some of the spatial aspects of the population it targets. As 
with all coercive actions perpetrated on a group of people, 
conscription-aged males and their families respond to these 
methods with tactics of their own to avoid being caught in the 
dragnet. While examining conscription methods, I show how 
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citizens seek to avoid military service through situational 
responses specific to the recruitment officers’ tactics. The 
tactics of oblava and civilian responses are spatial in nature, 
both at the micro-scale and at the larger regional level. To 
demonstrate this series of actions/reactions, it is useful to 
explain state tactics and civilian responses together—the focus 
of the next set of subsections. However, popular and formal 
resistance to oblava more generally focuses on the illegal nature 
of the practice and suggested policy changes/alternatives; I 
examine and explain this aspect of resistance and the state’s 
response to it in a separate section.  
 
The Marshrutka Trap 
 A common tactic used by recruiters is to commission the use 
of marshrutki (Russian: minibus taxis; singular: marshrutka). 
Marshrutki drive on regular routes through even the smallest 
cities in Tajikistan. Their drivers display the route number on a 
card placed on the front windshield so potential riders might 
wave them down anywhere along the route. They charge each rider a 
fee of 1-2 Somonis (about $0.2-0.4 during the research period) 
dependent upon the distance to be travelled and some run longer 
routes between cities. I used them to travel around Dushanbe, 
Kurgan-Teppe, Khujand and Khorog. Marshrutki are perhaps the most 
common form of transportation for most citizens in Tajikistan and 
throughout Central Asia generally. As such, they are an ideal 
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locus for officers from the voenkomat to find young males to 
apprehend and impress into the military.  
 During recruitment periods, recruitment officers or hired 
goons commandeer some marshrutki; the vehicle makes its usual 
stops, but the officers lie-in-wait on-board for potential oblava 
targets. Young males eligible for conscription are prevented from 
exiting and, when the vehicle is full, the driver is directed to 
the local voenkomat to process its captured riders. Female riders 
are allowed out of the bus at their stops (or simply denied entry 
in the first place) and will not be taken to the voenkomat. One 
marshrutka driver explained that “drivers working capital lines 
are obliged to devote one working day to the needs of the 
military office during the call” (Asia-Plus 2013a). Riders may 
enter voluntarily (unaware) or be forced to board a commissioned 
marshrutka by recruiters. One respondent to a news reporter noted 
that plain-clothed recruiters emerged from a marshrutka when he 
was waiting at a stop. They asked him, ““Are you a student?” I 
answered yes, he asked me for a student ID, which I could not 
show, then they surrounded me and pushed me into the marshrutka” 
(Respondent 15 2014). 
 Interviews with young males in Dushanbe confirm this 
tactic; I have already highlighted one at the beginning of this 
dissertation (Respondent 1 2013; Respondent 15 2014). Many are 
aware of this tactic through friends who have experience with it 
(Respondent 6 2013) and/or media reports (Majid 2013). Young 
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males react to this tactic mostly through spatial behavior 
modification; they simply avoid taking marshrutki during 
recruitment season whenever possible. Since this is difficult 
given the strong public reliance on this form of transport, 
another tactic is to avoid boarding a marshrutka that has no 
women on board--a somewhat reliable sign that it has been 
commandeered by officers from the voenkomat (Respondent 6 2013).  
 
Public Spaces: Bazaar, Parks and Side Streets 
 Public spaces are frequented by recruiters, especially 
“crowded places such as bazaars, markets, and parks,” but they 
concentrate on side streets rather than main avenues (Respondent 
15 2014) to secure military aged males for conscription. Another 
typical place is the dvor (Russian: courtyard) of an apartment 
complex, where recruiters lie in wait for unsuspecting targets. 
The easy tactic to avoid oblava would seem to be simply avoiding 
leaving the house, but of course this is not always possible. One 
interviewee in Dushanbe explained how his schedule and those of 
his friends are altered during conscription drives: “we try to 
avoid meeting with our friends in day time, avoid going out. And 
this became part of our culture. Many things you shall do tonight 
were postponed to early morning; basically it dictates you to 
make your schedule according to oblava’s schedule” (Respondent 5 
2013). 
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 Referring to the danger of public space posed to males 
during conscription, he further explained how this affects his 
family. “Because of all this, whenever my mother has a task for 
me, she does it herself, because she knows I can be conscripted 
if I go out. And every single day I am warned by my mother, “be 
careful,” whenever I go outside (Respondent 5 2013). Similarly, a 
Pamiri living in Dushanbe remarked that his mother “calls me 
every morning once a day. She tells me to avoid walking the 
streets in vain” (Respondent 15 2014). Every family in Tajikistan 
is aware of the disruption that oblava causes to the flow of 
daily life for four months each year. It generates a substantial 
amount of public anger at the voenkomat and Rakhmon regime, which 
leads to increased media coverage. 
 Public spaces have been the scene of many dramatic episodes 
reported in media sources (Ahmadi 2013; Ашуров 2013) during 
conscription season. Many men have been caught at the bazaar 
(Mamurzoda 2012). In one case, a man pursued by recruiters 
through a bazaar in the southern town of Vose (Khatlon Oblast) 
attempted to jump over a cauldron of oil used for preparing food, 
tipping its contents upon an older female cook, who was badly 
burned. The military commissar of Vose, responding to citizens 
who blamed his officers for the incident, refused to admit it had 
even happened, stating it “is only a rumor” (Ahmadi 2013). The 
cook is a mother of four and would require months of treatment, 
putting the burden of caring for her children on her sister for 
this period as there was no direct assistance from the state.  
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 These types of experiences, where potential conscripts are 
essentially arrested – sometimes after a chase – are common in 
media stories during recruitment season. Oblava related stories 
appear in media sources that cover Tajikistan, in particular 
Asia-Plus, Ozodagon, and the Radio Ozodi, a division of the U.S. 
Information Agency’s Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The stories 
posted on these sites reflect the popular dissatisfaction with 
the systematic coercion of the male population, while 
simultaneously presenting a forum for discussion of alternatives 
by local experts and government officials. Local activists, who 
seek to expose these recruitment methods and offer reforms to the 
military system, source many of the stories reported by these 
media sites. 
 A few other telling examples include a conscript who broke 
his leg attempting to escape (Ozodagon 2014d), a 42-year old 
journalist (Vose 2013) picked up off the street, and madrassa 
students raided during evening prayer in their dormitory (Asia-
Plus 2013c; Asia-Plus 2013b). Videos shared online have also 
documented oblava in action. In one short clip posted on YouTube, 
a couple at their own wedding is shown facing their supporters 
and guests when the scene is interrupted by what is reported to 
be the arrival of recruitment officers (off screen); the groom 
immediately flees for his freedom, running away from the camera 
and the crowd into the night (Gulov 2013). Another shows a young 
Tajik in traditional Muslim garb who has been caught by 
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recruitment officers and is being taken to the voenkomat while he 
(very) emotionally pleads for them to release him (Нуриев 2015).  
 These articles and videos demonstrate that oblava is part 
of the everyday experience for RT citizens during recruitment 
drives, highlighting the coercive role of the state and the 
extensive power the security apparatus has over the population. 
But they also demonstrate that the local press actively reports 
this abuse of state power and provide a space for critique of 
government actors. In a state where access to electronic news and 
social media outlets has been shut down for days or even weeks at 
a time, often for seemingly trivial reasons (including the 
unwanted YouTube posting of Rakhmon singing and dancing at a 
party), this is notable (Camm 2013a; RT 2012; Taylor 2013). In 
its 2015 annual report, Freedom House currently ranks Tajikistan 
179th in the world and labeled the situation as “Not Free” (though 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are farther down 
the list). The report made special note of the Rakhmon regime’s 
barring of independent media from reporting on the situation in 
GBAO as a “prime example” of repressive governance (Freedom House 
2015; RFE/RL 2015b). 
 This tactic has been addressed by human rights groups, one 
of which noted that “it has become common practice for the 
government’s Communications Service to put pressure on the media 
in response to criticism by blocking internet resources” (NGO 
Coalition 2013, 45). The Rakhmon regime has closed institutions 
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that have challenged it, including Amparo, a young lawyers group 
in Khujand that has assisted conscripts and worked against oblava 
through legal channels (the group remains active even if it no 
longer officially carries the name). I discuss Amparo in more 
detail later in this chapter. For now, it is important to 
acknowledge the link between Amparo and media outlets; the legal 
association provides many of the leads and stories regarding 
military conscription directly to media outlets, and its members 
are quoted regularly in those stories.  
 In the pages that follow, stories of this sort not only 
provide a foundation for understanding the role oblava plays in 
citizens’ daily lives; they link the experiences of these 
citizens with their compatriots across the country and around the 
world. Most Tajikistanis exhibit limited mobility, spending most 
of their lives in or near their hometowns and villages. Reading 
news stories about oblava creates a shared experience among them, 
even if it is a negative one. Nonetheless, disdain for 
conscription practices seems to be one thing that nearly all 
citizens agree on, and that is notable. Unpacking how individuals 
and groups have resisted conscription and its ugly son, oblava, 
is important to understanding how the military system more 
generally inhibits the growth of national sentiments. 
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Resistance 
 Potential recruits develop counter-tactics to avoid being 
picked up through oblava. These practices are performed during 
recruitment season and are typically dependent upon the 
vulnerability of the person in question, as some males feel safer 
due to connections, status as a student, or possession of a 
voenniy bilet. “Safe” males may adjust their behavior when in the 
company of vulnerable friends, however. Obviously, these 
practices are situated in time and space. Temporally, recruiting 
drives are bound to the biannual two-month periods and only then 
do targeted males need to adjust their behavior. During these 
periods, the importance of space is demonstrated through young 
males’ avoidance of, and heighted awareness in, public areas and 
along mass transit lines. However, as oblava can happen virtually 
anywhere, heightened awareness at all times to one’s environment 
is imperative four months per year for those considered most 
vulnerable to conscription: poor, unconnected, and uneducated 
young men. 
 
Connections and Verbal Tactics 
 People who have connections in the government do not 
hesitate to use them to escape oblava. Calling their connections 
by mobile phone at the moment they are caught, can typically 
result in release by the recruiters on the spot. One respondent 
called his “tagha” (uncle on mother’s side; in southern 
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Tajikistan, it is vernacular for a ’sponsor’) when recruiters 
caught him and his friends. He was able to get out, but could not 
directly help his friends, who had to extricate themselves from 
the situation on their own (Respondent 1 2013). Such connections 
provide comfort to those who have them. Furthermore, those who 
are confident and knowledgeable of the power of connections to 
the elite may attempt to talk their way out of being taken to the 
voenkomat by stating that they have powerful friends – even when 
they do not. Speaking confidently and demonstrably of connections 
– even threatening the status of the recruitment officer – may 
persuade a captor to release his captive.  
 Similarly, knowledge of oblava’s illegality, coupled with 
enough confidence to stand up to recruiters practicing these 
tactics, may result in the release of a potential recruit. In the 
story highlighted at the beginning of this dissertation, the 
respondent resisted, stating his rights as a student. He was 
immediately asked if he was Pamiri. “I said yes. After that, they 
let us go. One of the reasons they let me go it is my ethnic 
background. They know that normally Pamiris tend to be more 
educated people than the average citizens” (Respondent 15 2014). 
In this case, the officers’ perception (not without some basis) 
of Pamiris influenced them to release their quarry. It is likely 
they viewed him as a hassle not worth pursuing--one that 
potentially could get them into trouble with lawyers and/or angry 
family members who were likely to be educated in the unlawful 
methods of the recruiters.  
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 Some respondents noted that simply “behaving confidently” 
to indicate that you have someone “behind you” and should be 
respected (an important personal connection) works, even if no 
connections in fact exist (Respondent 5 2013; Respondent 4 2013). 
On the other hand, another said that speaking up about your 
rights may bring a harsh response from the recruiters; still, he 
noted that conscripts may be asked about their parents in case 
they are important people that might get the recruiters in 
trouble (Respondent 6 2013). 
 However, it is important to note that these tactics may be 
more likely to be effective in large cities such as Dushanbe or 
Khujand, where the bureaucracy is extensive and such connections 
common. In villages and smaller towns, connections to state elite 
for average conscription aged males are less plausible. In 
addition, the government footprint is smaller in these regions 
and local officials tend to know the other apparatchiks in the 
surrounding area, making bluffs easier to call. Perhaps most 
importantly, this tactic is far more likely to be used by 
educated males. Those in small villages and/or from modest 
families often know little about the systematic workings of the 
state and their rights within it. They are unlikely to have 
connections or know anyone who does and therefore do not 
understand some of the verbal tactics that could be used if they 
are caught (Respondent 5 2013). Similarly, as relatively 
powerless citizens, the concept of citing the illegality of 
oblava as a tactic is also an unlikely choice. Far away from the 
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eyes of the media and more educated citizens, villagers are less 
likely to challenge the state’s coercive methods.  
 
Amparo 
 The Association of Young Lawyers, Amparo, is an 
organization that has operated in Sughd oblast out of the city of 
Khujand since 2005. Its primary goal is “defending the rights of 
conscripts and military service members and the strengthening of 
civilian control over the armed forces” (NGO Coalition 2013, 54). 
Hence, Amparo places the performance of oblava and dedovshchina 
directly in its crosshairs. Amparo has published annual 
monitoring reports for Sughd Oblast for 2010 (Samadova and Gulov 
2011) and nationally for 2011 (Samadova, Sobirov, and Rahimova 
2012) that provide useful statistical information on conscription 
and oblava as well as a description of the association’s 
activities that assist conscription-eligible males and conscripts 
to understand their legal rights within the military context.  
Most of Amparo’s efforts have been centered on Khujand and Sughd 
Oblast, but its goal of changing the conscription system is 
national. 
 The monitoring reports mention five primary activities for 
disseminating information on the legal rights of conscripts and 
servicemen in the 2007-2010 period (Samadova and Gulov 2011). It 
is useful to examine how Amparo works to understand its 
contribution at individual, local and national scales. From 
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assisting families of wrongfully conscripted males to proposing 
both a contract-based military and alternative forms of national 
service, AMPARO is at the forefront of formal resistance to the 
RT military’s personnel policies and practices. These five 
activities outline the organization’s efforts to promote and 
defend legal rights at these scales within the framework of RT 
law “On General Military Duty and Military Service.”  
 The first is the “Organization of public reception,” which 
outlines the association’s direct legal consultations with 
clients regarding their rights as conscripts or servicemen. 
During this period, over 600 people have approached Amparo for 
assistance. “Legal literacy,” the second activity, works to 
educate the population at large regarding their rights before 
conscription. It encompasses the most wide-ranging forms of 
assistance, including training for lawyers and activists; a 
variety of publications (soldier and conscript pocketbooks, 
monitoring reports, brochures, and articles in Russian, Tajiki 
and Uzbek); television talk shows, informational meetings for 
rural governments, students and families; and informational 
stands at the entrance to voenkomats. Third, Amparo disseminates 
information on alternative civil service and has developed a 
draft law to that effect, which it has forwarded to government 
agencies and made publically available. Fourth, Amparo worked to 
raise the legal literacy of servicemen and held training seminars 
at 18 military units in Sughd, attended by over 600 conscripts. 
Lastly, Amparo has participated in conferences organized by the 
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International Project “Society and the Army.” This project is 
active in a number of FSU republics and promotes the protection 
of servicemen and the institution of alternative civil service 
models by governments (Samadova and Gulov 2011, 45–50).  
 Amparo’s work drew the ire of the Rakhmon regime. On 
October 24, 2012, a court accepted the RT Justice Ministry’s 
motion to shut down the association. EurasiaNet covered this 
story and linked it to Amparo’s work on conscription and torture 
conventions.  
…an Amparo representative, speaking at a European Union-
funded seminar in Dushanbe, accused the government of 
failing to address torture cases. Not long after that 
seminar, Amparo was charged with a number of technical 
violations. The charges also closely followed a briefing 
that Amaparo activists gave the UN special rapporteur on 
torture, Juan Mendez, during his visit to Tajikistan in May 
(EurasiaNet 2012b). 
 
However, it is hard to imagine that the Rakhmon regime was solely 
concerned with torture, and at least one observer agreed. 
EurasiaNet again: 
“My hunch is that they pissed off somebody in Khujand, 
possibly related to their military recruits activism,” said 
a Western diplomatic source. “To be fair they appear to do 
a pretty good job in this area, and have taken the lead on 
it” (EurasiaNet 2012b). 
 
 Amparo’s closing resulted in protests from a variety of 
NGOs and IGOs. Human Rights Watch’s Europe and Central Asia 
director Hugh Williamson stated that the granting of this legal 
motion “is a transparent attempt to silence voices working on 
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critically important issues such as torture and the rights of 
military recruits and a major step backward for human rights in 
Tajikistan” (Human Rights Watch 2012). But in fact, Amparo was 
not silenced even while it officially closed its doors. Many of 
its members continue the work on military personnel issues and 
maintain contact with the others (Respondent 16 2013). The 
regime’s move may have made these lawyers’ efforts more 
difficult, but the association has taken a new, less centralized 
form. One casualty of the move has been the loss of the annual 
monitoring report, which requires an institutional capability 
that has largely evaporated with Amparo’s closing; there are only 
two annual editions: 2010 and 2011. Nonetheless, so little has 
changed in the military commissariat’s methods and the conditions 
within the RT military itself that it is difficult to imagine 
significant statistical or qualitative variations from these two 
years in ways that affect citizens’ views of the national armed 
forces. 
 
Masculinity and Resistance in Khorog 
 GBAO is a difficult oblast for the RT government to 
administer. The legacy of the civil war left a number of 
opposition commanders in positions of power, either formally as 
part of the government or informally through their control over 
Pamiri militias (Respondent 25 2014). The self-governing nature 
of Pamiris, formalized within the territorial structure of an 
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autonomous oblast both in the USSR and independent Tajikistan, 
has presented a challenge to some of Dushanbe’s policies. Pamiris 
predominantly practice Ismaili Islam and their imam is the Aga 
Khan. The Aga Khan development network provides substantial 
educational, cultural and financial resources to its members in 
GBAO, weakening the power of the state to leverage its interests 
there.  
 In discussing recruitment with Pamiri men in Khorog, there 
were some conflicting stories regarding oblava, though it appears 
that recruitment is a bit different in the administrative capital 
of GBAO. First, a number of respondents remarked that oblava is 
no longer practiced (as of 2010) – at least regularly – in Khorog 
due to officers getting physically assaulted by locals 
(Respondent 7 2013; Respondent 8 2013). Others noted that it is 
still there, even if it is practiced less violently (Respondent 
10 2013; Respondent 13 2013). Another described that it as being 
much more common in villages and along the highway in GBAO on the 
way to Dushanbe (Respondent 12 2013). This is an especially 
difficult situation for parents whose sons are taken this way, as 
it forces them to travel long distances to help (negotiating with 
and/or bribing) free them from the voenkomat; conscripts taken 
locally are sent to the nearest voenkomat which families of 
conscripts can more easily visit and attempt to free their sons. 
This same respondent explained that recruitment officers often 
pick up Pamiris in Dushanbe, even if they are students, because 
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the officers believe the conscripts’ parents will travel to pay a 
bribe; it is simply for financial gain. 
 Nearly all Pamiri respondents were explicit that military 
service was something that they were not afraid of; like many 
Tajiks, they actually desired to perform military service – 
though few wanted to enlist in the RT military. One respondent 
stated that dedovshchina and general bad conditions is the main 
reason most young men do not want to serve, even if they do not 
admit it, noting “being a coward is not appreciated in the 
region” (Respondent 13 2015). Some served in the Russian border 
guards before their withdrawal in 2005 (Respondent 12 2013; 
Respondent 7 2013), while others joined just to avoid oblava and 
finish their service early (Respondent 9 2013). During these 
interviews it was apparent that the Pamiris I interviewed had a 
fairly masculine view of the military, that it was a ‘school of 
life’ and to some degree, a stepping-stone to manhood. However, 
there was some reluctance to serve in the RT military due to its 
perceived unprofessionalism. Also, many noted that they or their 
relatives/friends served in the border guards in order to serve 
near home and that until recently, this service branch was full 
of Pamiris. One stated that his nephew volunteered so that his 
uncle could choose where he served, undoubtedly as close to home 
as possible (Respondent 10 2013). It is possible that this 
situation is unique to GBAO, but through my research I was unable 
to confirm it. I later asked a pair of respondents in Isfara 
(Sughd Oblast), if volunteering for service instead of being 
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conscripted would help a soldier to be based near his hometown. 
Their answer was “no” (Respondent 17 2014). It is perhaps 
unsurprising that there are inconsistencies in the practices of 
military recruitment, particularly in time and space. Aspects of 
the conscription system remain dynamic, but its basic structure 
remains coercive, unpopular and largely unchanged in its methods 
and goals. 
 
Emigration 
 I describe the geopolitical importance of emigration and 
the remittance economy to Tajikistan in terms of its relationship 
with Russia in Chapter IV. Emigration also acts as a valuable 
option for males seeking to avoid military service in Tajikistan. 
This option is condoned by the state, which considers those 
living and working outside of its borders to be free from 
conscription while they are abroad. Media outlets have noted this 
situation, considering it virtually the equivalent of unofficial 
deferment (Yuldashev 2013c; Asia-Plus 2014a). Emigration is a 
form of avoidance rather than resistance; military aged labor 
migrants can come and go from Tajikistan at will and avoid 
conscription simply by not coming home during the recruitment 
period. Respondents noted friends or family who had emigrated 
abroad not only to Russia, but even to the U.S. (to study) with 
the intention of returning only after they turn twenty-eight and 
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are no longer eligible for conscription (Respondent 5 2013; 
Respondent 4 2013).  
 Understanding the choice to emigrate, pay a bribe or resist 
conscription must be understood within the context of the 
conditions within the armed forces of Tajikistan. That life in 
the RT military is difficult if not dangerous is well known to 
nearly everyone in Tajikistan. In the next section I examine the 
conditions that dominate perceptions of the military among RT 
citizens and contribute to its failure to legally fulfill its 
manpower needs and inhibit its ability to develop national 
sentiments.    
 
Conclusion 
 Most RT citizens’ interaction with, and understanding of, 
the country’s national military is constructed around the 
conscription process. Conscription is publicized as requiring 
young males to fulfill their national duty; yet the official 
deferment and exemption methods create an unequal playing field. 
Males with important political connections and financial means 
are able to avoid service through those connections by bribing 
someone within the voenkomat structure (a doctor, recruiter, 
commissariat official). Only those who either want to enlist 
(which seems to be very few) or have little choice when their 
number is called actually serve in the RT military. The public’s 
disdain for its armed forces has helped to raise a military 
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filled with conscripts who, in the words of RT citizens, are from 
marginalized backgrounds: a “peasant army”.  
 Popular disinterest in serving in the RT military has 
caused a counter reaction by the state, which either actively or 
tacitly accepts the practice of impressment of males into the 
military through the exercise of oblava. This indiscriminate 
practice captures unsuspecting and suspecting males in the public 
areas – and even homes – of Tajikistan, often creating a game of 
cat and mouse in some of the country’s urban areas. Conscription-
age single males develop tactics to avoid being caught in 
oblava’s web, though it appears many of these tactics are more 
suited to those with higher education levels, connections and 
confidence. The options for less connected, poor, and/or less 
educated males are substantially lower. While it is possible for 
them to employ some of these tactics (arguing the illegality of 
oblava, calling a political connection, or acting calm, cool and 
collected during recruitment process), most males from 
marginalized backgrounds don’t understand their rights, have no 
important political connections and thus lack confidence in this 
context. 
 Of course, all this begs the question, why avoid service at 
all? The conditions in the RT military structure are quite poor, 
when it comes to the availability of food, health care, uniforms, 
and housing. Additionally, military training is minimal, giving 
potential recruits the impression that they are gaining little in 
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compensation for the bad conditions they must endure. If one is 
not to become a trained soldier, why join the army? Most 
importantly, the ritualized hazing practice of dedovshchina 
performed among the RT conscripts strikes fear into the hearts of 
military-aged males and their families. The stories on 
dedovshchina appearing in news media and those told by veterans 
act to make military service more like a prison sentence and help 
to foster the idea that becoming a soldier is rather pointless.  
 In the next chapter, I unpack the role of the issues 
described in the preceding paragraph and consider how they shape 
Tajik nationalism. If military service holds little value to RT 
citizens – despite a Soviet tradition that looks favorably on 
such service –there are clearly significant challenges to the 
notion of the military as a national integrator. This challenge 
is intensified by the presence of the Russian 201st MRD, which 
has long accepted Tajikistanis among its personnel. Most 
recently, the Russian Federation and the RT have legalized the 
enlistment of the latter’s citizens into Russian units based 
outside of Tajikistan, including in combat operations abroad. 
With better pay, overall conditions and materials, the perception 
of less dedovshchina and professional training, the option of 
service in the RF armed forces could be an appealing one to many 
RT males and complicates the situation of the RT military in the 
minds of its citizens. By examining the conditions within the RT 
armed forces and service options with Russia (and other states), 
we can better understand the resistance to conscription into 
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Tajikistan’s national military and its failure to create positive 
national sentiments.  
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CHAPTER VI 
MILITARY CONDITIONS AND FOREIGN PRESENCE 
Introduction: The Disdain for National Military Service 
 The disdain for conscription described in the preceding 
chapter does not, by itself, explain the widespread resistance to 
military service – a resistance that stands in marked contrast to 
the high value placed on military service that is part of the 
Soviet legacy (Respondent 2 2013; Respondent 4 2013; Respondent 7 
2013; Respondent 8 2013; Respondent 12 2013; Respondent 22 2014; 
Respondent 23 2014). The everyday practices relating to military 
personnel are shaped not only by the social realities of life in 
Tajikistan, such as ethno-regional identity, poverty and the 
aftermath of the Civil War, but also by the legacies of the 
Soviet period such as the hazing practices of dedovshchina. 
Indeed, my interviews revealed that many RT citizens lament the 
decline in the social status of military service since the Soviet 
period that is prevalent in independent Tajikistan. Nonetheless, 
it is also understood why this situation exists: conditions in 
the RT military are substandard, training is minimal, and hazing 
is rampant. This military may be modeled after the Red Army, but 
it largely fails to match the latter’s professionalism and thus, 
national appeal.  
 This chapter examines the conditions within the RT military 
that create such negative views among the population. It is 
organized into four main sections, each addressing important – 
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but closely linked – aspects of these conditions. First, I show 
how the experiences of conscripts are closely related to the 
military’s failure to provide adequate material needs (food, pay, 
uniforms, equipment) and organization (training and leadership). 
Second, I unpack the widespread problem of ritualized hazing, 
referred to as dedovshchina, which plays a greater role in 
discouraging military service than any other single factor. The 
stories on dedovshchina appearing in news media and those told by 
veterans act to make military service resemble a prison sentence 
and the idea of becoming a soldier seem senseless to potential 
conscripts.  
 While I note its pervasive influence, the third section 
focuses the role of ethno-regional identity in the officer corps, 
particularly as it relates to advancement and the composition of 
the senior officer corps. With the president and his closest 
apparatchiks predominantly from the Kulob area, more specifically 
the town of Dangara, a pattern has emerged that often favors 
certain ethnicities and/or regions of origin over others within 
the state governmental and security apparatus. How this affects 
the experience of regular citizens and conscripts is crucial to 
how military service acts (or fails to act) as a national 
integrator. If certain identities are favored over others and/or 
conscripts collectively associate with those from similar ethno-
regional identities within their units, the military may 
reinforce societal cleavages rather than fostering national 
sentiments. The reinforcement of societal divisions has been 
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performed in many other militaries, such as Afghanistan (Simonsen 
2009) and Israel (Levy and Sasson-Levy 2008), and is considered 
more the norm for multiethnic armies (Enloe 1980). Understanding 
how ethno-regional identity is manifested in the national 
military of Tajkistan is critical to understanding the production 
of national sentiments there. 
 If military service holds little value to RT citizens – 
despite a Soviet tradition that looks favorably on such service – 
it appears clear that there are significant challenges to the 
notion of the military as a national integrator. In the fourth 
section, I demonstrate how this challenge is intensified by the 
presence of the Russian 201st MRD, which has long accepted 
Tajikistanis among its personnel. Most recently, the Russian 
Federation and the RT have legalized the enlistment of the 
latter’s citizens into Russian units based outside of Tajikistan, 
including those involved in combat operations abroad. With better 
pay, overall conditions and materials, the perception of less 
dedovshchina and professional training, the option of service in 
the RF armed forces is an appealing one to many RT males and 
complicates the meaning the RT military holds for many of its 
citizens.  
 
Why Avoid Service? Conditions in the RT Military 
In the Tajik army soldiers are beaten, hungry, humiliated, 
used like slaves for generals, etc. Even if such 
information is not in the mass media, every poor and rich 
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person possesses this information. This sort of information 
can’t be locked, because people tell their pains, they 
complain (Respondent 4 2013). 
 
 Bribing to avoid service, resistance to oblava, and calls 
for a contract military and alternative forms of national service 
all lead to an important question: Why do young males, who grow 
up in a post-Soviet culture that places value on military 
service, want to avoid their so-called civic duty? Further, why 
do males who live in a country with a high birth rate (CITE) and 
little economic opportunity largely shun military service? In 
many states, the military offer of a paycheck, room and board is 
an attractive option for those in need of employment. The answer 
to these questions lies in the conditions within the RT military. 
Some of these conditions relate to the Soviet legacy, such as 
dedovshchina, while others relate to such fundamental matters as 
health, pay, food and professionalism. Each of these aspects of 
daily life in the RT military is viewed negatively, leading most 
of the population to avoid peacetime service and challenging the 
military’s capability to positively influence national sentiment.  
 Additionally, ethno-regional identity shapes and reflects 
many of the daily practices within the RT military. The 
geographic placement of new conscripts, the performance of 
dedovshchina, and promotion through the officer ranks all take 
place within a framework of ethno-regional identity. The 
following sections explain each of these practices, highlighting 
the role identity plays within them. In some cases, identity is 
203 
incredibly important (officer promotion and placement), while in 
others its influence is expressed unpredictably in time and 
space. For example, some respondents noted how certain identities 
are targeted in dedovshchina, while in others’ experiences, 
ethno-regional identity did not play a strong role. First, I 
examine the popular perception of the military, including 
prospects after service. I then turn to the popularly disdained 
practice of dedovshchina and its effect on conscription, unit 
cohesion and soldier welfare. Then I discuss issues of pay, 
health, food and advancement. Lastly, I scrutinize how ethno-
regional identity affects advancement within the officer corps 
and favors certain groups over others-- making the merits of 
individual officers a secondary or even tertiary consideration. 
 
Basic Conditions 
 Media stories that address life in the military mention the 
bad-to-horrible conditions under which RT soldiers serve and the 
problems this causes conscription efforts. This is no better 
displayed than in a Radio Ozodi article with the English title 
“Where does the military service’s negative image in recruits 
minds come from?” (Юсуфӣ 2014). The government often downplays 
the problems in the military, making statements about national 
duty. One area chairman addressed some new conscripts; according 
to Asia-Plus news, he “noted that parents and teenagers should 
not complain about the conditions of military service in parts of 
204 
the country’s armed forces, as they are consistent with current 
standards” (Nazriyev 2014). Recently, the ruling People’s 
Democratic Party Tajikistan (PDPT) office in Sughd oblast 
organized a trip that included local parents to visit their sons 
serving in the southern parts of the country. The delegation was 
to visit all the basic aspects of daily life on the base, 
including barracks and mess halls, in an effort to familiarize 
participants with the terms and quality of their service 
conditions (Rafieva 2014). 
 
Dedovshchina: The Bane of the Mladshii Conscript 
 It is important to note that my sample group was relatively 
small and that dedovshchina can be a sensitive topic in 
Tajikistan, as it is a traumatic experience for many soldiers. 
With this in mind, I offer some insights into the practice and 
other aspects of military life, but I am not in a position to 
present robust conclusions from the limited data derived from my 
research. Nonetheless, there seems little disagreement about 
dedovshchina’s negative effect on soldier morale throughout the 
post-Soviet world (Daucé and Sieca-Kozlowski 2006; Herspring 
2005a); the details of the practice help to shed light on the 
conditions in the RT military, but there seems little evidence 
that it serves to further the development of national sentiments.  
 The Tajik interviewee who spoke the quote at the beginning 
of this section wanted to enlist in the RT military. He explained 
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that his brother, a veteran, convinced him not to join almost 
solely due his experience of being tortured through dedovshchina. 
He still had interest in military service, so he considered other 
options. 
(T)he fact is that after the Soviet period dedovshchina was 
expanding. It was the understanding of lower case officers 
that dedovshchina is a good method of teaching new 
recruits. Here when I dropped the idea of joining the Tajik 
military, but there was an option of joining the 201st 
Russian military base, with better pay, no dedovshchina, 
and better training (Respondent 4 2013). 
 
Whether dedovshchina is absent from the 201st MRD is perhaps an 
open question, as there is sufficient literature to suggest that 
it remains a problem within the contemporary Russian military 
(Daucé and Sieca-Kozlowski 2006; Herspring 2005a). Regardless, 
citizens of Tajikistan consider their military bases to be 
dangerous spaces due to this practice. 
 A Pamiri interviewee who served in the Russian border 
guards prior to their withdrawal in 2005 described dedovshchina 
as part of his experience. At this time, his border guard unit 
(like most others) was comprised mostly of enlisted personnel 
from Tajikistan (Pamiris, Tajiks and Uzbeks) with Russian 
officers. He explained that he was well trained and fed, and had 
all his necessary material needs met.  
In the border guards there was hazing as well, but not as 
severe. When we left the border guards in 2004, the Russian 
border guards left Khorog and people started to enter the 
RT border guards, hazing grew and intensified. When 
veterans left the RT border guards, they started to tell 
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others about the hazing and men should avoid joining the RT 
military (Respondent 12 2013). 
 
During his time in the service, the RT military was preparing to 
transition to a border protection role, so there was a national 
military base attached to his Russian unit; they were separated 
by a wall, but otherwise in close proximity to each other. The RT 
personnel were lacking in even basic material needs. “(T)he RT 
soldiers would come and ask for food and clothes. In the RT army 
they did not have good uniforms. We had everything in the border 
guards: toothpaste, good food, uniforms, boots, combs, and our 
haircuts were always clean” (Respondent 12 2013). Another Pamiri 
interviewee, who was not accepted into the Russian border guards, 
also mentioned the advantages of this service over the RT units. 
“The main thing was money, they had good pay, they had good 
conditions. Lots of people went for money. Now, there is no 
money, no conditions” (Respondent 8 2013). His brother, however, 
served in the Russian 201st MRD in Dushanbe for similar reasons, 
signing a second service contract to stay in the unit. 
 Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of his experience 
concerns the how ethno-regional identity shaped the dedovshchina 
experience. The interviewee served in two different border guard 
zastavi (outposts): Kalaikhum and Vanj, both in GBAO along the 
Panj River and the Afghan border. In the former location, most of 
the soldiers were Pamiri. He remarked that they did not haze each 
other, though fights sometimes took place. However, at zastavi, 
where a few Pamiris were outnumbered by Tajiks, the “Tajiks would 
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band together and target the Pamiris.” In Vanj, his arrival 
brought the number of Pamiris to three, so “the others could not 
pick on us. Not because of my strength, but because I 
communicated well and was able to negotiate with the others.” For 
the most part, the Pamiris didn’t haze each other here either, 
but the Tajiks were all from Kulob and hazed each other 
regularly. “I asked them why they did this. They said this 
(regional identity) didn’t matter to them” (Respondent 12 2013).  
 Of all the ethno-regional identities in Tajikistan, I 
detected the most solidarity among Pamiris in my research. 
Perhaps this should not be surprising; they comprise a relatively 
small population within Tajikistan and their home region is a 
collection of somewhat isolated mountain valleys in the high 
Pamirs. Their educational level is considered to be exceptionally 
high on a relative scale, as is their pride in being Pamiri. My 
interviewee explained one of the factors that reinforce this 
solidarity. 
Pamiris do not haze each other. Khorog is a small town; if 
I come from the military and tell people who hazed me while 
I was in, people I know may choose to haze them when they 
see them. There would be one situation when Pamiris would 
haze each other, but this is related to ‘slave’ actions, 
where younger soldiers perform duties for older ones 
(Respondent 12 2013). 
 
 The slave actions he mentions refers to simple tasks that 
mladshii (younger) soldiers perform for starshie (older) 
soldiers; he considered these duties to be a normal part of daily 
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routine in the military. Some respondents noted that dedovshchina 
was not really an issue in their experience and/or that everyone 
was treated equally (Respondent 22 2014; Respondent 21 2014), 
while others noted that it doesn’t exist on bases where many 
officers are present (Respondent 16 2013; Respondent 12 2013). 
These experiences may refer to this more routine form of hazing 
that is largely normalized within the daily structure of military 
life. On the other hand, dedovshchina involves physical and 
mental abuse, generates fear in conscripts and breaks unit 
cohesion, contributes to desertion and has been linked to 
suicides (RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty 2006; Asia-Plus 2008; 
Haidar 2014; Ozodagon 2014c; Asia-Plus 2014b; Asia-Plus 2014c; 
Djuraev 2014). In some cases interviews, I felt that the 
respondent wanted to hide his experience with dedovshchina 
(Respondent 21 2014) or was openly unwilling to discuss it 
(Respondent 9 2013).   
 A Pamiri respondent who served in the RT Presidential 
(National) Guard in Dushanbe also noted the Pamiri solidarity 
within the military. During dedovshchina, he explained that 
starshie Pamiris would take care of mladshii Pamiris, mostly by 
replacing material goods that had been taken from them. He noted 
that other ethno-regional groups didn’t exhibit this kind of 
solidarity in the military. Further, while he was friendly with 
the other three Pamiris in his unit, he interacted with the 
Tajiks he served with only professionally. “We communicated 
officially, but not so much as comrades” (Respondent 14 2013).  
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 Another Pamiri who served in the security services 
corroborated his group solidarity. “Pamiris band together, 
especially away from their home region. Other regional 
identities, not so much” and “Pamiri officers protect Pamiris” 
(Respondent 10 2013). When asked about other (specific) 
identities, he stated that Uzbeks and Kyrgyz would be targeted in 
dedovshchina, especially if they were serving far from their home 
regions. One Pamiri who served in the RT army refused to answer 
questions regarding dedovshchina and remarked that there were no 
problems in his unit among the different ethno-regional groups 
(Respondent 9 2013). It is impossible to know if this was truly 
his experience, but it stands in contrast to that of all other 
veterans from GBAO.  
 A Khujandi member of Amparo and expert on military 
personnel affairs in Tajikistan commented on the ethno-regional 
issue. When asked about Pamiri solidarity relative to other 
groups, he responded “(t)his is the nature of the Pamiri people. 
However, it cannot be applied to other ethnics/regions in 
Tajikistan. For instance, a Kulobi may torture a Kulobi, or a 
Khujandi may do the same with a Khujandi mladshii” (Respondent 16 
2013). He further described the practice of base assignment and 
how it helps establish a spatial pattern to the practice of 
dedovshchina at the national scale. Since conscripts are 
typically deployed to bases far from their home region, soldiers 
in any given region are typically not from the surrounding area. 
Thus, bases in southern Tajikistan are likely to be full of 
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conscripts from the north and vice-versa. He then associates the 
practice of dedovshchina more prominently with southern (Kulobi) 
Tajiks. 
(T)he people of the north tend to be more educated compared 
to the south, and dedovshchina apparently appears less in 
the units in which they serve. This is typically in the 
southern bases; in contrast, the northern bases have more 
dedovshchina due to more southerners serving there. In 
addition, the units that are based in Dushanbe and the 
Regions of Republican Subordination have more visits and 
control from the center just due to their proximity, which 
makes the existence of dedovshchina to be in doubt there 
(Respondent 16 2013). 
 
 
Soldier and Officer Compensation 
 Multiple respondents reference the very low compensation in 
the RT military as an important disincentive to serve (Respondent 
1 2013; Respondent 4 2013; Respondent 8 2013; Respondent 14 
2013). Some compare it directly with pay and benefits found in 
Soviet or Russian armed forces, which are substantially higher 
(Respondent 12 2013; Respondent 21 2014). If it is true that the 
RT conscripts are predominantly from economically and 
educationally marginalized backgrounds, extremely low to 
nonexistent pay would seem to add a disproportionately negative 
component to the experience relative to wealthier and better 
educated ones. Put differently, if pay were reasonable, poor 
males would at least be compensated, even if they were unable to 
avoid service. Since the pay is nearly nonexistent, the negative 
experience of military service is exacerbated further. 
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 One Pamiri who served in the Presidential (National) Guard, 
noted that he was never paid. “Instead of money, we received 
basic goods like toothpaste. They said, “this is your salary”” 
(Respondent 14 2013). He noted that soldiers did not receive 
enough basic goods and that sometimes starshie conscripts stole 
cases of materials and sold them on the black market.  To make 
his service time even worse, officers demanded bribe payments 
from conscripts in order to be granted the contractually allotted 
10 days of official leave. 
 One way to gauge the pay of career soldiers (despite these 
conditions, Tajikistan does have some) is to look at the 
compensation of officers. Like many statistics for the RT 
military, the full pay range of the cadre is not readily 
available. However, in 2014 Radio Ozodi published a comparison of 
pay for lieutenants (junior officers) in each of the 15 post-
Soviet republics. The article listed pay in Russian rubles, but 
also presented an equivalent in U.S. dollars for the five Central 
Asian republics. “In dollar terms, according to this study, a 
lieutenant in Tajikistan receives $56, while the salary of his 
colleagues in Uzbekistan is $120, in Kyrgyzstan - $200, in 
Turkmenistan - $250, and in Kazakhstan - $470” (Radio Ozodi 
2014).  
 What is striking about this comparison is not that 
Tajikistan is the lowest, but rather just how low; Tajikistan is 
the poorest of the former Soviet republics at $990 per capita GNI 
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(The World Bank 2013b), but Kyrgyzstan is not far behind at $1210 
(The World Bank 2013a), yet it pays its lieutenants nearly four 
times as much as Tajikistan ($200 compared to $56). Coupled with 
the neglible pay and limited material goods provided to 
conscripts, it is difficult to imagine many soldiers entering the 
RT armed services with the intention of long-term employment, 
unless they have some promise of rapid advancement through the 
ranks. One respondent noted that his brother wanted to stay in 
the military to potentially pursue a career, but the pay was too 
low to make it worthwhile (Respondent 18 2014).  
 Tajikistan has the full range of officers (generals, 
colonels, majors, etc.), so who stays and climbs through the rank 
structure? This is an important question if the military is to 
represent the breadth of society and help to mold positive 
national sentiments among the population. The next section 
examines how ethno-regional identity shapes the officer corps and 
in turn reflects the social divisions that exist in Tajikistan.  
 
Ethno-regional Groups in the Officer Corps 
 The importance of ethno-regional identity and patron-client 
networks in the advancement of officers through the ranks 
represents perhaps the greatest challenge to the military as a 
contributor to national sentiments. If certain groups are favored 
for advancement over others, the very concept of a national 
military is thrown into question. The majority of the cabinet 
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ministers and other key figures of the Rakhmon regime are from 
the Kulob area, more specifically from the president’s hometown 
of Dangara. It is logical to expect that this region of origin be 
disproportionally represented among not only the general 
officers, but also increasingly among senior officers (colonels 
and majors) of the RT military. The heads of the key ministries 
and services in the RT security sector fit this pattern. Below is 
a list of these officials/generals with their hometown/place of 
birth in italics. All of these towns are in relatively close 
proximity to each other in the SE section of Khatlon Oblast as is 
shown on Map 6.1. 
Ministry of Defense: General Sherali Mirzo, Hamadoni (near 
Kulob), Khatlon Oblast  
Ministry of Interior: Ramazon Rahimov: Dangara, Khatlon 
Oblast 
GKNB (former KGB): Saimumin Yatimov: Farkhor, Khatlon 
Oblast 
Committee on State Secrets: Saidamir Zuhurov, Farkhor, 
Khatlon Oblast 
Border Guards: Lt. General Rajabali Rahmonali, Dangara, 
Khatlon Oblast (president’s nephew) 
National Guard: Bobojon Jamolzoda: Dangara, Khatlon Oblast 
(“Who is who? (Кто есть кто)” 2015; Asia-Plus 2013d; Asia-
Plus 2013e) 
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The main leaders of the security apparatus of the RT government 
are all from the same ethno-regional group of Kulobi Tajiks to 
the exclusion of Khujandi Tajiks, Garmi Tajiks, Dushanbe/Hissori 
Tajiks, Uzbeks, Pamiris and Kyrgyz. At what point does it begin 
to matter and how are officers from less-desired groups weeded 
out? 
 
 
 
Map 6.1. Tajikistan Administrative Divisions and Urban Areas 
 
Unlike oblava and dedovshchina, discussion of ethno-
regional identity in the RT military is not well documented in 
the media (with the exception of the biographical sketches of its 
highest leaders). It may be inferred in some articles on 
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conscription and hazing, but is rarely, if ever, considered 
directly. In my field research, insight into this important 
phenomenon could only be gained through interviews with locals 
and to some degree, a few Western expatriate military experts. 
Given that the number of these interviews is relatively small, it 
is important to acknowledge that the information I present in 
this section is limited in depth. However, the fact that there is 
disproportionate representation by southern Tajiks over all other 
groups in the military officer corps does not seem to be 
controversial. Rather, there are differing views of the logic and 
legitimacy of this condition in the context of Tajikistan’s 
geopolitics. 
 The general acceptance that southern Tajiks filled the key 
positions in the Rakhmon regime was apparent in conversations 
with nearly everyone I met in Dushanbe and other parts of the 
country. As a result, I asked a local military expert about 
whether this mattered in the RT armed forces. 
Researcher: Do the people from Kulob have more prospects in 
military compared to, for example, from Khujand? 
 
Respondent: They have better prospects in both civil 
service and the military. But the system does not prevent 
the appearance of people of other ethnic/regional groups. 
It admits them, but without those who are really talented, 
the system fails. They are admitted out of need. The guys 
from north can be working and holding high positions in 
both military or ministry administration, but for this they 
have to be really adept in their work, whereas those from 
the south do not necessarily have to be so accomplished. 
They differ in terms of quantity as well. The guys from the 
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south are prioritized compared to other parts due to their 
network connections (Respondent 16 2013). 
 
 His response includes two important points. First, as in 
the conscription system, entrance into the officer corps is not 
predicated on ethno-regional identity; the system does not appear 
to exclude certain groups from entry into either the ranks of 
enlisted personnel or commissioned officers. Second, he discusses 
the relationship between ethno-regional groups (and their related 
patron-client connections) and the proficiency and expertise of 
military officers. Officers who are politically connected and/or 
from the south can advance through the ranks with little effort 
(and foreseeably no ceilings) while those from other regions need 
to be hard workers and/or talented if they hope to advance. When 
political connections carry significant weight, they often trump 
talent and hard work; thus, even being a skilled and capable 
officer is no guarantee of rapid or consistent advancement, while 
political connections (often ethno-regional in nature) carries 
substantial weight in promotion. 
 A conversation with a Pamiri military expert (Respondent 18 
2014) revealed his view of the parameters of potential 
advancement. I have previously noted that in my experience, 
Pamiris not only exhibit the most resilient solidarity as a 
group, but also see military service as an attractive career 
option (or at least project the least fear of service). However, 
according to this source (among others), Pamiris are talented, 
but rarely make it past major (senior officer). Reaching this 
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plateau prevents them from obtaining the rank of colonel or 
general, unless they can prove their loyalty in some way or 
perhaps advance through corruption. For him, the hierarchy of 
ethno-regional groups within the military is as follows: 
1. Kulobis (Dangara especially) 
2. Regions of Republican Subordination (RRS)/Dushanbe 
3. Khatlon  
4. Sughd/Khujandis (including Uzbeks) 
5. GBAO/Pamiris (including Kyrgyz) 
 
 The position of Pamiris at the bottom is indicative of 
endemic differences between Dushanbe and power brokers in GBAO. 
The Rakhmon regime has not been able to exercise its desired 
level of sovereignty over the oblast since independence. Pamiri 
solidarity couple with geographic isolation in their mountain 
valleys has made the short arm of Dushanbe’s law even shorter. 
This relationship has led to violence in Khorog on occasion, the 
most pronounced in the summer of 2012 when the RT military 
descended upon the capital of GBAO in force (Радио Озоди 2012; 
Kucera 2013a). I discuss this event in detail later in this 
chapter. For now, it is important to recognize this antipathetic 
situation and its effect on ethno-regional relations within the 
RT military structure.  
 Uzbeks make up the second largest ethno-regional group 
behind Tajiks in Tajikistan. During the civil war, their militias 
fought on the side of the government in the current oblast of 
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Khatlon. After the war, the Rakhmon regime marginalized their 
influence (see Chapter II) and official use of the Uzbek 
language. Unlike Pamiris, Uzbeks live in sections of Tajikistan 
that are also heavily populated by Tajiks. Uzbeks do not share 
the degree of autonomy enjoyed by Pamiris (aided by the isolation 
of their homeland). Additionally, the existence of the titular 
republic of Uzbekistan, with which Tajikistan has a tenuous 
diplomatic relationship (see Chapter IV), can add tension to 
Uzbeks’ interactions with Tajiks and the Rakhmon regime. 
 My only interview with an Uzbek (a local village leader), 
however, provided some interesting insights. Within the context 
of this section, I asked what this interviewee thought of the 
domination of Kulobis within the military hierarchy (and 
government), he offered a sobering response. “The President is a 
strong ruler. He needs his loyal assistants; this is not an 
issue. We are not a democracy. It will be many decades before 
anything like this is possible” (Respondent 22 2014). The Central 
Asian concept of “peace” is one that acknowledges power and 
stability as primary, with individual rights and equality often a 
distant second (Respondent 24 2014). “If you have bread and water 
to dip it in, everything is okay” (Respondent 22 2014). In some 
ways, his view represents an aspect of the Soviet legacy; when I 
asked about the Russian 201st base in Kurgan-Teppe, he told me, 
“(t)he Russians made us what we are today. Our country, our 
nation. We owe them. There are no problems whatsoever. Without 
them we are nothing!” (Respondent 22 2014). This view may or may 
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not be shared by younger Uzbeks who did not grow up in the Soviet 
period. Nonetheless, such a positive view of the former colonizer 
is an important illustration of the enduring influence of Soviet 
social engineering. 
 
Ethno-regionalism and Conflict: Khorog, Summer 2012 
 I have demonstrated the strong sentiments of solidarity and 
desire for (continued) autonomy displayed by Pamiris. This 
autonomy is practiced in a number of ways, from the lasting power 
in GBAO afforded former commanders from the civil war to the 
development and maintenance of their own schools and universities 
and development projects through the financial support of the Aga 
Khan. Further, the control of cross-border (especially illicit) 
trade with Afghanistan is also important. In a territory with 
limited resources, Dushanbe has been wary of this autonomy and 
attempted to chip away at it whenever possible.  
 The events of the summer of 2012 generated little media 
coverage outside of Central Asia. Within Tajikistan, they were 
big news. In short, General Abdullo Nazarov, head of the border 
guard district at Ishkashim, was murdered on July 21, 2012, in 
what has been characterized as a personal dispute over the cross-
border tobacco trade with a former Pamiri civil war commander, 
Tolib Ayombekov, who controlled much of this trade. Negotiations 
began between the RT law enforcement agencies and Ayombekov, who 
agreed to hand over those purportedly involved in the murder for 
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trial. The negotiations broke down when MoI Alpha unit special 
forces, MoD army, and National Guard units arrived by helicopter 
into Khorog on July 22. Ayombekov believed the government was 
coming for him and the other commanders who wield informal power 
in GBAO. More units arrived on July 23. Locals claimed the total 
number reached 3000 – including a contingent that was already in 
Khorog for military exercises (“Khifz-2012”) (Kerymov, Bakhrieva, 
and Akdodova 2013, 12–13). 
 Fighting broke out in the early hours of July 24, with 
locals claiming that the RT units opened fire, which generated a 
response from the Khorog residents and supporters of the 
commanders. All electronic communications were cut off from the 
city, with the head of the Communications Service claiming that 
this was because “a bullet hit a fibre-optic cable;” the cable 
was not restored until August 28 (Kerymov, Bakhrieva, and 
Akdodova 2013, 14). Negotiations mediated by the “Group of 20,” 
local mahalla civic leaders, began on July 25. The fighting came 
to an end on July 28 after the Aga Khan called on all Ismailis to 
allow the situation to be settled through relevant state 
structures, a call that was largely answered by the Khorog 
population (Kerymov, Bakhrieva, and Akdodova 2013, 15). A 
voluntary handover of small arms by locals followed. In August, 
two men accused of killing General Nazarov voluntarily 
surrendered and were tried and convicted in January 2013, and 
received lengthy prison sentences. 
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 For Khorog residents, the violence has had a powerful 
lasting effect. The human rights reports notes that “due to the 
exchange of fire it was impossible to move about the city” and 
“in particular around the microdistricts in which military 
activities were conducted, there were snipers who also shot at 
peaceful inhabitants” (Kerymov, Bakhrieva, and Akdodova 2013, 
30). The death toll included 22 civilians and 23 members of the 
RT security forces; one of the civilians was only 16 years old, 
killed by a sniper. In addition, unknown assailants raided the 
house of Imomnazar Imomnazarov, another former civil war 
commander on August 22, and killed him (Kerymov, Bakhrieva, and 
Akdodova 2013, 34). Many locals believe these were RT security 
forces. 
 The “invasion” of Khorog provides important insights into 
the competencies of the RT military and the Rakhmon regime’s 
intentions regarding its use. According to one source who 
witnessed the fighting directly, the many RT soldiers had no 
interest in fighting and either jumped in the Gunt River to 
escape or simply surrendered at the earliest opportunity to the 
resistance in Khorog (Respondent 13 2013). Examining the casualty 
lists, more security forces were killed than Khorog residents 
(many of whom were clearly noncombatants). Further information is 
difficult to come by. The government has released very little and 
Khorog residents are careful to discuss the matter (though some 
claim a victory of sorts). Nevertheless, the military action in 
Khorog poses important questions about the RT units’ limited 
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tactical capabilities in actual combat – not to mention their 
motivation. If the view of the action as a victory for the Pamiri 
resisters has any merit, the morale of the RT units appears to be 
quite low, as exhibited by their willingness to break or be taken 
prisoner in order to escape fighting. It should not be surprising 
that a force conscripted and impressed into service, underfed, 
and undertrained would also be unmotivated to fight an internal 
enemy that offers no existential threat to the state (or perhaps 
more importantly, to their families). 
 But the question of ethno-regional identity within the 
military is a poignant one in this case. What does it mean for 
Pamiri soldiers to arrive for a training exercise and be informed 
they would essentially be attacking their hometown (or at least 
the capital of their home region)? Pamiris are somewhat divided 
on their views of the former civil war commanders/warlords who 
control much of the illicit cross-border trade (especially 
narcotics) with Afghanistan. Many are uncomfortable with the 
illegal and immoral nature of the trade’s influence on the region 
and the sometimes-forceful manner the commanders’ deputies 
exhibit among the population (Respondent 25 2014). Still, 
negative views of these figures are weighed against a general 
distrust of the government in Dushanbe. The choice between a 
problematic brother at home and a distant cousin with 
untrustworthy intentions in Dushanbe is a complicated one.  
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 This choice is further influenced by a Soviet legacy that 
emphasizes a strong central government with a powerful leader. 
But it took decades of social engineering to shape views that 
favor the centrality of Moscow and the legitimacy of Soviet state 
power. In the early decades of the USSR, some Pamiris supported 
Stalin’s policies in the region that challenged local power 
structures. The families of those who chose this path are still 
remembered for this action and locals comment on their 
association with Stalin (Respondent 25 2014). Will those who 
sided with Dushanbe on the military action in 2012 be socially 
banished?  How will they be remembered? If the cultural past is 
any indicator of the present, it seems logical to assume that 
Khorog’s residents are experiencing a reckoning of sorts. How the 
Pamiri population socially interprets individual actions by 
locals during the fighting is difficult to assess at this time.  
 Nonetheless, the situation highlights the importance of 
ethno-regional identity in the RT military, especially if the 
actions of Pamiri soldiers are judged differently from those with 
other ethno-regional affiliations, such as Tajiks or Uzbeks. It 
also poses another related question: did Pamiris soldiers who 
took part in the fighting advance within the RT military rank 
structure as a result of their actions? Could active 
participation in this event be considered a form of loyalty test 
for the Rakhmon regime’s security apparatus? This last question 
is even harder to answer in the contemporary environment in 
Khorog, but its pertinence is hard to overstate. If officers from 
224 
certain ethno-regional groups have glass ceilings in the rank 
structure, it stands to reason that they may grasp at 
opportunities to prove their loyalty to the regime.  
 If this is indeed the case, it poses yet another challenge 
to the military’s ability to produce and reproduce stronger 
national sentiments. One the one hand, choosing the national 
military over one’s home region would seem to elevate the nation 
over subnational allegiances. Of course, the opportunity for 
individual career advancement (especially in the context of a 
poor country) must be considered too, perhaps lessening the role 
played by nationalist sentiments. On the other, being placed in a 
position where advancement is predicated on performing in a 
manner not required of the dominant ethno-regional group (risking 
one’s social reputation) challenges the idea that the nation is 
an inclusive, rather than exclusive, body. While other groups fit 
into lower positions in the state/military hierarchy discussed in 
previous interviews (Respondent 18 2014), none seem to carry the 
same price for allegiance with the state when tough choices are 
presented, as they were in 2012 and have continued to be since. 
 Indeed, the events during the summer of 2012 were 
catastrophic for Pamiris in their relations with Dushanbe. How 
the Rakhmon regime handles Pamiri autonomy and develops inclusive 
policies will help shape this relationship more than military 
action, which acted more to pull GBAO away from Dushanbe than 
increase positive views of the government. 
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Foreign Militaries and Tajikistani Recruits 
 In the Soviet Union, the Tajik SSR was one of the smallest 
and least militarized republics. In addition to its own national 
armed forces, in recent years it has accommodated military units 
from foreign powers such as Russia and France (the latter’s units 
exited in 2014) (Kucera 2014; Kutnaeva 2010). Soldiers from the 
U.S. Special Forces have been temporarily based there who are on 
leave from Afghanistan and/or who are training RT military units 
(Kucera 2013a; Kucera 2012a). American military contractors have 
been training locals in non-lethal technical equipment as well. I 
personally met a few of these current and former soldiers during 
my fieldwork. Further, India has provided direct aid to 
Tajikistan’s military (Yuldashev 2013a) and refurbished a 
military airfield west of Dushanbe at Ayni, though the base 
remains vacant at this time (Kucera 2010; Kucera 2011). Of these 
foreign forces, only Russia consistently maintains a substantial 
contingent. 
 This relatively recent influx of attention and investment 
from foreign militaries (Russia excluded) is notable for a number 
of reasons. First, it represents a substantial increase over the 
number of units based there during the Soviet period, of which 
the Russian 201st MRD is a direct descendant. Second, on one 
side, some of these foreign militaries represent an effort to 
develop influence in this newly independent state that sits 
within the Russian sphere of influence, while on the other, 
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Russia seeks to maintain and/or expand its influence in its 
former territory. Third, this attention positions the RT 
government to take advantage of this competition and benefit from 
foreign training missions, direct equipment transfers, and 
financing of its security programs. Lastly, this assistance helps 
to improve aspects of the RT security forces, though it pales in 
comparison to the presence of the Russian 201st MRD, which acts 
as the security guarantor of the Rakhmon regime.  
 I argue that the existence of the Russian base allows the 
regime to avoid substantial investment in its own military, 
particularly regarding the basic rights of its personnel in terms 
of food, medical care, supplies and pay. If Russia is willing to 
perform the function of national defense for the state, why 
should the RT invest in its own military? If Tajikistan does not 
invest adequately in its national armed forces, how are they to 
be perceived by the population as a representative institution of 
the larger nation? 
 This section addresses the ways in which the presence of 
foreign militaries in Tajikistan shape popular views of the RT 
military. These militaries are professional, highly technical, 
and serve as national symbols in their countries. In Chapter V, I 
problematized the issues surrounding the consideration of the RT 
military as a national integrator and/or symbol, focusing on its 
unpopularity in the practice of conscription. In previous 
sections of this chapter, I examined material and behavioral 
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conditions within the military. Comparing Tajikistan’s national 
armed forces to these foreign militaries, particularly Russia’s 
(with which locals are most familiar), presents yet another 
challenge to the potential integrating role of military service 
in Tajikistan. This challenge is further complicated by the 
option RT nationals have of serving in the Russian 201st MRD in 
Tajikistan, and more recently, to serve as a contract soldier in 
any units of the Russian military. The latter option may 
potentially include deployment into combat abroad. Given that 
this option is available to locals and their own military is 
characterized by such poor conditions, there are very few reasons 
left for any male to choose to serve the state rather than 
Russia. This surely poses serious challenges to the development 
of national sentiments, especially in a post-Soviet state where 
the concept of military service is held in high regard. 
 
The Russian 201st MRD in Tajikistan 
 I briefly discuss the evolution of the Soviet 201st MRD 
into its Russian equivalent in Chapter I, but it is important 
here to emphasize the Russian rationale for keeping this unit. 
Shortly after independence, Moscow viewed Tajikistan’s political 
situation as unstable and their fears were legitimized by the 
eruption of the civil war within a year. With no universally 
recognized government to which Moscow could transfer the 201st or 
the border guards serving on the Afghan frontier, the units would 
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have to remain Russian for the time being. At the same time, 
civil war raged in Afghanistan and the Russian government feared 
this instability would spread into its former territories; 
indeed, connections between these conflicts exacerbated this 
fear. The 201st was soon drawn into the Tajik Civil War on the 
pro-government side while it remained a Russian institution and 
Moscow saw the value of a military base in what appeared to be a 
region rife with political instability. The Rakhmon regime, 
established in 1992, asked Moscow to remove the Russian border 
guards along the Afghan frontier, a process that began in 2004 
and was completed in 2005 (Respondent 12 2013). 
 Semi-permanent basing agreements for the 201st were signed 
between the RT and RF, initially a ten-year deal in 2004, which 
was recently replaced in 2013 by a 30-year extension set to end 
in 2042 (Roudik 2013; Kozhevnikov 2013; Service 2013; Kucera 
2013c). This was an important deal for both states, and there was 
considerable local media coverage of its negotiation. A Voice of 
Russia article on the deal noted “the threat of terrorism and 
drug trafficking remains strong” and quoted a member of the RT 
parliament, who stated ““Russia’s progress and stability means 
stability for the entire region” (Voice of Russia 2013). 
Tajikistan’s own Asia Plus interviewed another lawmaker, Ismoil 
Talbakov, who noted “it is not secret that the Russian military 
base in Tajikistan today not only protects the interests of 
Russia or Tajikistan, but it also may provide peace and stability 
in the whole Central Asian region” (Yuldashev 2013b). On the 
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Russian side, a foreign policy aide of Vladimir Putin, Yuri 
Ushakov, commented “(t)this base is needed by us, and is needed 
by Tajikistan” (Kucera 2012b). As may be apparent from these 
quotes, much of the rhetoric about the need for the 201st base 
revolves around instability emerging from Afghanistan.  
 However, little of this coverage challenged the need for 
the agreement, or for Russian presence in Tajikistan. This may 
very well represent the broad support for Russian presence in 
Tajikistan, but to some there was not enough debate. Eurasianet’s 
Josh Kucera noted that one opposition politician “said that the 
presence of the base weakened Tajikistan’s sovereignty.” The 
politician, Aminyat Abdulnzarov stated, “(a)fter the pressure 
applied by Russia, the parliament had no choice but to ratify the 
agreement.”” Paraphrasing another, he noted that the “debate in 
Tajikistan as been pretty muted for a deal that’s going to mean 
29 more years of Russian military presence there” (Kucera 2013c). 
 Another Eurasianet blogger, David Trilling, aptly noted 
that Rakhmon was up for reelection the following year, raising 
the question of Russia’s ability to influence elections in some 
Central Asian states. “(Rakhmon) has not said he will definitely 
run, but few expect any change of power. If he betrays Vladimir 
Putin, however – as ousted President Kurmanbek Bakiyev from 
neighboring Kyrgyzstan can tell you – he could face a formidable 
opponent” (Trilling 2013).  
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 This view speaks to the deep, symbiotic yet uneven 
relationship I unpack in Chapter IV between the Rakhmon regime 
and the RF that involves security guarantees, migrant labor, and 
maintenance of the political status quo for both sides. While 
instability in Afghanistan is certainly one threat to be 
countered, it is often overstated. In fact, one Tajik commenter 
rightly questioned the utility of the 201st in Tajikistan to 
counter the threat of “Taliban-style militants.” “If they decide 
to ‘attack,’ this will be done the way its done elsewhere in the 
Muslim world: they will first change the Tajiks psychology, 
making them kill infidels. This enemy won’t be visible in the air 
or on the border” (Kozhevnikov 2013). Another potential threat 
that goes largely unnamed is Uzbekistan, with which the RT regime 
is often at odds. Russia has often been unhappy with Uzbek 
President Islam Karimov, so having the 201st base active is a 
deterrent to the north as well.  
 For locals, knowing the 201st will be based in Tajikistan 
for the foreseeable future may be reassuring, given the state of 
the RT military. One respondent commented that at one point his 
mother was concerned that the agreement had not been signed yet, 
and “was planning to move to Moscow, because as NATO and U.S. 
troops leave Afghanistan, the increase in drug trafficking, 
stability threats and an increase in Islamic fundamentalism will 
start appearing” (Respondent 5 2013). Another, who spent some of 
his younger years in Kurgan-Teppe near the Russian base there, 
also had positive views of their presence. “Russians being in our 
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territory does not affect me to be less patriotic. Besides, their 
existence is accepted positively. They guard our border better. 
Therefore, in current situation Russian presence makes us feel 
safer” (Respondent 6 2013). 
 The discursive legitimation for the 201st’s presence and 
the long-term basing agreement highlights the degree to which 
Russia can exert pressure on Tajikistan’s politicians and the 
Rakhmon’s regime’s reliance on Russian assistance to remain in 
power. This is important if we are to understand how the regime 
seeks to shape popular views of Russia and its military, in many 
ways at the expense of supporting its own armed forces. In the 
next sections I examine how locals view potential service in the 
Russian military. 
 
Honorable Service with the Old Hegemon 
But I don't think it will help me to go to the Tajik army. 
I can go to the Russian base. I have heard they are 
recruiting Tajik people (Respondent 1 2013). 
 
 In Chapter V, I note some of the experiences of RT 
nationals serving the Russian border guards as well as the 
desire, or at least interest, of some respondents in serving in 
the Russian 201st MRD. I also discuss the strong social value 
citizens placed on military service in the Soviet Union, 
including the Tajik SSR. This aspect of the Soviet legacy 
appeared in a number of interviews and media coverage. 
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Specifically, the concept of military service is still considered 
important by many in Tajikistan, even if the comments by my 
interview respondents suggest that they have difficulty 
associating the RT armed forces with this service (i.e. service 
in the RT forces may not meet the standards set by the Soviet 
Union). Put another way, for RT citizens, military service is 
valued, but service in the RT military doesn’t measure up because 
of its poor conditions, lack of training and discipline, 
extensive problems with dedovshchina, and nearly nonexistent pay. 
My fieldwork shows that many RT citizens would like their 
military to be more professional--to serve the country and be an 
institution to be proud of, but it simply does not meet this 
standard.  
 If service in the RT military is considered to be 
pointless, service in the Russian armed forces substitutes as a 
worthy alternative. In my research, three respondents expressed a 
direct willingness to enlist in the 201st MRD (Respondent 1 2013; 
Respondent 4 2013; Respondent 6 2013), even if they had not 
attempted to do so. All thought military service to be important 
and interesting, but none seriously considered joining the RT 
armed forces, at least not after they heard what it was like. One 
respondent noted that others, like his brother, did not 
understand that the RT military was not the Soviet Red Army 
anymore. He joined and had bad experiences with dedovshchina and 
convinced the respondent not to enlist, telling him stories of 
his hazing. Conversations with his brother convinced him not to 
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enlist, even though he was interested in military service. He 
ended up studying in the U.S. instead (Respondent 4 2013).  
 Two others served in the Russian border guards before they 
withdrew from Tajikistan in 2005 (Respondent 12 2013; Respondent 
21 2014) and both indicated that their experience was largely 
positive in terms of pay, training and general treatment by their 
comrades, even if some dedovshchina took place there. Their 
experiences match the general views and expectations of serving 
in the 201st MRD held by other respondents. My first respondent 
had a friend who was serving in intelligence in the 201st. He 
noted that Tajiks were useful to the Russians in this kind of 
work, especially when dealing with Afghanistan, patrolling the 
border, and other related activities.  
Respondent: He told me why Tajiks are recruited. They know 
Afghanistan, they look similar. Russians cannot go there 
because they are bald.   
Researcher: They would be found out. 
Respondent: We know the scripture, Farsi. Not all, but the 
majority know…If (I had) my choice, I (had to choose 
between) the 201st or our military, I would choose the 
201st (Respondent 1 2013). 
 
 Given the modest number of interviews I was able to conduct 
during my fieldwork, it would be premature to assume these 
responses are indicative of the viewpoints of most males in 
Tajikistan. However, when coupled with the overwhelming 
perception of the bad conditions found within the RT military and 
the legacy of social importance assigned to military service 
during the Soviet period, it seems likely that others hold 
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similar, if not precisely the same, opinions about the Russian 
201st. Of course, there are realities and experiences that can 
run counter to this view; for example, some labor migrants who 
have lived in Russia and experienced xenophobic attacks may not 
feel inclined to associate themselves with the Russian state, 
though it is also possible that they crave the social and legal 
acceptance associated with such an opportunity discussed below. 
Political elites with military backgrounds or connected Kulobi 
Tajiks who serve in more advantageous positions or units (such as 
the Alphas Special Forces) may prefer the opportunities available 
to them in the RT security apparatus. These would seem to be 
logical exceptions to what might be safely assumed to be a 
general preference for the Russian 201st over the RT military.  
 
Serving Mother Russia Abroad 
 In January 2015, Russia issued a decree that enables 
foreign nationals to serve in its military (RFE/RL 2015a). This 
development altered the status quo on the matter in two important 
ways. First, most foreign soldiers serving in the RF military 
forces do so in Russian units based in their own country; for 
example, Armenians, Georgians and Tajikistanis serving in Russian 
units based in Armenia, Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and 
Tajikistan respectively. Second, and most importantly, foreign 
nationals serving in the RF military may now be sent abroad into 
combat (RFE/RL 2015a). One month after this law was enacted, the 
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RT amended its own law making it illegal for citizens to fight 
with groups in armed conflicts in foreign lands (Kucera 2015a). A 
member of the RT parliament, Makhmadali Vatanov, noted that this 
law was only meant to apply to citizens fighting in “illegal 
armed formations” (Yuldashev 2015), a legal application clearly 
aimed at groups such as the Islamic State (IS). 
 The new law would presumably draw support from males in 
Tajikistan who were originally conscripted to service in the 
201st, though the concept of serving anywhere Russia’s enemies 
may be found is distinctly different from defending Tajikistan in 
an RF uniform. Nonetheless, given the pay (an average monthly 
salary of $500), training and other benefits of service coupled 
with the legacy of post-Soviet military tradition, it is likely 
that RT citizens will line up to apply for contract enlistment in 
the Russian military. In an interview with Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, one young Tajik “said paid service in the 
Russian army was a preferable alternative to working in Russia as 
a labor migrant” (RFE/RL 2015a). 
 The RFE/RL article noted another important stakeholder in 
Russia’s offer: labor migrants already in living Russia. In 2014, 
Mohammed Amin Majumder, leader of Russia’s Federation of Migrants 
stated, “100,000 migrants were ready “to defend Russia’s 
interests anywhere in the world.”” This support is seen as a play 
for citizenship for labor migrants who lack social and legal 
status and protection in Russia (RFE/RL 2015a). The entrenched 
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relationship between the migrant economy and military recruitment 
in Tajikistan has been further cemented through the addition of 
Russia’s decree on foreign contract soldiers. The Rakhmon 
regime’s quick compliance with RF military’s personnel needs 
provides yet another indication of its dependence both on the 
201st for its existential defense and on migrant remittances for 
its economy. The legal nature of this new source of remittances – 
the Russian armed forces – provides some stability to the 
process, which, for labor migrants, is subject to the ups and 
downs of the Russian economy and the whims of its immigration 
policies. Contract soldiers carry legal protections and their 
salaries from the state would not be vulnerable to the same 
hazards as those of migrant workers, who regularly experience 
extortion and threats to their visa status; even this year Russia 
has introduced expensive new tests and work permits as part of 
the work visa process (EurasiaNet 2015).  
 The timing of this decree coincides with Russia’s active 
military campaign in eastern Ukraine, where some commenters 
believe Putin has overstretched the reach of his armed forces. 
Reports surfaced quickly that RT enlistees in the Russian 
military had been sent to Ukraine. Military spokespeople for the 
RF deny such reports (EurasiaNet 2015; KyivPost 2015; Morse 
2015). However, EurasiaNet reports that an interview with a 
Dushanbe resident revealed that his cousin had been transferred 
from the 201st base to Crimea, where he has been promised an 
apartment and can move his family (EurasiaNet 2015). In any 
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event, it would seem that plans to raise the size of the 201st 
MRD to 9000 troops by 2020 (Radio Ozodi 2015) are contingent on 
recruiting Central Asian males to serve there. Overall, the 
Russian military has announced plans to grow its armed forces 
from the 2014 figure of around 295,000 personnel to over 500,000 
by 2021 (Yuldashev 2015). Given the demographic decline in the 
Russian national population, the logic and timing behind Putin’s 
recent decree becomes clear. 
 Just how this new opportunity shapes national sentiments in 
Tajikistan is hard to gauge at this point. Statements from 
representatives of both Russia and Tajikistan are instructive. 
EurasiaNet interviewed Yaroslav Roshchupkin, the spokesman for 
Russia’s Central Military District, which includes Tajikistan.  
“First, it is not the Russian army that needs recruits from 
Tajikistan. But we provide them this opportunity because 
many wish to get Russian citizenship. Contract soldiers get 
Russian citizenship through a simplified procedure and they 
can get a [low-interest] mortgage through the military,” 
Roshchupkin told EurasiaNet.org. He added that the number 
of Tajiks who have joined the Russian military is a secret 
(EurasiaNet 2015). 
 
Roshchupkin also stated that the 201st base in Tajikistan is not 
able to process recruits at this time, so RT citizens must 
currently apply at a recruitment office in Russia. Military 
training and Russian language skills are prioritized among 
applicants.  
 Comments by RT officials provide an interesting look at the 
juxtaposition between contract service in the Russian military 
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and the issues surrounding conscription and basic conditions in 
the RT military. An RT member of parliament, Nasrullo Makhmudov, 
stated that, “I think that Tajik citizens must serve in the 
official Tajik army. However, there are times when a person has 
left the country and cannot serve. […] It is up to them. If they 
want, they can serve in the Russian army” (EurasiaNet 2015). 
Makhmudov seems to imply that those RT citizens who migrate to 
Russia will constitute the majority of contract recruits and that 
locals will continue to be forced to serve in the national 
military. If so, this is a dubious analysis; I have shown that 
other male citizens see the value of service in the 201st. It is 
unclear why Makhmudov thinks they would not opt to enlist.   
 However, this is not the most far-fetched statement made by 
a government official on the subject. The RT MoD spokesperson, 
Faidun Makhmadaliev, when asked by EurasiaNet whether the new 
Russian policy would hamper the RT military’s conscription and 
recruitment efforts, responded that this was not a problem 
because Tajiks are patriots. “They will never refuse their poor 
mother in favor of a rich one.” He further claimed that “(p)eople 
stand in line to serve in the army. We can even choose the best 
candidates for the Tajik army” (EurasiaNet 2015). These 
statements contradict the RT military’s struggles with 
conscription, living conditions and dedovshchina (which 
EurasiaNet notes in the article). The statements are consistent 
with the approach used in other responses to criticism of 
military issues from government officials: denial.  
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 When asked about avoiding oblava by Ozodagon in 2013, 
Makhmadaliev replied, 
First, it shall be mentioned that the term “Oblava” does 
not exist in law for military service. In addition to the 
above mentioned, every citizen have rights and 
responsibilities, to serve in military. In case if those 
citizens, whose ages became proper for military service, 
would visit recruitment centers themselves, there would not 
be any need for searching them (Ozodagon 2013). 
 
When asked about illegal conscription practices in Sughd, 
“recruiters express no knowledge about ‘oblava’ in districts and 
cities across the Sughd, and also refuse even a single case of 
‘oblava’ in youth recruitment” (Yodgor 2011). In the oblava case 
in the bazaar of Vose, which burned a local female cook with hot 
oil mentioned in the previous chapter, the local military 
commissar said that the recruiting office was not guilty because 
“there was no oblava of conscripts that day” (Radio Ozodi 2013). 
Major-General Azam Kasymov, Sughd military garrison chief, 
responding to comments about problems with living conditions in 
the RT military, stated that the military has “created the 
perfect conditions for service” and “parents who visited military 
units across the country were convinced that today we have very 
good conditions” in the military.” Regarding the morale of 
soldiers in the RT military, he responded that “many who are 
drafted by force in the army, having served, thank us” (Mirsaid 
2014).  
 These quotes are typical of government responses to 
journalistic inquiries into conscription practices and conditions 
240 
in the military. My research strongly contradicts statements of 
this nature, as do stories in the news media and opinions of the 
general public. It seems the state simply denies the existence of 
problems until it can determine whether or not it wishes, or has 
the capacity, to tackle them. Perhaps this should not be 
surprising in such a poor country. But it is difficult to hide 
the reality of Tajikistan’s military and its ever-closer 
relationship with Russia. 
 
Service in Other Foreign Militaries: The Military High School 
 During my fieldwork, I interviewed three Tajiks who 
attended a national military high school located near the 
Dushanbe airport. Obtaining information on this school was 
difficult, though its existence was corroborated by a Western 
deputy military attaché. The school offered the recruits a path 
to join the RT military with preferential treatment, but the more 
attractive option for some was the potential to enter the 
military (any service) of Russia, India or France as an enlisted 
man (Respondent 3 2013). Acceptance into these foreign militaries 
would be predicated on successful completion of the program and 
the passage of examinations, including tests of language skills. 
Unfortunately, like other aspects of the RT military apparatus, 
it was rife with corruption and advancement often involved the 
payment to certain officers, or political/regional connections 
similar to the advancement of officers through the ranks. 
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Respondent 3 (Darwazi Tajik) dropped out of the program for this 
reason; he was unconnected and did not have the money to 
continue. 
 Another attendee (Kulobi Tajik) also mentioned the problems 
of advancement and the necessity of bribes in order to take and 
pass the required examinations (Respondent 19 2014). Both 
respondents noted that the largest ethno-regional group in the 
school was Kulobi Tajiks, mostly privileged sons from Dushanbe, 
but that there were student from all over the country. Officers 
were mostly Tajiks (no Uzbeks or Kyrgyz), though they could not 
tell where they were from or if any were Pamiri. There were also 
instructors from many places, including the U.S., France and 
India. 
 The international aspect of this military school 
demonstrates that Russia is not the only state offering military 
service options to RT citizens, even if this service option is on 
a much smaller scale and operates with (likely) a much higher 
barrier to entry (language skills, connections, aptitude). It 
remains to be seen whether the continued growth in the Russian 
military presence and political influence on the Rakhmon regime 
from Moscow allows these other militaries to stay involved in the 
school.  
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Conclusion 
 The basic conditions and daily practices within the 
military help to create and perpetuate strongly negative popular 
views of the RT national military. Food, health conditions, pay, 
training, uniforms, and equipment are all reasons Tajikistani 
males cite when responding to the question, “why not serve?” That 
males by and large do not want to serve is especially pertinent 
in the poorest former Soviet republic, which has a rapid 
population growth rate and few economic prospects; if conditions 
in the military were tolerable, the food decent, and pay 
reasonable, it is logical to conclude that a sufficient number of 
males would volunteer. But the normalized hazing of dedovshchina 
stokes fear in the heart of most military aged males. 
 Ethno-regional identity is laced into the fabric of 
everyday life in Tajikistan and the military fits this pattern. 
The everyday practices and structures in the RT armed forces 
shape and reflect these divisions. My research suggests that this 
serves to inhibit national sentiments and any views of the 
military as a national integrator. While group identity often 
plays an important role in the performance of dedovshchina, there 
is also a universalizing aspect to this practice that lessens the 
significance of ethno-regional identity. The importance of the 
starshii – mladshii relationship (older – younger) among 
conscripts is fundamental to the perpetuation of dedovshchina, 
even as it varies somewhat in time and space. In this context, 
some ethno-regional groups (Pamiris) exhibit strong solidarity 
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relative to other groups (Kulobi Tajiks).  
 Most importantly, the ethno-regional composition of the 
general officers – all originating from SE Khatlon Oblast – poses 
potentially serious challenges to the RT military as a national 
integrator. Further, the existence of an ethno-regional hierarchy 
with separate glass ceilings for officers from different groups 
(Kulobis at the top, Pamiris at the bottom) prevents the 
development of any impartial system based on merit. Coupled with 
low pay, it is difficult to envision many talented (non-Kulobi) 
men choosing military service as a career. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION: NATIONALISM, MILITARISM AND RENTIERISM 
This study began with the assertion that examining 
universal conscription practices and ethno-regional identity 
within the RT military could provide important insights into the 
development of national sentiments in Tajikistan. Military 
imagery, war remembrance and notions of national integration 
place military service squarely in the center of typical state 
efforts to produce national sentiments. This chapter returns to 
this assertion. The first part of the chapter examines how the 
study of conscription, living conditions and ethno-regional 
identity in the RT military can contribute to discussions about 
the development of national sentiments in post-Soviet states. The 
second part conceptualizes the Rakhmon regime’s military policies 
and practices in the context of an ever-strengthening Russian 
geopolitical relationship with Tajikistan. 
 
Overview: What Have We Learned? 
 The Soviet social structure considered military service as 
crucial form of civic duty and its legacy continues to shape RT 
citizens’ views. However, the contrasts between the Soviet, and 
later Russian, militaries and the armed forces of the RT reveal 
significant differences that diminish citizens’ opinions of their 
national armed forces. Nationalism in Tajikistan was a component 
of Soviet socialization of Central Asian populations, with the 
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international view of Soviet citizenship having priority. Upon 
independence (but after the civil war), the newly independent 
state needed to develop its own sense of national identity, or at 
least the appearance of such; this research showed that the 
notion of active interest on the part of the RT government to be 
somewhat lacking, as I explain later in this chapter. 
 The larger picture of Tajik nationalism generated by the 
Rakhmon regime focuses on aspects of a shared Tajik history and 
past glory embodied in the Samanid Empire and King Ismail Somoni 
over 1000 years ago. However, it is more likely that the reality 
of developing national sentiments is different, with mundane, 
everyday social practices outweighing historical events and 
concepts of ethnogenesis in the minds of RT citizens. Though the 
practice of universal conscription does not take place every day, 
it is a reality four months out of the year and embodies the 
pervasive notion of national service that was so important during 
the Soviet period. Further, the civil war shattered any illusions 
of a strong cohesive national bond among Tajiks (not to mention 
Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Pamiris).  
 In this dissertation I have drawn attention to the wide 
popular disdain for military service through my analysis of 
conscription policies and practices in Tajikistan. It is evident 
from discussions with interviewees and analysis of media reports 
that locals view the practices associated with universal 
conscription negatively, even if they agree with its premise 
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and/or perceived necessity. There are a number of practices that 
shape this view. 
 First, the state does not follow its own policies. Men who 
are exempt, have a deferment, do not fit the age parameters, or 
have a medical voenniy bilet (or would qualify for one) are often 
conscripted, processed, and sent off to duty in quick order. 
Corruption is rampant throughout the system (not to mention the 
government generally) and officers from the voenkomat use a 
variety of tactics and situations to solicit bribes from 
potential and actual conscripts. Those who can afford to pay 
often do so unless they have some other way to avoid service.  
 By selectively enforcing its own policies and tacitly 
allowing wealthy, politically connected individuals to escape 
national military service, the state creates a de facto divide in 
the polity. On the surface, this divide may appear to be class-
based. However, deeper examination reveals that subnational 
groupings play an important role. If the highest levels of the RT 
government are disproportionately filled with cabinet ministers 
and military cadres from southern Tajikistan, specifically Tajiks 
from the area around Kulob and Dangara, it problematizes this 
issue as solely class-based.  
 A deep analysis of ethno-regional identity in the 
governmental apparatus of Tajikistan is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation (see Nourzhanov and Bleuer 2013), but the reality of 
Kulobi dominance in the political sphere is not lost on the 
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citizens of Tajikistan. Much like the Soviet Union before it, the 
political and economic spheres in Tajikistan are tightly 
intertwined; those who control the government largely control the 
economy, even at relatively small scales. Therefore, issues of 
privilege and exceptionalism among the connected classes in 
Tajikistan are closely linked to ethno-regional identity, 
specifically southern Tajik identity.  
 However, it is important to note that simply being a Tajik 
from Kulob or Dangara will not place a young male in a privileged 
position. The clan and patron-client networks that control the 
government in Dushanbe may be based in Kulob and Dangara (and 
predominantly filled with individuals from these clans), but they 
are not the only ones from this region. Nor are southern Tajiks 
the only members of these patron-client networks; people from 
other ethno-regional groups may join a network and prove their 
loyalty. Even Uzbeks and Pamiris may be found in positions of 
power in RT government’s networks. Nevertheless, southern Tajiks 
still dominate key positions and since the civil war have 
established their hegemony over the other groups.  
 Thus, at the scale of the average RT male citizen, 
privilege and its associated power are centered among the ruling 
patron-client networks in Dushanbe and Dangara/Kulob. The ability 
to avoid military service through connections, then, is also 
centered in these locales.  
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Conscription, Oblava and the Soviet Legacy in Tajikistan 
 Though the popular disapproval of conscription is strong, 
it is unquestionably surpassed by the anger, frustration and 
level of active resistance to the illegal practice of oblava. 
Characterized by tactics based on deception and brute force, 
citizens’ experiences with oblava range from the mundane 
collection of males on commissioned marshrutki running their 
regular routes, to raids in individual homes, to chases through 
bazaars and other public spaces. Given the conditions in the 
military, male citizens running from recruitment officers are 
seeking to avoid what could be equated to a prison sentence. 
 
Russian Presence 
 The deficiencies within the RT military structures and 
practices are not the only challenge to its ability to generate 
national sentiments. The semi-permanent basing of the Russian 
201st MRD in Tajikistan presents another test of sorts. When 
viewed in comparative terms, it is clear that this relatively 
well-funded, professional military contrasts with the 
underfunded, undertrained, conscripted RT armed forces; the 
former is representative of the highly-regarded Soviet military, 
while the latter is indicative of how much has changed for the 
worse in Tajikistan after independence. Further, the newly 
available option for citizens of Tajikistan to join the Russian 
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military without legal repercussions poses a direct challenge to 
the RT military as a symbol of national unity and strength.  
 This new policy represents yet another way in which these 
two states seem to be embracing a deeper hegemonic relationship, 
with Russia dictating the terms and the Republic of Tajikistan 
willing to oblige by offering its territory and population for 
the hegemon’s geopolitical requirements. Naturally, this presents 
a significant challenge to the sovereignty of Tajikistan, and the 
development of national sentiments. Unpacking the role of these 
dynamics is important when considering how the military shapes 
Tajik nationalism.  
 
Military Service as Biopower 
 
 This dissertation has described the conscription system and 
its practices (both legal and illegal), material and living 
conditions, and ethno-regional identity in the RT military. These 
conditions and practices are highly unpopular among RT citizens 
and construct a widening divide between the state and its polity. 
This is an especially poignant development given the traditional 
association of military service with civic duty that was 
established under Soviet rule and largely embraced by its 
citizens, even in contemporary Tajikistan. Further, the need for 
the Rakhmon regime to generate national sentiments in this newly 
independent state – with numerous subnational cleavages that 
250 
played a significant role in the civil war – is important for its 
political stability. Employing the military as a national 
integrator, not to mention security guarantor of the state and 
its territorial integrity, is a common tactic for post-colonial 
regimes. So why has the Rakhmon regime invested so little in the 
RT military while simultaneously citing the duty of every able-
bodied citizen to serve in it? The regime’s contradictory 
rhetoric and practices are further revealed by its consistent 
references to the dangers posed by existential threats emanating 
from Afghanistan and the Islamic State. 
 The answer to this question lies in two different, but 
interconnected, relationships. First, the aftermath of the civil 
war and the consolidation of power by Rakhmon involved the 
elimination of warlord territorial fiefdoms among both his allies 
and former enemies. During the civil war, the nascent RT military 
was comprised of pro-government militias that wielded significant 
military and territorial power. After the peace treaty was signed 
in 1997, these militias and their leaders were reluctant to 
directly give up their arms and personnel. As I described in 
Chapter II, over time Rakhmon coopted rival commanders and 
militarily eliminated others. Some who had joined his government 
and pledged loyalty later became existential threats through 
growing local power or even open rebellion.  
 That this power consolidation was tenuous and at the time 
bloody surely contributed to the decision to institute universal 
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conscription nationwide. This move would simultaneously lead to 
the expansion in the size of the army while diminishing the power 
of remaining militia commanders in the RT military structure. 
That Rakhmon needed to eliminate internal threats to his power – 
even within his own army – would not easily be forgotten. 
Creating a strong military force might be useful, but could its 
commanders be trusted? Further, training large numbers of the 
male population from all over the country could backfire; if an 
internal threat to his power were to arise, the potential for 
masses of local citizens trained as soldiers to join any 
organized opposition would exist. These potential scenarios had 
to be considered by the fledgling regime as it assessed the goals 
and policies of its armed forces.  
 Unsurprisingly, then, the RT government’s main investment 
has been in its units under the MoI umbrella: the “Alphas” 
special forces (Russian: spetsnaz) unit (IISS 2015) composed 
primarily of southern Tajiks (Respondent 31 2014). As the 
ministry’s title would suggest, these units are formulated and 
trained to suppress internal dissent (or those characterized as a 
threat to the state). Arguably they may be one of the few units 
actually capable of organized military action; in fact they have 
received training from U.S. Special Forces (Kucera 2012a) and 
they acted as the tip of the spear during the operation in Khorog 
in 2012 (RFE/RFL Tajik Service 2012).  
252 
 It is notable that the southern Tajik-dominated Alpha elite 
unit is housed in the MoI instead of the MoD, symbolizing where 
the regime perceives the true threat to the state. It is 
reasonable to speculate that this unit (and other related ones) 
receive a disproportionate amount of material funding and 
training, which adds context to the state’s lack of funding or 
training for the MoD and larger scale units in the MoI (i.e. 
border guards). It is also reasonable to speculate that soldiers 
serving in the Alphas have a very different military experience 
and that they harbor different notions of national sentiments 
than average conscripts serving in regular units.  
 Unfortunately, access to information on this unit is 
relatively hard to obtain. The experience of the average 
conscript is the primary focus of this dissertation and their 
experiences are arduous, unfair, and even life threatening.  
  
Discipline and Punish? 
 I have noted previously that service in (most units of) the 
RT military has much in common with serving time in prison. 
Little to no pay, mental and physical hazing that is often life 
threatening, poor quality and low quantity of food rations, 
conscription practices that include random search and capture 
tactics, little actual military training, basing of conscripts 
far from their home regions, limited (if available) annual leave, 
and little to no personal access to friends or family from the 
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outside are all common negative features of service in the RT 
military. While the desire to serve in the world’s militaries is 
by no means universal, many offer a number of positive incentives 
(pay, health care, room and board, training, social bonding) to 
draw in recruits for short-term service and even stay for a 
military career. That this aspect seems to be largely missing 
from the RT experience is noteworthy, especially given the 
rhetoric of existential threats that are regularly put forth by 
the Rakhmon regime (and other Central Asian governments).  
 Foucault’s (1995) analysis of the prison system offers a 
useful conceptualization of the processes involved here. 
Referring to the development of national armies in the 18th 
century and the development of discipline in their organization, 
he compares how militaries internally socialized discipline and 
formed obedient bodies for the polity as a whole.  
Politics, as a technique of internal peace and order, 
sought to implement the mechanism of the perfect army, of 
the disciplined mass, of the docile, useful troop, of the 
regiment in camp and in the field, on manoeuvres and on 
exercises. In the great eighteenth-century states, the army 
guaranteed civil peace no doubt because it was a real 
force, an ever-threatening sword, but also because it was a 
technique and a body of knowledge that could project their 
schema over the social body (Foucault 1995, 168). 
 
Surely the regimented society of the Soviet Union (a state born 
of war) and the importance it placed on military service left a 
deep mark on the concept of governance in Tajikistan. Many 
citizens still remark on the social value of military service 
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during the Soviet period; a few even state that this should be 
the case in contemporary Tajikistan even while admitting that 
major changes would be necessary to the RT military to correct 
problems with the recruitment system and improve conditions and 
internal service practices. Only one interviewee (Respondent 15 
2014) rejected the idea of military service outright; all others 
saw it as potentially useful personally, and socially important, 
or indicated that they would enlist immediately if the country 
were faced with a true existential threat.  
 The civil war undoubtedly created a number of crises for 
Tajikistan. One of the main loci of political instability was the 
military. The juxtaposition of the need for a stabilizing 
military force against the potential and realized threat that 
emerged from within the RT military itself almost certainly 
influenced not only conscription practices, but the general lack 
of military training and financial investment in the armed forces 
that continues today. The result, then, is the cycling of young 
males through the discipline of a military system without the 
ability to function as an institution capable of basic 
operations, let alone defending the territorial integrity of the 
country. In short, the RT armed forces contain the form (albeit a 
poor one) of a military without the function necessary to execute 
its duty of defending the country and the nation.  
Foucault unpacked how the mode of discipline implies an 
uninterrupted, constant coercion, supervising the processes 
of the activity rather than its result and it is exercised 
according to a codification that partitions as closely as 
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possible time, space, movement (1995, 137) (the italics are 
mine). 
 
As Foucault’s quote noted, Tajikistan’s military system focuses 
on the processes of discipline rather than its result. The 
cycling of (mostly uneducated and unconnected) young males 
through the armed forces appears to be performed for the sake of 
the process, since investment and training seem largely absent 
from RT military doctrine.  
 From the beginning of the conscription process to the end 
of a soldier’s military service, coercion and discipline are 
prevalent in their lives. Snatched off the street through oblava, 
detained and cycled through the voenkomat as if arrested and 
convicted, and serving in substandard facilities far from home 
with little access to the outside world, the lives of conscripts 
resemble incarceration in many ways.  
 It is virtually impossible to know the Rakhmon’s regime’s 
true intentions regarding its military forces other than the 
maintenance of state power over the territory and the economic 
returns it brings. But there are plausible explanations for the 
country’s contradictory approach to the organization and 
administration of its national armed forces, even if those 
explanations are necessarily speculative in nature. These 
explanations fit some of the actions and realities that the 
regime has already taken, situations in which it has found itself 
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from its inception through the aftermath of the civil war, and 
its desire to maintain the political status quo. 
 By using conscription, the RT government avoids any need to 
provide enlistment incentives such as pay, good quality room and 
board, and serviceable uniforms and kit. Naturally, this saves 
limited ‘public’ funds for projects that distribute rents to 
important regional and local power brokers as outlined by 
Markowitz (2011; 2013), or projects that enrich the president and 
the inner circle of his patronage network. 
 However, the perhaps less obvious but arguably more 
important aspect of this scheme is the political control of 
bodies that ensues, Foucault’s biopower. Unlike more extreme 
autocratic states (such as Turkmenistan), for the most part 
Tajikistan has not attempted to limit the movement of, or create 
or enforce many policies designed to control, its population; the 
exception is the regime’s cooptation of mosques and the limits it 
has placed on religious expression that it considers to be 
extremist (for which there is a very low bar). When considering 
policies and practices regarding military service, the link is 
apparent: limiting internal threats to the state. Military 
service indirectly serves this purpose. 
 By cycling young males through military service – but 
offering very little training – the regime exercises a form of 
control over the section of its population that poses its biggest 
potential threat. This potential threat begins with an idle young 
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male population. An examination of key demographic statistics is 
useful to help unpack the potential threat posed by idle males.  
 The natural rate of growth in Tajikistan is quite high; in 
2013 the country had a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 3.8 and 36% 
of its population below the age of 15 (PRB 2014). It is also 
interesting to note that the conscription policy contributes to 
these statistics; as Chapter V addresses, married men with two 
children are exempt from service, thus creating a strong 
incentive among young couples to marry early and reproduce 
quickly.  
 These statistics must be viewed within the context of 
Tajikistan’s difficult economic circumstances and the lack of job 
opportunities that I discussed in Chapter IV. The migrant economy 
is one side of the solution to the demographic challenge; it 
sends young males to Russia for work, removing them from the 
state’s immediate concern while simultaneously acting as a source 
of income to locals and the state alike. That many villages in 
Tajikistan are missing significant numbers of their male 
population is testament to this condition. 
 Males remaining in Tajikistan represent two other 
categories: those connected to the state directly through 
employment or indirectly through patronage, and those who are 
eligible for service in the military. In both cases, the state 
maintains its hegemony over them. While there are, inevitably, 
some who do not fit either of these categories, the state’s 
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efforts to maintain the status quo is perhaps made simpler 
through these mechanisms and practices of control. The fear of 
idleness among a young male population that has multiple ethno-
regional cleavages in a post-civil war environment is palpable. 
Foucault recognized the state’s approach to biopower through 
military organization in the context of idleness. 
The principle that underlay the time-table in its 
traditional form was essentially negative; it was the 
principle of non-idleness: it was forbidden to waste time, 
which was counted by God and paid for by men; the time-
table was to eliminate the danger of wasting it – a moral 
offence and economic dishonesty (Foucault 1995, 154). 
 
Foucault is referring here to individual idleness within the 
military, but it is useful to equate his view with the 
development of discipline within the polity. Indeed, his 
discussions and conceptualizations of the military and prison 
system are a method of describing the formation of self-
discipline among the population, which serves the purposes of the 
dominant group. 
 In considering the context of the Kulobi Tajik-dominated RT 
government, I must acknowledge that I find it doubtful that the 
government plotted to create an intricate system of biopolitical 
control that encompasses such a broad plan for its population. 
However, I do find it quite plausible that, as the realities of 
the political and economic situation confronted by the Rakhmon 
regime and the policy choices it made during in first decade or 
so after independence became apparent, the resulting social 
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landscape contained much to their liking. That landscape also 
includes a powerful outside actor: Russia, which I discuss in the 
next section. Before doing so, it is useful to speculate further 
on how the Rakhmon regime envisions its military.  
 All signs seem to point toward the connection between an 
underfunded and publically disdained national military and the 
presence of Russian forces in Tajikistan. In order to understand 
why the regime invests so little in its military in light of 
geopolitical challenges, we must first accept Russia as the 
security guarantor of Tajikistan. The limited resources available 
in the country make financial investment in any activity without 
economic return challenging and militaries tend to fall on the 
expensive side of public spending. If Russia is willing to 
provide Tajikistan with national defense services for the cost of 
a semi-permanent base, then there is little incentive to invest 
in their own armed forces.  
 The fear of internal enemies – whether from Islamic 
insurgency, regional-based dissenters, or even political rivals – 
provides incentives to limit the training and capabilities of the 
national military for two reasons. First, a renegade officer may 
foment a rebellion/coup against the regime. Given the size of the 
country and the armed forces, this could be difficult for the 
regime to stop; therefore, emphasis on prevention is prudent. I 
discussed the problem of the civil war commanders/warlords in 
previous chapters, noting that some of the anti-opposition 
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leaders rebelled against the government in the aftermath. These 
events are surely remembered by the regime. 
 Second, the fear of internal enemies can translate into a 
fear of the general population. Indeed, the existence and actions 
of the GNKB is evidence that this fear. In this context, having 
large numbers of the male population cycle through the armed 
forces and receive training in the military arts presents a very 
real threat. Large numbers of small arms and other weapons are 
available across the border in Afghanistan – not to mention 
leftovers of the civil war in Tajikistan – so the fear of a 
popular uprising also fits with the regime’s logic of low 
military investment. These two fears also explain the higher 
levels of investment in the MoI units, particularly the Alphas. 
Their loyalty is imperative to the regime and they are focused on 
internal suppression as opposed to territorial defense. 
 Recently, there have been a few developments regarding the 
RT military that are worthy of note. It is difficult to gauge 
whether or not they will result in any real changes, however. 
First, Rakhmon shifted his cabinet after the last election in 
2013, replacing his Minister of Defense for the first time since 
he gained power (Asia-Plus 2013d). The old minister, Sherali 
Khairulloev, had done little in the way of reform during his 
command and the new one, Sherali Mirzo, formally commanded the 
MoI border guard forces. This change was coupled with Rakhmon 
proclaiming end of oblava in March 2014 (Yuldashev 2014). 
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Unfortunately, stories immediately emerged of oblava taking place 
during the following spring recruitment period (Ozodagon 2014b). 
In the context of the Rakhmon regime’s goals (stay in power) and 
fears (internal more than external), it seems unlikely that the 
government harbors any real notion of reform. If this view is 
incorrect, and reform is on the agenda, progress will be very 
slow; the structures of corruption, limited resources and limited 
experience and competence in the officer corps will present 
substantial challeges. 
 
Russia and the Contradiction of National Military Service 
 As discussed earlier, the guarantor of RT state security 
must be filled from the outside. Russia has largely filled this 
role since independence, through its intervention in the civil 
war on the pro-government side and the long term basing agreement 
for the 201st MRD. As discussed in Chapters IV and VI, the 
relationship between the RT and RF governments is increasingly 
bound through both military cooperation and the migrant economy.  
 The challenges to Tajikistan’s stability are notable. 
Building and maintaining strong ties with Russia are an 
understandable reaction to these challenges, and each state has 
much to gain from cooperation. In the simplest sense, the Rakhmon 
regime gains a low-cost security guarantor and Russia gains a 
foothold in a territory of its former empire that it sees as key 
to its ability to contain threats of Islamic extremism.  
262 
 What is most interesting in this relationship is how the 
long-term presence of a foreign military is seen not only as 
positive, but even preferable to the national military of the 
home country. The recent action to legalize (by both states) the 
enlistment of RT citizens to serve in the Russian military 
anywhere in the world, including in combat situations, is a 
fascinating development. As my interviews show, young males in 
Tajikistan generally see the idea of service in the Russian 
military in positive terms, and others in the population note 
feeling safer with the 201st MRD agreement signed. How the 
population views the RT military contrasts strongly with the 
positive views it has of the Russian military.  
 Some analysts may see these geopolitical moves as part of a 
strategy for Russia to gain lost territory – a so-called 
reformation of the Soviet Union (or at least its border regime). 
Russia has performed similar aggressive (but non-violent) actions 
in the recent past. Artman’s (2013) discussion of Russia’s 
issuance of RF passports to Georgian citizens in South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia as a form of territorial control (if not 
acquisition) offers an example of the ways in which Russia seeks 
to gain hegemony over areas of its former empire. In these cases, 
‘passportisation’ acted to separate the people from the Georgian 
state, thereby denying sovereign control over territory by the 
government in Tbilisi. The difference here is that 
passportisation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia was a hostile act 
aimed at the Georgian state, through which Russia essentially 
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secured territory contiguous to its own. The RT government, by 
contrast, has openly welcomed the enlistment in the Russian 
military of RT citizens, even though that act facilitates the 
acquisition of Russian citizenship.  
 The Rakhmon regime has shown itself to value the 
maintenance of power over the development of a sovereign nation-
state. It may see the development of nationalism as a useful goal 
in the long run, but it seems to prefer policies that guarantee 
its stability in the short run. These choices may appear 
counterintuitive from the outside. However, given the 
geopolitical realities of a small, mountainous, landlocked state 
with numerous ethno-national cleavages, recent domestic political 
violence, very little economic resources, and a rapidly growing 
population, the choices are not ideal. The border regime and 
construction of separate nations in Central Asia was performed by 
the Soviet Union and it seems the project was successful in 
fulfilling at least one of its goals.  
 Conversations with locals during my fieldwork revealed that 
most believed maintaining strong ties to Russia was important for 
Tajikistan’s stability and economy. Clearly, this is unlikely to 
contribute to the development of national sentiments in 
Tajikistan, and may act to hinder them. In this way, the Soviet 
project of citizenship and state building has exhibited a 
stronger legacy than the social construction of the Tajik nation 
initiated by Moscow and continued after independence. 
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Conclusion 
 This dissertation contributes to critical military 
geographies in four ways. First, it unpacks how the formation of 
a national military shapes and reflects the daily lives of a 
small post-Soviet country. Second, it problematizes the 
rhetorical effort to produce national sentiments and integration 
through military service by analyzing the conditions of that 
service. Third, it juxtaposes service in the national military 
against service within a foreign unit based in the country and 
explores how the latter can affect desire to serve in the former—
in the process inhibiting the deepening of national sentiments. 
Lastly, it conceptualizes military service as a form of biopower 
that works to control male idleness rather than produce an 
operational military force.  
 The interconnection of these four aspects of my research in 
Tajikistan also extends into geo-economic considerations. The 
role of the migrant economy in producing and reproducing the 
hegemonic relationship between the Rakhmon regime and the 
population of Tajikistan is remarkable. On another, larger scale, 
the Russia’s hegemony over Tajikistan is exhibited through the 
latter’s reliance on remittances from the migrant economy and the 
former’s willingness to politically exploit this dependence to 
secure military basing rights in Tajikistan. These relationships 
may be profoundly different from the prominence of the military-
industrial complex and neoliberal geopolitics addressed by 
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critical militarism research on Western subjects, but it 
demonstrates that geo-economics is relevant to the study of 
militarism in other geopolitical situations and environments. 
These kinds of connections are important if studies in critical 
military geographies are to expand into different spaces. 
 Through this research, I have sought to open new avenues 
for work in critical military geographies that include autocratic 
states. In more than a few ways, the repressive environment of 
Tajikistan limited my access to statistical data, potential 
interviewees, and ability to perform participant observation. 
Nevertheless, by addressing a little-understood state with a 
different military structure, geopolitical goals, and popular 
conceptions of service, this research diverts from the beaten 
path of previous work in this geographic sub-discipline.  
 Even in such a different environment, this subject matter 
can be linked back to current critical research in militarism. 
The discourse of ‘danger’ so prevalent in the West’s 
characterization of Central Asia contributes to Tajikistan’s 
militarization. Surely influenced by the conflicts in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, these discourses help build legitimacy in military 
aid programs to this autocratic state. I saw the emphasis the 
U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe places on military aid and cooperation; 
the mission has both a Defense Attaché and an Office of Military 
Cooperation (OMC), each headed by a Lt. Colonel. These offices 
have facilitated training operations performed by U.S. troops, 
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including units associated with internal popular suppression 
during the Khorog operation. It is important to continue to 
critique geopolitical hegemonic actions by both Russia and 
Western powers alike. Doing so requires getting into the field 
and seeing the landscape from the ground level. It can be 
challenging, but the perspective is dramatically different and 
that matters. 
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APPENDIX 
SURVEY FORMS IN RUSSIAN AND TAJIKI 
 
Опросный лист 
 
Военное положение в Таджикистане и реалии строения нации в постсоветское 
время 
 
Докторский исследовательский проект на 2013-2014 годы - Г-н. Даг Фостер, 
факультет географии, Университет Орегона. 
dfoster@uoregon.edu Тел: 987217068 
 
Эти вопросы составлены таким образом, чтобы развить понятие, о влиянии иностранных 
военных баз на повседневную жизнь между соседями вокруг.Просим Вас ответить на 
вопросы как можно честней.  
Эти вопросы составлены способствованию понятии повседневной жизни армии 
Таджикистана. Просим Вас ответить на вопросы как можно честней.  
 
Закруглите ответы, которые наилучшим образом описывают Ваш опыт и чувства. 
1. В каких военных силах Вы служили? 
 
Пехота    Воздушные силы  Пограничные войска  
 
Президентская гвардия  Десантные войска  Спецназ 
 
2.  какая самая высокое звание, которое Вы получили? 
 
___________________________ 
 
3. Какие из нижеуказанных групп наилучшим образом указывает на  вашу этническую 
принадлежность? 
 
Таджикистанец  Северный Таджик  Самаркандский Таджик 
 
Кулябский Таджик  Гармский Таджик  Бухарский Таджик 
 
Ванджский Таджик  Дарвазский Таджик  Памирец Русский 
 
Киргиз    Ягнобский   Узбек  Туркмен 
 
Другое (запишите) ________________________ 
 
4. Сколько вам лет? ______________  5.  Мужчина  Женщина 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
Поле для исследователя 
 
Собеседник № _____ 
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Варақаи пурсиш 
 
Милитаризм дар Тоҷикистон ва воқеиятҳои миллатсози дар замони 
Мустақилият 
Рисолаи Докторӣ дар солҳои 2013-2014 – Ч-б. Даг Фостр, факултаи география, Донишгоҳи Орегон. 
dfoster@uoregon.edu Тел: 987217068 
 
Саволгузорӣ чунон ба роҳ монда шудааст, ки фаҳмиши таъсири пойгоҳҳои хориҷиро ба 
ҳаёти рӯзмарраи наздащонро равнақ дихад. Хоҳиш, ба саволҳо то имкон рост чавоб гӯед. 
 
Чавобҳое ки ба беҳтарин шакл ҳиссиёту таҷрибаи Шуморо инъикос мекунанд, ба давра 
гиред. 
 
1. Дар кадом намуди қушунҳои ҳарбӣ хизмат кардаед? 
 
Қушунҳои пиёда  Қувваҳои ҳавойи   Қушунҳои сарҳадӣ  
 
Гвардияи президентӣ  Қушунҳои десантӣ  Таъиноти махсус 
 
2.  Рутбаи баландтарине ки соҳибаш шудед? 
 
___________________________ 
 
3. Кадоме аз гурӯҳҳои этникии зерин, Шуморо хубтар муаррифӣ мекунад? 
 
Тоҷикистонӣ               Шимолӣ    Самаркандӣ 
 
Кӯлобӣ                            Ғармӣ               Бухоройи 
 
Ванҷӣ          Дарвозӣ              Помирӣ            Рус 
 
Қиргиз         Яғнобӣ  Ӯзбек   Туркман 
 
Дигар (варианти Шумо) ________________________ 
 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
Ҷой барои тадқиқотчӣ 
 
Ҳамсӯҳбат № _____ 
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